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Abstract 
During the near decade of Conservative rule in Canada, from 2006 – 2015, 
rancorous anti-refugee and anti-migrant discourse and policy were circulated, which 
manifested in a large-scale overhaul of the immigration system. Social, economic, and 
physical exclusions increased as a reassertion of state sovereignty through the 
reconstitution and solidification of borders, as well as the increased precariousness of 
migrant bodies. The primary goals of my dissertation research have been to learn why 
some migrants chose to leave Canada ‘voluntarily’ and to understand the factors that 
have forced them to do so. Among the key questions this dissertation attempts to answer 
are the following: 1) What factors push migrants to make decisions on the spectrum of 
forced voluntary return? 2) How does gender, as it intersects with other identities and 
social relations, influence migrants’ experiences of forced voluntary return?  3) What 
does the addition of forced voluntary return, a non-binary concept, offer to current 
research on voluntary and involuntary migration? This research proposes that particular 
spaces and relationships became laden with feelings of exclusion and criminalization, 
which for the migrants centred in this dissertation, resulted in a loss of hope for a future 
in Canada. Participants identified loss of hope as one of the primary factors that pushed 
them to leave ‘voluntarily’, so as to relieve the pain associated with staying. The 
exclusions were importantly impacted by gender, class, racialization, age and ability, 
which came together in ways that pushed some into a forced ‘voluntary’ return. I offer 
the spectrum of forced voluntary return to capture some of the tensions and messiness 
within migrant experiences of return that are neither completely voluntary nor forced.  
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Introduction  
The primary goals of my dissertation research have been to learn why some migrants 
chose to leave Canada ‘voluntarily’ and to understand the factors that have forced them to 
do so. I offer the concept of forced voluntary return to capture some of the tensions 
within migrant experiences of return that are neither completely voluntary nor forced. 
Among the key questions this dissertation attempts to answer are the following: 1) What 
factors push migrants to make decisions on the spectrum of forced voluntary return? 2) 
How does gender, as it intersects with other identities and social relations, influence 
migrants’ experiences of forced voluntary return? 3) What does the addition of forced 
voluntary return, a non-binary concept, offer to current research on voluntary and 
involuntary migration? These questions were initially posed during the near-decade of 
Conservative rule in Canada, from 2006 – 2015, when rancorous anti-refugee and anti-
migrant policy and discourse were being circulated, presenting an opportune historical 
moment to deeply examine the issues inherent in these questions. I answer the questions 
by centering the lived experiences of migrants and frontline service providers who work 
in the migrant-serving sector in this dissertation, so as to prioritize the perspectives of 
participants directly affected.     
 Between 2008 and 2015 the Canadian immigration system underwent a drastic 
overhaul of policies and procedures, which disrupted humanitarian and welcoming 
narratives long-rooted in the construct of a multicultural Canada. The changes pursued by 
the Conservative government imposed restrictions and limitations on migrants, and 
increasingly divided newcomers into hierarchical categories, defining which migrants 
were permitted, and which would be constituted as a threat to the nation; these 
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hierarchies were necessarily multidimensional and shifting. As the constructed 
dichotomies of ‘deserving/undeserving’ migrant and ‘genuine/bogus’ refugee were 
increasingly ontologized and included in public discourse, measures were taken to 
repressively manage these theoretical distinctions and the associated categorization of 
bodies in gendered, racialized and class-based ways. Social and economic rights, ranging 
from health care to education, to work and social assistance, were restricted along 
gendered parameters for those marked as ‘undesirable’, while patriarchal and neoliberal 
power relations impacted both policy development and the allocation of funds. 
Moreover, the social, economic, and physical exclusions imposed through policy 
and practice were strategically developed by conservative political actors. These 
exclusions served as a reassertion of state sovereignty through the reconstitution and 
solidification of borders, as well as the increased precariousness of migrant bodies. 
Bureaucrats, civil servants and other gatekeepers were relied upon to oversee these 
exclusions, becoming the “civilian soldiers” (Orr, 2004) whose actions had far-reaching 
impacts. The concept of civilian soldiers was outlined by Jackie Orr to explain 
phenomena she was observing in response to the September 11th 2001 attacks in the 
United States. She described citizens being psychologically militarized to combat 
potential future terrorist threats, however, without tools, training, or any real sense of 
what they are preparing to fight. I use this concept in the Canadian context to refer to 
people who are recruited through state discourse, policy directives and funding 
restrictions. These civilian soldiers can then use their discretion to reinforce, by whatever 
means are at their disposal, ideologies of migrants as either deserving of inclusion or 
potential criminal threats (Bhuyan, 2012; Park & Bhuyan, 2012; Villegas, 2013b). These 
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civilian soldiers are recruited because they hold control over access to services, supports 
or community integration. For the migrants who are the focus of this dissertation, 
particular spaces and relationships become laden with feelings of exclusion and 
criminalization, which have resulted in a loss of hope for a future in Canada.      
The Language of Labels 
 The language used to describe people’s lived experiences is decisively important 
in the deconstruction or reification of categories. Labels prompt socially-produced 
expectations related to different identities, including gender, racialization, class and 
migration trajectory. As well as the associated expectations, labels have material impacts 
on people, as oppressions and privileges are tied to particular identities in varying ways. 
Deconstructing understandings of gender, racialization, class, refugee, as well as migrant 
identities requires an understanding of their construction, dissemination and reification, 
which then allows for broader theoretical and analytical understandings of how 
interactions and oppressions contribute to the production and reproduction of these 
categories. Within this dissertation, I use specific identity terms cautiously, particularly as 
they relate to gender and immigration status, in order to reveal the oppressions directed at 
these identities, as well as the material impacts on individuals.  
Gender 
Though feminists’ conceptualizations of gender differ, in this dissertation I 
employ understandings of genders as non-binary, relational social constructs, which are 
not biological, but rather elaborated and imposed in particular ways in specific moments 
(Alexander & Mohanty, 2013). These constructs, which frame and create boundaries 
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concerning ‘appropriate’ practices of femininity and masculinity, and the roles assigned 
to each, operate differently in different locations (Riley, Mohanty, & Pratt, 2013). In 
other words, gender is a variable, but also a learned categorization that is pervasively 
used to artificially and forcefully divide people into two distinct groupings. These two 
groupings are constituted and regulated through specific regimes of power that privilege 
certain identities and experiences, while oppressing and negating others. As Mohanty 
(2003) argues, “sexism, racism, misogyny, and heterosexism underlie and fuel social and 
political institutions of rule and thus often lead to hatred of women” (p. 3). Therefore, 
when gender is used to assign value to identities, and these are upheld by people in 
positions of power to privilege certain expressions of male identity, there are important 
material implications impacting women, trans and non-binary individuals, as well as 
some men. Societal roles that are feminized are often devalued both economically and 
socially in order to maintain dominant power relations. These roles are nuanced by other 
intersecting identity constructs, which further disadvantage poor and racialized women, 
trans, non-binary and non-conforming people.     
Feminist theorists have complicated and challenged essentialized understandings 
of gender identity and roles, articulating gender as a fluid and evolving “performance” 
(Butler, 1999a, 1999b; De Beauvoir, 1974). These performances are also necessarily 
intersectional, as racialization, class, age, sexuality and ability impact the way people 
understand and express their gender. Analyzing and deconstructing hierarchical gender 
constructs and their impacts allow for conceptualizations of, and contestations against, 
inequalities and oppressions. In this dissertation, I focus on gender relations within, 
throughout, and as a result of migration, highlighting participants’ gendered experiences; 
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I also underscore the work of scholars who critically explore and theorize forced 
migration, transnationalism, borders, security and state sovereignty. The literature review 
in Chapter 2 explores and prioritizes feminist analyses, valuing transnational and anti-
racist perspectives that challenge normalized patriarchal power relations on micro, meso 
and macro levels. This chapter establishes the basis for the analysis that is drawn through 
the other chapters.       
The research participants in this dissertation primarily identified experiences 
along binary gender lines, as the majority identified as women and/or spoke specifically 
of women’s experiences. Thus the dissertation research offers an important opportunity to 
present an analysis of female migrants’ oppression as it compares to males, but the 
experiences of trans and non-binary migrants are absent from this research; further 
research is needed into their experiences.      
Migration 
I understand international migration as a historicized phenomenon linked to 
intersecting oppressions and privileges centered on social, economic and political forces. 
Based on intersecting gender, racialization, class, ability, sexuality and citizenship 
constructs, there are shifting articulations of who experiences ease of travel and 
relocation, and who is framed as the ‘other’, the non-citizen, ‘illegal’ immigrant or 
‘bogus’ refugee, who is disciplined and excluded both socially and legally. I use the term 
migrant to refer to immigrants, refugees and other displaced people, recognizing that the 
distinctions between these groups are often shifting and fluid, unable to capture people’s 
“complex and messy social realities” (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018, p. 50). As Mountz 
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(2010) explains, “[p]eople tend to envision their own identities not in the terms set by 
states, but rather as occupying and migrating through the grey areas between categories, 
policies and states” (p. 26), in other words the narrow categories used by state actors to 
describe migrants’ experiences and identities are unable to capture people’s nuanced and 
shifting realities. While migrants may be obliged to try to fit their experiences into 
refugee/humanitarian, family class or economic categories, these limited understandings 
of people’s experiences may increase migrants’ vulnerability when their realities do not 
fit neatly within the categories outlined (Boehm, 2011). As Carling (2015) argues, “[w]e 
need to embrace the inclusive meaning of ‘migrants’ as persons who migrate but may 
have little else in common. In that way, we respect both the uniqueness of each individual 
and the human worth of all” (para. 20).  
 Furthermore, I utilize the term forced voluntary return (FVR) in a broad way, 
recognizing different forms of agency, as it can mean more than simply leaving. For 
example, FVR may include people who choose silence by not taking up opportunities to 
fight deportation orders or find other immigration applications available to them; 
alternatively, migrants not known to immigration authorities may present themselves 
through various applications though they know they have very little opportunity of being 
accepted; others may be willing to leave Canada for a very short period, so long as there 
is a plan to return. I draw a distinction between FVR and self-deportation because of 
context specific factors that may not always be present, though I include self-deportation 
within the spectrum of FVR. Self-deportation is used in the United States to describe 
particular policies and environments (Filindra, 2012; Fragoso, 2013; Kobach, 2007). 
While similarities may be found in other contexts, this does not account for all instances 
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of FVR. Therefore, I use FVR because it offers a broad spectrum of return possibilities 
from voluntary to involuntary return.    
Criminalization Through Exclusion 
In this dissertation, I understand migrant criminalization as having both legal and 
ideological components. As Menjívar and Kanstroom (2014) argue, migrants are 
frequently criminalized for simply existing in specific spaces where their presence is 
illegalized. This illegalization of migrants, through the denial of immigration status, 
leaves them susceptible to arrest, incarceration and banishment through deportation. Even 
where migrants are not officially criminalized through legal systems, they may feel 
criminalized through exclusion or repeated challenges to their presence in certain spaces 
and relationships.  
In Canada, the legal criminalization of migrants is applied very inconsistently, 
despite the many provisions in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that can 
facilitate punishment (Bhuyan & Smith-Carrier, 2012; Crépeau, Nakache, & Atak, 2007; 
Villegas, 2013a). While police officers and Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA) 
officers have the power to arrest and detain unauthorized migrants, the fact of simply 
being present on Canadian territory without immigration authorization is not necessarily 
a reason for legal action or enforcement. In particular, police do not have a responsibility 
to criminalize migrants by imposing legal controls on people who simply do not have 
immigration status (Mattoo, 2017), yet they frequently give themselves the power to do 
so (Cole, 2015). Through my work as a service provider, I have witnessed that even 
CBSA officials have at times overlooked and permitted undocumented residence 
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inconsistently, ignoring certain people without immigration status rather than taking 
enforcement action.  
However, when a migrant is issued a deportation order, they are legally expected 
to leave the state’s territory within a timeframe determined by the CBSA. If they do not 
comply with the deportation order and remain in Canada clandestinely, a nation-wide 
arrest warrant is issued, which invokes criminal processes and punishments. In these 
instances, immigration and legal enforcement is more likely by both law enforcement and 
CBSA.  
The inconsistent and ambiguous criminalization of migrants in Canada generates 
confusion from service providers, gatekeepers and among migrants themselves. Migrants 
are thereby unevenly marked as undeserving, and are frequently viewed as trying to cheat 
or lie in order to gain access to services and spaces reserved by the Canadian state for 
citizens. The suspicion generated by the limiting of access to these services and spaces 
causes migrants to feel criminalized through social and physical exclusion. Therefore, 
while some people are deliberately targeted, as outlined above, others may experience the 
ripple effects as they too may be excluded even though they should not be. These feelings 
of criminalization often function according to a hierarchy of status, with migrants who 
hold more secure statuses often less at risk. However, the dispersed ways that exclusion 
materializes overlaps across immigration status. Therefore, even so-called ‘deserving’ 
migrants, who are supposed to be separated from these experiences, may feel 
criminalized in different ways as they are questioned or denied access. The only concrete 
antidote to the broadly felt criminalization that was identified by participants interviewed 
for this research was acquiring of citizenship.   
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Theoretical Framework 
 In order to reach the goals established above, I will draw on two key theoretical 
frameworks, feminist transnationalism and intersectionality throughout the dissertation. 
These frameworks are appropriate for this work because they provide theoretical 
groundings to analyze the structural and societal relations that intersect to produce ruling 
relations and oppressions on multiple scales, from the macro (international) to the micro 
(individual), which allows for a deeper understanding of state sovereignty and bordering 
policies and practices. My understanding and use of these approaches is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 1, and is described in an introductory way, as follows: Work on feminist 
transnationalism stems from a call for a broad understanding of global power (Ahmed, 
2000; Glick Schiller, 2010; Grewal, 2005; Mohanty, 1988), critiques of “gender neutral” 
theorizations (Mahler & Pessar, 2001; Nolin, 2006), and of Western perspectives that 
leave East/West binaries unproblematized (Ahmed, 2000; Grewal, 2005; Mohanty, 1988). 
Utilizing transnational approaches to theorize and conceptualize power also provides 
theoretical authority to challenge the reified constructions of the nation-state and borders, 
allowing me to also base my work within critical border studies. Migration scholars have 
also approached theorizations of transnationalism in their investigations of the movement 
of people, critiquing past approaches to the study of im/migration and im/migrant agency 
(Glick Schiller, 2010; Glick Schiller, Basch, & Szanton Blanc, 1995; Grewal, 2005).  
This theorization offers diverse conceptualizations of people’s lived experiences, which 
often involve multi-sited relationships and power relations (Ahmed, 2000; Glick Schiller, 
2010; Glick Schiller et al., 1995; Nolin, 2006).  
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Intersectionality is a useful complement to transnationalism for conceptualizing 
the ways inequalities, discrimination and oppressions intersect and overlap. 
Intersectionality, which was coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), is an approach that is 
inherently valuable for disrupting dominant power relations and constructed inequalities 
based on difference. A nuanced intersectional understanding allows for the 
problematization of dichotomies, divisions and compartmentalizations. Identity markers 
such as gender, race or class are inherently intertwined, and gender is racialized and 
classed, with each variable producing a “modality” through which the others are lived, 
coming into existence through their relation to each other (Gilroy, 1993; McClintock, 
1995). These frameworks allow me to investigate the intersecting identities that push 
people into forced voluntary return; and they take into account dominant societal power 
relations, as well as government policies and their implementation. These frameworks 
have therefore enabled me to conceptualize Forced Voluntary Return in broad and 
nuanced ways that may further contribute to discussions within the fields of critical 
border studies and deportation studies.   
Methodology 
 As Kirby and McKenna (1989) explain, since “research is done by particular 
people in specific social and historical contexts, these have implications that need to be 
acknowledged” (p. 23). It is not just the social location of the researcher that must be 
recognized, but also the power relations and politics in which the ideas, cultures and 
histories being studied are embedded (Said, 1979, p. 5). As such, my positionality is an 
important consideration, not only with regards to my relationality with research 
participants, but also with regards to a recognition of my own epistemological 
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understandings. My involvement as both volunteer and staff with the FCJ Refugee Centre 
in Toronto provided the basis for my fieldwork and the connections to other service 
providers. It was through my work with this organization, and ongoing discussions with 
colleagues, that the issue of forced voluntary return was identified. 
 I used mixed methods to explore the three key questions outlined earlier, 
including interviews conducted with migrants, as well as frontline settlement workers 
who have had experiences of forced voluntary return. I undertook a textual analysis of 
policy, which showed how anti-migrant discourse circulated in recent NGO documents, 
media reports and a program evaluation of the Assisted Voluntary Return and 
Reintegration program in Canada. I also analyzed selected statements and speeches made 
by federal government officials to elicit how gender, racialization, class, age, and ability 
intersected in exclusionary discourses about refugee claimants and migrants, and how 
forced voluntary return is encouraged and integrated into policy decisions.  
The Location: the Sanctuary City of Toronto 
The fact that Toronto was declared the first Sanctuary City in Canada in 2013 
meant that residents should have access to all city services regardless of their 
immigration status (Keung, 2013a). Exploring forced voluntary return within a city that 
defined itself as inclusive offered an interesting backdrop for this research. In fact, the 
majority of the migrants I spoke to were not aware of the policy, nor had they benefitted 
from the city services to which they could have access. The frontline workers I spoke to 
were generally skeptical of the policy and its benefits, acknowledging that it was a good 
policy in theory rather than in practice. As Sathya, an immigration lawyer, shared, “I 
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mean, obviously it’s wonderful.  I just don’t know that it’s been really that implemented, 
or that it’s that widely understood or known...” Sathya was critiquing city service 
providers for their lack of knowledge of the policy or the ways it should be implemented 
to better serve migrants. Asha, a community clinic lawyer was even more doubtful: 
     It sounds really sexy, [...] Toronto is a Sanctuary City, but what does  
     that really mean if you deconstruct it and see, how many people can  
     really benefit from those services? [...] it looks really good on paper,  
     but the practical impact has not been as great.  
Kate, a settlement service provider critiqued the policy along a similar vein, explaining  
 
that 
  
     my idea of what it would mean to be a Sanctuary City is not my experience  
     in terms of—or the people who I work with, their experience of living in  
     Toronto. So, I think it’s like a great myth, if that makes sense. 
In addition to the limited reach of the Sanctuary City policy itself, as it only included 
services entirely funded by the City, it was limited in terms of its implementation, as City 
workers were often unaware of the policy or how to apply it (Hudson, Atak, Manocchi, & 
Hannan, 2017).  
Maria, one of the migrants I spoke to who had knowledge of the Sanctuary City 
policy, still described Toronto as  
     a very hard place, you have to be ready to fight otherwise you are dead. Or  
     better to pack your stuff and go home. This is not for everyone. I don't feel  
     special, I just feel like I've been paying a very high price for being here, and  
     I feel that I'm still paying some of the price. I'm still paying. 
Therefore, despite City Council’s declaration of inclusiveness, Toronto remained a 
difficult and exclusionary space for many migrants, forcing some to leave.   
Chapter Outline 
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 The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 1- Methods: 
Opportunities, Limitations and Personal Experiences provides a detailed explanation 
regarding the methodological framework and individual methods utilized. The rationale 
for these decisions is elaborated, as is the location and period of research. Finally, the 
methodological approach for the writing of the dissertation is considered. Chapter 2-
Literature Review: State Sovereignty, Illegalization and the Canadian Context presents 
topics that are investigated through frameworks of “illegalization” and deportability to 
highlight the increased precarity inherent in the policy changes and the impacts that is 
having on precarious migrant populations. In Chapter 3- Canadian Immigration Policy: 
Boxes and Boundaries, Spaces and Relationships, I outline some of the changes to 
Canadian immigration and refugee policy from 2008-2015, analyzing the shift in 
atmosphere and approach that led to an increase in the criminalization of migrants. These 
shifts are contextualized with specific theoretical frameworks. I will also draw on 
participants’ interaction with the Canadian immigration system to learn from frontline 
service providers’ expertise and lived experiences. In Chapter 4- The Wide Reach of 
Migrant Criminalization and Loss of Hope, I draw on the experiences shared during 
interviews to analyze and unpack the multilayered criminalization of migrants. This 
criminalization, often felt through exclusion, is produced and experienced differently 
based on intersecting identities and oppressions, and the results are linked to a loss of 
hope, which, for some, propels forced voluntary return.  Chapter 5- Forced Voluntary 
Return: Nuancing the Tension Between Voluntary and Involuntary, Individual Agency 
and Loss of Hope considers participants’ conceptualizations of forced voluntary return. It 
builds on the discussions in the previous chapters to highlight the intersecting motivations 
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that push people to self-deport, and highlight people’s own experiences as they relate to 
these discussions. It also offers an analysis of the now-terminated International 
Organization for Migration’s Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) 
program, a pilot project implemented in the Toronto Region from June 29, 2012, until 
March 31, 2015. This particular implementation of the project is briefly contextualized 
among the AVRR programs run internationally. Finally, my conclusion outlines the 
central findings of the dissertation, and provides a nuanced understanding of 
voluntary/involuntary return binaries based on intersectional understandings of who has 
self-deported and the policies and exclusions involved in these decisions. 
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Chapter 1- Methods: Opportunities, Limitations and Personal Experiences 
 
This project is rooted in qualitative methods, which provide feminist tools to consider 
migrants’ and frontline workers’ experiences of forced voluntary return. In this chapter, I 
outline the specific methods used, the ways the questions were approached, and the 
limitations encountered. I also explore the methodologies used for this dissertation, as my 
choices, based on particular political intentions, changed throughout the research. My 
social location as a frontline worker/advocate within the migrant-serving sector proved to 
have an important impact on the access I was granted to participants, including both 
migrants and service providers, and thus I outline how my positionality impacted the data 
I collected. I also discuss the ethical considerations that shaped my interactions within the 
changing immigration and governmental landscape. Finally, I address my approach to 
coding and data analysis to analyze 1) What factors push migrants to make decisions on 
the spectrum of forced voluntary return? 2) How does gender, as it intersects with other 
identities and social relations, influence migrants’ experiences of forced voluntary 
return?  3) What does the addition of forced voluntary return, a non-binary concept, offer 
to current research on voluntary and involuntary migration? Questions are raised about 
the multilayered criminalization of migrants’ experiences and the connected, often-
overpowering, loss of hope.  
 This chapter first addresses my positionality, as this impacted the way my 
dissertation topic was conceived, as well as my approach to it. It subsequently explains 
the methodologies I employed within this qualitative research. My case study, based in 
the Greater Toronto Area, is then contextualized, followed by an explanation of the 
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sampling I undertook, as well as a section on data collection which offers a description of 
the participants. Research with this vulnerable population necessarily raises ethical 
questions which are addressed in the protection and ethics section of this chapter to 
highlight considerations and debates undertaken. This is then followed by sections 
explaining my coding process as well as my analysis. While interviews make up the 
majority of my data, I undertook some complementary data collection to offer a more 
robust understanding of the issues being raised; this data is outlined in the 
complementary data collection section. Finally, I consider the methodological approach I 
use to write these chapters, and my reflections on the changes I made to my initial 
approach, so as to meet the requirements of a York University dissertation.   
My Positionality 
I came to this PhD dissertation as an advocate, activist and frontline community 
worker. While the research was undertaken to complete the requirements for my PhD, its 
conceptualization and implementation were inherently intertwined with my role at the 
FCJ Refugee Centre and my ongoing involvement in the migrant-serving sector. This role 
has evolved to be more than employment for me, as co-workers, clients and other allies 
have become my community: the people I spend time with, support, confide in, and 
depend on, both within professional, as well as social settings. However, I do not claim to 
be an insider with respect to the particular migrant experiences studied here, a discussion 
I will return to below.     
I initially became involved with this Centre due primarily to a need for 
employment after I faced my own immigration-related challenges and subsequent self-
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deportation from the UK. This experience, while difficult, was based in particular 
experiences of privilege both in the UK and in Canada. Having studied in the UK, I 
decided that I wanted to establish myself there; however, after three years of residence, I 
was denied a visa extension. I contested that decision, but was left with limited resources, 
my own hypervigilance based on the fear of doing something ‘wrong’, and an ongoing 
feeling of wasting time (a feeling that was frequently described in the interviews I 
conducted in Toronto). I ultimately decided to give up on my hope of establishment in the 
U.K., withdrew my application and returned to Canada. My research and theorization 
have helped me to better contextualize my own experience after the fact, but I absolutely 
do not purport to speak for any of my participants, or their experiences.    
Upon my return to Canada, I obtained employment in a shelter for refugee women, 
where I not only learned about Canadian immigration processes and procedures, but more 
importantly, women taught me about the diverse daily challenges they were facing. The 
women I worked with inspired and encouraged me to pursue an opportunity to study 
these issues further. While engaged in a PhD program, it became increasingly important 
to me to maintain frontline work, to remain connected with the refugee community and to 
offer the support that I could.  
 I became involved with the FCJ Refugee Centre in Toronto in 2011, first as a 
volunteer, and then as a staff member in a variety of different roles. Through this work, I 
have gained knowledge about the immigration system, as well as its overarching 
limitations (especially under the Harper government) as I supported people through their 
processes. This client-centered work has taken many forms and has come with many ups 
and downs, challenges and opportunities. I have both celebrated with and cried with 
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coworkers and clients, received middle of the night panicked phone calls, and shared in 
jokes, adventurous activities and victories small and large. This work, above all else, has 
helped me to understand that the categorizations we impose on migrants do not represent 
their identities or experiences. Instead, people decide on the boxes they try to fit into 
based on what can be argued and proven; the criteria for each category push people to 
pursue the pathways and labels available to them, through which they believe they have 
the best chances of being accepted. As the people I have supported moved between 
statuses and the associated identities, the definitions became less pertinent. This was also 
highlighted in the interviews I conducted with frontline workers. Goldring and Landolt 
(2013b) use the idea of “chutes and ladders” to conceptualize the negotiations involved in 
immigration processes and the trajectories that move migrants closer to, or further from 
secure status, or horizontally from one precarious status to another. Their elaboration 
enables visual imagery of the often-fluid dynamics involved in the production of 
precarious status.1     
It is also through this frontline work that my PhD research project was initially 
conceptualized and then proposed. The co-director of the Centre where I work, Francisco 
Rico-Martinez, first suggested the topic of self-deportation to me, as he had been noticing 
the important impact of this issue among our clients. He has since offered practical 
support and ideas, as well as theoretical and analytical advice. I have also had the 
opportunity to discuss the topic in depth with colleagues, as well as with members of the 
FCJ Youth Group, who provided invaluable feedback by identifying with the topics 																																																								1 Precarious immigration status refers to the legal status of all non-permanent residents, which include 
those who are dependent on a person or institution for their status (sponsored spouses, temporary workers), 
as well as refugee claimants and denied claimants, temporary resident visa holders, visa overstayers, and 
people without authorized status. (Goldring, Berinstein, & Bernhard, 2009; Goldring & Landolt, 2013b).	
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raised and offering tremendous insights. The Centre also provided me with spaces to 
conduct interviews, in addition to connecting me with participants. As I explain in detail 
below, the research would not have been possible without access to this particular 
centre’s clients.  As a worker at FCJ, I was well aware of the potential of a conflict of 
interest in my relationship with those I interviewed.  As such, I have ensured that my 
exposure to the issues addressed in this dissertation has come from a number of sources, 
including from legal and settlement and other frontline workers.  
As I describe in more detail below, Tuhiwai Smith (1999) advocates community 
research which she suggests relies upon and involves the community itself. Das Gupta 
(2003) argues that anti-racist research requires collaboration with the “community”, 
though she complicates both what collaboration and community can mean. In her 
analysis (and that of other scholars, as elaborated below in the section on qualitative 
research), collaboration offers a clear critique of “traditional research” in which the 
researcher holds the knowledge and the researched are the subjects, “placed in a position 
of subordination”; instead she draws on Kirby and McKenna (1989) to argue that 
collaboration can position the participant as an expert who may assist the researcher (Das 
Gupta, 2003, p. 458). Das Gupta also problematizes simplistic assumptions about whom 
to collaborate with, recognizing that the very concept of community can be understood 
differently by different people, and people may be part of many communities at once, 
based on intersecting identities and oppressions they experience. Thus it is not every 
person or organization within a community that necessarily has insider or outsider status 
based on multiple power relations, and not all can be experts on the community. She 
advances a “detailed and nuanced analysis of social settings rather than characterizing 
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them in stereotypical terms” (p. 460). Fassin (2010) further problematizes the role of non-
governmental organizations as an outsider (scholar) – insider (NGO worker), questioning 
the ‘humanitarianism’ they may or may not promote. His critiques of the organizations 
themselves challenge researchers, as well as frontline workers, concerning the necessarily 
benevolent or progressive roles of community organizations.    
In order to further respond to these concerns regarding community research and 
collaboration, it is important to explain the position of the FCJ Refugee Centre within the 
settlement sector. This Centre was established in 1991 by the current co-directors with 
the financial and logistical support of the Sisters of the Faithful Companions of Jesus 
(FCJ), who remain active members of the Board of Directors and for whom the name FCJ 
has been maintained. While the Centre has implemented secular practices and serves 
clients regardless of their religious beliefs, the religious affiliation is still felt. The Sisters 
FCJ are still financial supporters of the Centre, as they provide a significant portion of the 
core funding, as well as use of their properties for transitional housing, which enables 
work that is not tied to project or political restrictions. The congregation has placed 
immense trust in the co-directors of the Centre, who came to Canada as refugees 
themselves, and who have led the Centre’s work with progressive, social justice goals.   
The Centre receives no federal funding, but does receive provincial and municipal 
funding, and as such, it maintains the freedom to publicly contest federal policy and 
government rhetoric when other organizations cannot (most settlement organizations 
receive funding from IRCC), all the while working for systemic change. The Centre has 
also prioritized working with people that other organizations could not, or would not, due 
to capacity and funding limitations (IRCC funding prohibits service-provision to migrants 
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who are not convention refugees or permanent residents). As such, FCJ often becomes 
the last resort for migrants who have exhausted their other options, or whose situations 
are deemed to be too complex, particularly those with precarious immigration status. This 
puts the Centre in a unique position with regard to forced voluntary return, which was 
reaffirmed during several interviews. This organizational position also partially explains 
the limitations in recruiting participants who have lived experience of forced voluntary 
return from other agencies, since others are reluctant to serve migrants who face ongoing 
and multilayered criminalization.  
Feminist epistemologies reject ‘objective’ truths and ‘neutral research’, actively 
contradicting the notion that observers can be completely separate from their research. As 
Kirby and McKenna (1989) explain, since “research is done by particular people in 
specific social and historical contexts, these have implications that need to be 
acknowledged” (p. 23). It is not just the social location of the researcher that must be 
recognized, but also the power relations and politics in which the ideas, cultures and 
histories being studied are embedded (Said, 1979). Being located as a staff member at 
FCJ Refugee Centre, I am neither an insider to the migrant experience highlighted in this 
study, nor am I a ‘neutral’ distanced outsider; rather, I am co-constituted by and through 
my relationships. Torre and Ayala (2009) draw on Gloria Anzaldua’s work and 
conceptualization of Mestizaje consciousness, which permits “complexity, situatedness, 
and connection even/amidst conflict” (p. 388) in order to encourage researchers to 
understand their own often-contradicting identities. This approach understands that the 
“varying identities, communities, relationships to power and privilege, experiences, 
desires and vulnerabilities” that people hold are not simple, linear or even compatible (p. 
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390). Further, Torre and Ayala argue that we are influenced by our relationships and 
interactions, in such a way that there are no pure insiders or outsiders, and because of this, 
they argue that divides can be narrowed.  Das Gupta (2003) similarly argues that this 
distinction between insiders and outsiders is necessarily complicated as “multiple [and 
contradicting] power relations exist simultaneously” based on researchers’ race, gender, 
class, as well as other identities (p. 462). Tuhiwai Smith (1999) also advances that the 
division between insider and outsider can be problematized in certain contexts, and that 
one of the main differences is that “insiders have to live with the consequences of their 
processes on a day-to-day basis,” as does their community (p. 137). Therefore, the 
processes of building relationships with research participants, data collection, analysis 
and distribution need to be considered carefully and critically. Moreover, she claims that 
an insider voice carries significant risks around highlighting views, values and beliefs 
that do not always represent the community (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999). Therefore, 
insider/collaborative research requires constant reflexivity, a critical understanding and 
transparency of the researcher’s choices, power relations and potential biases in order to 
avoid speaking for and over the people who are experts in their own experiences (Das 
Gupta, 2003; Fonow & Cook, 2005; Kirby, Greaves, & Reid, 2006; Tuhiwai Smith, 
1999). As Gatenby & Humphries (2000) argue, this reflexivity is necessary for 
researchers to be explicit about their subjectivities, because these subjectivities 
necessarily have a role in the knowledge produced (p. 103). While I am choosing not to 
go into detail or devoting much time and space here to my own critical reflexive 
processes, I have given a lot of thought to questions of power, privilege and my ability to 
do this kind of research throughout the PhD process. For me, an anti-oppression approach 
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underlying my connection and contribution to the migrant-serving community became 
essential to even begin to conceptualize a dissertation project. The scholarship defined 
above supports that methodology.      
Qualitative Research 
 In pursuing this project from a critical intersectional and transnational feminist 
perspective, I have sought out qualitative methodological approaches that value 
embodied knowledge, where each person sharing their experience is an expert (Enloe, 
2004; Hill Collins, 1999; Smith, 2005). Kirby and McKenna (1989) propose a critical 
methodology when working with marginalized communities that understands knowledge 
to be socially constructed, with different people experiencing the world differently and 
thus holding different knowledge. Their approach posits that knowledge changes over 
time and that power commodifies knowledge and influences its production. Qualitative 
approaches are thus well suited to begin exploration of the experiences of the migrants 
and frontline workers involved in this project, experiences which are necessarily 
influenced by intersecting identities and oppressions and that may be felt differently at 
different moments. This dissertation thus explores the meanings of these experiences and 
how they influence people’s decisions within forced voluntary return.  
My approach to this dissertation has also been influenced by Grounded Theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which asks researchers to allow participant voices to be heard 
as they tell their story, with the latter leading the direction of the inquiry. The salient 
problems can therefore be understood from the point of view of the participant who 
experiences them. Charmaz (2017) builds upon and critiques this approach, suggesting 
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that a Constructivist Grounded Theory approach “locates the research process and 
product in historical, social and situation conditions” (p. 34), highlighting this important 
gap in traditional Grounded Theory. As Charmaz (2017) critiques, the idea that that the 
researcher’s privileges, thoughts and opinions can be completely separated from the 
exploration through the methods elaborated proved unrealistic to me. I applied this type 
of critical approach as I entered this research with genuine curiosity about why migrants 
may engage in forced voluntary return. While I expected results to be tied to repressive 
policies in one way or another, I approached the data without clear ideas of what it would 
reveal, but reflexive about the social and power relations the data was located within. 
While this was very helpful for my coding process, I cannot claim to have followed any 
of the Grounded Theory approaches throughout the entirety of this research. The organic 
fluidity of the approaches, along with its potentially indefinite timeline, was not 
conducive to this project.  
Initially believing that experiences of forced voluntary return would be tied to 
specific regressive immigration policies, I proposed to use an Institutional Ethnography 
methodology in this dissertation. I had anticipated exploring closely how certain policies 
generated by the Conservative government “coordinate” (Smith, 2005) people’s actions 
and experiences. However, after coding the interviews, it emerged that it was not specific 
policies as such, nor the immigration institution alone, that pushed people out. Instead the 
exclusion described happened at multiple sites and in dispersed ways. Therefore, I 
decided instead to highlight the atmosphere of exclusion created by government actors 
and how that had multilayered impacts within other institutions and across civil society.       
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The Case Study 
 Due to my connection with the migrant-serving sector, my focus was entirely 
concentrated on the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). This location also provided a unique 
site for this research since it was the only place in Canada where the Assisted Voluntary 
Return and Reintegration (AVRR) program was piloted. While the program is now 
terminated, its implementation provided an important angle for the understanding of 
forced voluntary return. Moreover, Toronto was the first city in Canada to be declared a 
Sanctuary City. While this actually had little practical impact on my research, it offers a 
politically interesting backdrop to the questions being explored.  
 I used mixed methods to collect data for this research, including one-on-one semi-
structured interviews and textual analysis of policy documents and evaluation reports. I 
have also drawn substantially on an art-based, youth-led project that was developed at the 
Centre. This particular project involved the conception and production of a book written 
and put together by migrant youth, entitled Seeds of Hope: Creating a Future in the 
Shadows, for which I was one of the editors. While this book was not designed as part of 
my research process, the authors’ experiences and words contributed importantly to my 
understanding of the topics discussed in this dissertation. As such, I intermingle and cite 
their words in both the discussion and literature review chapters, as they contribute both 
theoretically and empirically.  
While some of my methods needed to be altered and rethought during the 
research phase for reasons that will be outlined, new opportunities presented themselves, 
which allowed me to enrich my analysis in various ways. For example, since the AVRR 
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program had already stopped recruiting participants when I started my interviews, I was 
not able to speak directly to people who would use it; however, I was able to speak to 
frontline workers whose clients had used it. I was also able to access and analyze a final 
government evaluation of the program as well as seek information and feedback from one 
of its administrators. Thus, this perceived limitation did in fact offer new possibilities.  
Sampling 
 In order to ground my research in the standpoints of the participants and center 
people’s embodied experiences, I conducted a series of interviews with migrants, as well 
as frontline workers who assisted with both leaving and staying. All these interviews 
were conducted in Toronto between March 2015 and August 2016, with the exceptions of 
one interview done over skype and another over email. Participants were recruited using 
a combination of purposive and convenience sampling. Bernard (2013) describes 
convenience sampling as “a glorified term for grabbing whoever will stand still long 
enough to answer your questions” and explains that it may be particularly useful for 
exploratory research (p. 167). Abrams (2010) further argues that this approach is often 
necessary when working with hard-to-reach populations, which migrants engaging in 
FVR turned out to be. The convenience sampling in my research refers to the interviews 
conducted with participants connected to the FCJ Refugee Centre, where I had pre-
existing interactions with the participants. While I was aware of and acknowledge the 
risks inherent in this kind of sampling, including the biasing of results based on the 
number of participants from one environment, as well as the power imbalances possible, 
there are several compelling reasons for this approach. Firstly, the Centre was in a unique 
position as a last resort for many migrants, and thus saw a higher number of migrants 
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considering forced voluntary return. This was reaffirmed to me during several interviews. 
Secondly, a fact that became clear after the research had started was that migrants 
engaging in forced voluntary return do not stay around to talk about it. Several of the 
frontline respondents spoke about this phenomenon as they described migrants who 
would come to briefly discuss the option and then leave the country quickly, or others 
who had not discussed it at all, leaving frontline workers to find out later through other 
sources that the person had left Canada. Their often-fleeting presence and lack of ongoing 
connections to settlement workers made interviews with migrants connected to other 
centres unrealistic. It also relates to the comparison made between FVR and suicide in 
two interviews, as it could be precisely when people stop talking about FVR that they 
engage in it.  
While I had hoped that snowball sampling would be possible and that migrants 
and frontline workers could assist in recruitment through the use of flyers, this became 
impossible. Therefore, it was only migrants that I had direct contact with who agreed to 
participate. On three occasions participants asked to be interviewed after learning about 
my research. The other four identified with the issue more clearly after the interview had 
started and they developed a better understanding of the research and terminology. I had 
the opportunity to discuss my research with all of the potential participants before they 
decided whether or not to participate, but in one instance in particular I offered an in-
depth explanation as a teaching tool for migrant youth who were struggling to access 
education. Through a program offered at FCJ Refugee Centre called Uprooted U, which I 
coordinated, I used my research proposal to discuss research development, theoretical 
frameworks and methods. This was an important opportunity, since as Tuhuwai-Smith 
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(1999) explains, decolonizing research processes should empower and educate people, 
sharing theories and analyses that inform findings and provide space towards self-
determination. They should involve demystifying the research process for those involved 
in order to challenge existing power structures (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). The youth in 
that ‘class’ identified and engaged with the topic, offering invaluable encouragement and 
insight. After the class, one person approached me and asked to be interviewed since they 
had understood the topic as being inherently tied to their experience.   
It took thirteen months to recruit the seven migrant participants, during which 
time I decided to also include a greater number of frontline workers. Eight months after 
my first interview I began focusing more attention on approaching frontline workers who 
could identify experiences working with clients who “couldn’t take it anymore” and had 
left. The social location of these participants allowed me to gain a better understanding of 
the ways they perceive, understand and address issues of exclusion and FVR (Bhuyan, 
2012; F.J. Villegas, 2014). I used purposive sampling to find participants specifically 
from a range of communities, both geographical and cultural. Purposive sampling, where 
researchers identify participants to address particular purposes, can also be useful when 
dealing with hard-to-reach populations (Bernard, 2013). As a result, I interviewed six 
settlement workers from four different organizations: one worked strictly with refugee 
claimants; the others had a diversity of experiences with a range of migrants. I also spoke 
to three lawyers, two of whom worked at legal clinics (one with a catchment area and the 
other with a diasporic target population), the third was a private bar lawyer who 
prioritized hard-to-win cases that other lawyers often refused. Finally, I also spoke with a 
doctor who primarily treated uninsured patients. While I approached four other targeted 
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individuals, they informed me that they did not have experience with this issue and that 
most of their clients will do anything necessary to stay. Even among many of the service 
providers who agreed to speak with me there was an initial response that most of their 
clients emphasized staying, and that they had to reflect, search their files and discuss with 
colleagues to think of cases to discuss. This was an interesting contradiction, which may 
partially speak to FCJ’s clientele, and partially to the limited ways people communicate 
about their return. While I have no way of determining the total population affected by 
this phenomenon, I estimate that it is likely relatively small as compared to the total 
number of precarious migrants. However, in reframing the understanding of migrant 
departure from a narrow voluntary/involuntary binary to a broad and nuanced spectrum, I 
would argue that the number of migrants in forced voluntary return situations is probably 
higher than is popularly believed. Finally, I also approached a manager at the Canada 
Border Services Agency to ask for an interview, as I hoped to gain their perspective on 
these issues. However, I did not receive a response from them.  
Data Collection 
Of the seven migrant participants I interviewed, four were from Latin America 
and the Caribbean, two were European and one identified as Asian. This is also 
proportionally reflective of FCJ’s clientele. Of these participants, five identified as 
women and two identified as men. One of the women and one of the men interviewed 
were in a heterosexual relationship and were interviewed together. Ages ranged from 
nineteen to seventy-three, with three being between nineteen and twenty-two, three in 
their thirties and one in his seventies. Five of the participants had post-secondary 
education, but four were currently unemployed, two were employed and one was “sort of 
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sometimes” working. When asked about race/ethnicity/cultural background, three 
participants identified as Catholic, one identified as Spanish, one as Black, one as Asian, 
and one as a mix of Italian, Portuguese, African and Aboriginal.  To the best of my 
knowledge they all identify as heterosexual, and five were in relationships at the time, 
two with Canadian citizens. Not all of these participants ended up leaving Canada, as two 
did not go through with their ideas of self-deportation, though they all seriously 
considered it. One ended up being accepted on a refugee claim, and another was accepted 
on another application but was speaking about her experiences before that fact.  
Demographic Information about Migrant Participants 
 
Pseudonym Gender Age Race/Ethicity
/Cultural  
Background2 
Geographic 
area they 
came from3 
Level of 
education 
Profession/ 
employment 
prior to 
coming to 
Canada 
Profession/ 
Employment 
in Canada 
Manuel Male 73 Catholic Central 
America 
Post-
Secondary 
degree 
Accountant unemployed 
Kelly Female 35 Italian, 
Portuguese, 
African and 
Aboriginal 
South 
America 
Started 
University 
Mechanical 
Technician  
  
unemployed 
Suny Female 22 Black Caribbean High 
School 
Cashier Sort of 
sometimes 
Maria Female 33 Spanish Latin 
America 
Bachelor’s 
degree 
Owned a 
restaurant 
Housing 
counselor 
Katherine Female 19 Catholic Europe Bachelor’s 
degree 
Student/ 
worked at  
McDonalds 
Occasional 
cleaning 
Jonh Carter Male  21 Catholic Europe High 
School 
Many jobs Construction 
Esse Female 39 Asian Asia PhD 
candidate 
Student Unemployed 
 																																																								2 I left this question deliberately vague when asking it in order to allow participants to identify however 
they were comfortable.   3	While I asked participants for their country of origin, I now feel that this may challenge their anonymity.		
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Of the frontline workers I interviewed, all but one identified as female. Their 
experience in the migrant-serving sector ranged from two-and-a-half to twenty-five years. 
The communities they worked with were very diverse in terms of country of origin, 
migration trajectories, age, gender and even class. Two respondents worked mostly with 
people from Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Brazil and Portugal, within a 
west-end Toronto-based catchment area. Many of these clients were non-status, but there 
were also refugee claimants, migrant workers and permanent residents. Another with a 
catchment area in the east end said her clientele was quite diverse, but the majority were 
from the Horn of Africa and faced a range of immigration issues. One participant said she 
worked extensively with the Filipino/a community, but also worked with migrants of 
varying status from within and beyond the GTA. Another said she had seen people 
primarily from the Caribbean, as well as some Nigerians, Afghans, Iranians, Indians and 
Pakistanis, the majority of whom were refugee claimants or held no immigration status. 
Interestingly, two tied the demographics of their clientele to gender, with one stating that 
she mainly saw women from Latin America and men from Africa, and another saying 
that she worked mainly with women from Africa but had seen an increase in people from 
the Caribbean and Latin America. One participant worked primarily with a particular 
diaspora community that came from many countries in Asia and Africa and another with 
“precarious migrants” broadly defined. While some organizations had a financial cut off 
or income level that was considered too high to receive services, others did not, and some 
worked primarily with people who were somewhat isolated, but most said that their 
clients had community connections. Some of the frontline workers acknowledged their 
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discomfort in speaking for their clients, but also recognized the limitations inherent in 
this research.  
I began each interview with an in-depth explanation of my work, which often led 
to a broader conversation before the list of questions was addressed. I had composed 
separate interview guides for those participants who had seriously considered forced 
voluntary return, and for the frontline workers; both guides had semi-structured as well as 
open-ended questions.4 The interviews often took a conversational tone, though I was 
cognizant of inserting my experiences or perspectives into the interviews. While I tried to 
conduct interviews in quiet, private spaces, these discussions were frequently interrupted, 
whether intentionally or not. Regaining the focus and concentration after an interruption 
was sometimes a bit of a challenge. The Skype interview also presented some unintended 
barriers, as there was no video accompanying the audio. I came to realize how often I rely 
on visual cues both to emphasize my questions and to properly perceive the participant’s 
response. The lack of these cues forced me to focus differently on intonation and to 
permit longer silences.   
The diversity of interviewees provided a broad range of perspectives and contexts, 
with participants prioritizing and focusing on different things. This suggested to me that 
there may be multiple entry points to this issue, and that the spectrum between voluntary 
and involuntary return may be fairly large. However, saturation was reached, as the 
underlying theme that came through these perspectives was the numerous, often 
overlapping, ways migrants were made to feel excluded and criminalized, leading to a 
loss of hope. Moreover, nearly all the frontline participants agreed on one determining 																																																								4	See appendix A and B, pages 225-228	
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factor that moved people towards forced voluntary return faster, and that was 
confinement within immigration detention facilities. 
Demographic Information of Service Provider Participants 
Pseudonym Gender Profession  Number of 
years in the 
sector 
Number of 
years at 
current org 
Community served 
Mariposa Female Director of 
Organization 
25 25 African: Eritrean and 
Ethiopian, Latin 
Americans, women from 
the Caribbean, youth,  
Luisa Female Support 
Worker 
15 15 People from the 
Caribbean, Nigeria, 
Afghanistan, Iran, India 
and Pakistan 
Chico Male Director of 
Organization 
24 15-17 Precarious migrants: 
refugee claimants, non-
status people, temporary 
workers, work permits, 
students, visitors. 
Kate Female Director of 
Organization 
6.5 2.5 Refugee claimants from 
all over 
Irene Female Manager 11 8 The Latin American, 
Portuguese/Brazilian and 
Caribbean communities 
Deborah Female Settlement 
Worker 
2 years 9 
months 
3.5 months Caribbean, Latin 
American and Portuguese 
Dr. 
Agarwal 
Female Doctor 6 4 Male refugee claimants 
from East and West 
Africa, Central and South 
American women, and 
some Caribbean women 
Samantha Female Lawyer 12 6 People from the Horn of 
Africa: Somali, Eritrean, 
Ethiopian, Kenyan, 
Sudanese 
Asha Female Lawyer 10 9 People from South Asia, 
Tanzania, the Caribbean, 
Iran and Afghanistan. 
Sathya Female Lawyer 9 2 Filipino migrants, refugee 
claimants, survivors of 
domestic violence 
Richard Male AVRR 
Administrator 
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My interviews were supplemented with field notes in which I recorded thoughts 
and observations after each interview. These also helped to readjust my focus slightly 
between interviews and to start to draw connections as well as disjunctures.     
Protection and Ethics  
 Before undertaking interviews, my proposal was reviewed and approved by the 
Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University’s Ethics Review Board, 
conforming to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics guidelines. 
Prior to each interview, participants were informed of their rights, including their right to 
not answer questions, to not have their answers recorded, or to end the interview at any 
time. One participant invoked these rights by asking that the recorder be turned off for a 
part of the interview. Participants, particularly those with precarious immigration status, 
were also informed of the limitations I faced as a researcher, including the possibility that 
I could be asked to disclose information if I was subpoenaed (Palys & Lowman, 2000). 
While I acknowledged that this was unlikely, the majority of those interviews were 
conducted when the Conservative Harper government was still in power. There had been 
discussions at the time within the academy about the reach of this government and the 
increased vulnerability of migrant populations (Young & Bernhard, 2013). As a partial 
remedy, I offered the option to each participant of choosing their own pseudonym 
(Villegas, 2015a) and signing the voluntary consent form using that chosen name. Most 
elected to do so, and as a result the names in this dissertation were almost all chosen by 
the participants themselves. By proceeding this way, I avoided recording participants’ 
real names or contact information. To eliminate financial barriers, such as transportation 
costs and childcare, thus ensuring that there were no costs incurred by the migrants who 
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participated in interviews, small amounts of money were provided to the seven 
participants. Each interview was recorded using a password-protected recording device 
and transcribed fully using encrypted software. Transcriptions were then saved in an 
encrypted file.     
Coding the Data 
 Once the interviews had been transcribed, I began analyzing the data to uncover 
the emerging themes. I drew on Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) Grounded Theory, starting 
with open coding, where I read through and examined all the interviews, noting down any 
possible themes and conceptualizing the categories that were being presented by the 
participants. I did this in two separate processes, one for the frontline workers and 
another for the migrant participants. I mapped each of these onto large sheets of paper in 
no particular order and with no outcome in mind. I then used axial coding to assemble the 
different themes and categories into similar groups based on observable relationships. I 
clustered and re-clustered the themes until I had seven or eight cohesive groupings. I then 
reread all the interviews, identifying any statement that would fit into a particular 
grouping. While the groupings were similar in the two sets of data, they were also 
slightly different, reflecting the slight differences in the questions asked, as well as the 
possibility of differing priorities between frontline workers and migrants themselves.  
 Once the interview transcripts had all been coded, I reorganized the data to place 
the quotes from each category together; this led to some re-coding and reorganizing of 
the data. Finally, I was able to identify the most salient arguments that were emerging. 
While people’s experiences are necessarily nuanced and there is no one trajectory to the 
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phenomena being studied, the multilayered and disparate ways migrants are criminalized 
became prominent across several of the themes identified. This criminalization, which is 
unpacked in later chapters of this dissertation, contributes to an overwhelming loss of 
hope and forces a voluntary return for many migrants.  
Analysis   
In order to understand the data presented in this project I used a qualitative 
analysis strategy. To begin to outline the ways power relations are experienced through 
policy implementation, dominant discourses and social interactions, this project explores 
the ways they are understood and felt by migrants and frontline service providers. By 
centering these experiences in this dissertation, I base my analysis in Feminist Standpoint 
Epistemology, where knowledge production starts with everyday life and the embodied 
knower is the expert (Smith, 2005; Yuval-Davis, 2011). Standpoint theorists begin their 
research with the realities of people’s lives and explore the oppressions created through 
structural processes and social orders (Code, 1995). By centering the experiences of 
often-silenced individuals and groups, this research actively engages in displacing 
commonly-held assumptions about dominant experiences in society. My approach to 
Feminist Standpoint Epistemology further uses an intersectional approach.   
Intersectionality, was developed from feminist standpoint theory to disrupt 
conceptualizations of oppression operating on single identity categories. Crenshaw 
(1989) argued that a simplistic one-dimensional understanding of oppression prioritizes 
the experiences of white women and black men and further marginalizes others. As an 
analytical perspective and framework, intersectionality has enabled a more nuanced 
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approach to understand the ways inequalities, discrimination and oppressions intersect 
and overlap to co-constitute each experience. Within this approach, identity categories 
are understood as relational, based on historical contexts, intersecting social constructs 
and dominant power relations. Therefore the interconnectivity of each oppression 
necessitates that we combat them all for any resistance to be meaningful (Brah, 1996). 
Yet, while an intersectional approach does not necessarily disregard identity categories, 
many contemporary feminists who take it up argue in favour of an anti-essentialist 
perspective, which challenges any inherent connection between attributes and identities 
(Gimenez, 2001; Grewal, 2005; Lutz, Herrera Vivar, & Supik, 2011).   
In her 2005 article The Complexity of Intersectionality, Leslie McCall critiques 
the lack of discussion around the methodology of intersectionality, suggesting that 
traditional methodologies may not be able to handle the associated complexity. She offers 
three approaches to the study of complex social relations, highlighting the achievements 
and sacrifices of each. The three approaches are defined as follows: First, the 
anticategorical complexity approach deconstructs and rejects analytical categories, 
maintaining that social relations are too complex and fluid to be reduced to fixed entities, 
and that this reduction inherently produces inequalities. The second approach, the 
intracategorical complexity approach, offers a perspective where “[t]he point is not to 
deny the importance -- both materially and discursive -- of categories but to focus on the 
process by which they are produced, experienced, reproduced, and resisted in everyday 
life” (p. 1783). Within this approach, categories are skeptically contextualized; they are 
not deconstructed to the point of rejection, but understood as misleadingly homogenizing. 
In this project, I draw principally on McCall’s third approach at the other end of the 
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spectrum, the intercategorical complexity approach. McCall describes this approach as 
using existing categories to capture “relationships of inequality among social groups and 
changing configurations of inequality along multiple and conflicting dimensions” (p. 
1773). This approach allows me to pursue a theoretical and analytical understanding of 
how interactions and oppressions contribute to the production and reproduction of 
categories, while at the same time focusing on the ways these categorical constructs 
impact people’s lived experiences. McCall’s article has been particularly important and 
influential for me because her methodological distinctions helped me to not only 
understand how to apply intersectionality better within my own work, but she also 
provided clarity behind some of the ongoing debates over its different uses.  
Therefore, the intercategorical complexity approach is valuable within my 
analysis to disrupt dominant power relations and constructed inequalities based on 
difference. I also use this intersectional approach within my critical policy analysis to 
highlight the ways policy and program decisions and their implementation impact and 
oppress migrants based on imposed identity constructs. This analytical approach offers a 
valuable way to understand the numerous policy changes announced between 2008 and 
2015 and ways in which they reified particular categories of identity, which oppressed 
migrants as a result. It also enables a critical understanding of the Assisted Voluntary 
Return and Reintegration (AVRR) program.  
Complimentary Data Collection 
 In addition to the data collected and analyzed from one-on-one interviews, I also 
investigated recent policy development in grey literature, media sources and policy texts 
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to offer analyses of the ways these contributed to migrants’ criminalization. I began this 
process by examining nearly all the policy changes proposed or implemented between 
2008 and 2015, of which there were many. After finding my areas of focus through the 
coding of interview transcripts, I narrowed in on the particular policies that criminalized 
and excluded migrants based on purposefully distinguished ‘deserving’ versus 
‘undeserving’ categorizations. By outlining the ways these policies were discussed, 
promoted and implemented in various texts, and relating these events to particular 
theoretical frameworks, the context for the hidden ‘attrition through enforcement’, a 
concept I return to in Chapter 2, becomes clearer.  
 I also utilized the CBSA’s (2015) Evaluation Report of the AVRR to analyze the 
varying reasons for the pilot project and their associated understanding of success. By 
contextualizing the Canadian version of this project among others implemented 
internationally, I build on the existing literature, contributing a unique perspective to the 
general and site-specific critiques of AVRR programs. While I was not able to directly 
speak to anyone at CBSA about the project’s implementation, the evaluation report 
offered a thorough description, which could be analyzed through close reading and 
textual analysis. Moreover, the perspectives offered by an external administrator of the 
project, Richard, allowed a nuanced analysis of its implications based on migrants’ 
intersecting identities.  
Methods for Writing  
As these understandings of power relations apply to knowledge production, they 
also apply to the ways findings are written. Edward Said (1979) importantly critiqued the 
		 40	
authority allocated to texts, which he argued are frequently understood in simplistic ways. 
He explained that this simplification often “strips humanity” from the knowledge 
produced and privileges the voices and perspectives of those who have historically been 
relied upon for knowledge production. It is the materiality of the text that implies that it is 
static and unchangeable, thereby artificially solidifying identities, ideas and concepts 
(Said, 1979; Smith, 2005; Yuval-Davis, 2011).  
Following Said and the others mentioned above, I understand that reported events 
and migrant identities are not stable “truths”, but fluid and influenced by immigration 
policies and trends that are also continuously shifting and evolving. As many of the 
participants of this project affirmed, it has been particularly difficult to stay current and 
on top of these ever-changing immigration realities. This dissertation offers a snapshot of 
almost a decade (2008-2015) of changes in Canadian immigration policies and the 
materiality of their impacts on migrants. In particular, I highlight a phenomenon, which I 
have called forced voluntary return, as it applied to migrants in the same decade.  
Initially I wanted to disrupt traditional ways of structuring a dissertation and avoid 
a literature review to highlight the fact that the knowledge produced in the academy is 
equally relevant to the knowledge coming from the community. By mixing the 
theoretically-based literature with community voices throughout, I had hoped they could 
reinforce each other, as I was drawing from both as appropriate. However, this approach 
became difficult to operationalize, and I began to question my goals. I struggled greatly 
with accessibility and trying to ensure that my work would have value for my participants 
and the community, as the theoretical began to overpower my chapters. Therefore, I 
decided to try and contain most of the complex theory to one chapter, so that it could be 
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understood as one part of the larger project. I also weave fiction and poetry into the 
dissertation to highlight the contributions these can offer to theoretical scholarship, as 
sources of knowledge and explanatory material. These alternative sources of knowledge 
expression open up the possibility of disrupting modernist constructions of space and 
time, understandings of violence and resistance, and different ways of sharing complex 
life experiences (Das Gupta, 2003; Gilroy, 1993; Narayan, 2013; Said, 1979).  At the 
same time, outlining the theoretical concepts in one chapter allows the other chapters to 
give prominence to the knowledge coming from the participants and the community 
while engaging these voices in an extended conversation with theory.  
Summary 
 This chapter has outlined the qualitative methods and approaches that were used 
in this research, including convenience and purposive sampling and critical textual 
analysis of policy and evaluation documents. The total number of participants 
interviewed was seventeen, including seven migrants and ten frontline service providers. 
The coding and analysis of the data draws on grounded theory approaches, as well as 
feminist frameworks of standpoint theory and intersectionality, from an intercategorical 
complexity approach.  This chapter has also described the measures that were used to 
protect the participants and the data, the ethics procedures that were followed, and the 
opportunities and limitations inherent in my approach to the project. The above steps 
guided my study of forced voluntary return and tied it to the gendered multilayered 
criminalization that migrants experience and that gives rise to the connected, often-
overpowering, loss of hope 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review:  State Sovereignty, Illegalization and the 
Canadian Context 
This dissertation explores migrants’ and frontline service providers’ experiences of 
forced voluntary return through a consideration of the multilayered criminalization that 
migrants experience and the associated, often overpowering, loss of hope that they 
articulate. Migrants’ experiences are necessarily gendered and impact people differently 
based on intersecting identities and social location. While I try to disrupt rigid identities 
and immigration categories throughout this dissertation, this chapter will highlight 
literature that speaks to these different categorizations to explain their impacts. The 
research participants included refugee claimants, an international student, a sponsored 
spouse, and people without any immigration status, although several had previously, or 
have since, moved between other forms of precarious legal status. The service providers 
spoke of their clients as generally fitting within these same categories (in addition to live-
in caregivers, trafficked persons and permanent residents). While the literature that I 
discuss in this chapter employs constructs that are often more static than these 
immigration categories tend to be, it offers important ways to analyze and better 
understand transnational connections between migration, migrant identities, and state 
policies.        
Three main bodies of literature have provided me with the tools needed to 
understand the breadth, scope and historical basis for my dissertation, and I develop my 
argument around them, while highlighting the relevant gaps to offer FVR as a 
contribution to critical border and sovereignty studies. First, the literature on state 
sovereignty has been an important area of research for the development of this 
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dissertation, as it is closely linked to theories of transnationalism, securitization, 
boundary making and border control, all of which are central to my argument. State 
sovereignty is often emphasized as a response to migration; borders and boundaries are 
produced, moved, solidified and weakened as a material manifestation of not only a 
demarcated territory, but sovereign powers of securitizing inclusion and exclusion. All of 
these power-generated processes have direct impacts on migrants, extensionally affecting 
the settlement sector, which makes their conceptualization important for this dissertation.  
Second, the literature on processes of illegalization worldwide and related 
research on deportation and detention have been central to unpacking the constructed and 
concrete risks faced by migrants with precarious immigration status. These risks are 
strongly connected to the legal, as well as discursive, criminalization of migrants in many 
different and nuanced ways and significantly impact a sense of belonging and hope for 
the future. This literature helps to explain many experiences described in the interviews I 
conducted, offering a foundation for a standpoint analysis of the broader systemic issues. 
However, gaps in this literature largely maintain binary conceptualizations of return as 
either voluntary or forced. Nuanced approaches to deportation studies, as well as other 
research on migrant return, have provided complex analysis of the processes involved in 
return. While these approaches highlight migrant agency in different ways, they have 
largely missed the messiness and agency inherent in diverse experiences that are neither 
completely voluntary nor forced. The addition of FVR is proposed to fill those gaps.     
Finally, the literature on the ways in which Canada built and continues to build 
and protect state boundaries on colonized indigenous land, is the third main area of 
literature. It provides a lens though which to examine the more localized history of 
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colonial boundary making, displacement, migration management and securitization.  I 
link the ongoing and internal boundary-making within Canada to a pervasive exclusion of 
certain migrant communities that forces some to leave ‘voluntarily’.      
I offer this overview through a feminist lens, which incorporates an understanding 
of identities as socially-constructed, relational and intersectional. Moreover, I employ 
transnationalism as a framework that demands an analysis of international relationships 
and movements at various scales. Bringing together the work of migration scholars and 
transnational feminists enables us to apply various analytical lenses to the study of 
transnational connections and the movement of bodies, as well as power relations, 
oppressions, ideas and activist movements. Intersectionality is a useful complement to 
transnationalism as it enables a more nuanced approach to conceptualizing the ways 
inequalities, discrimination and oppressions are co-constituted, intersecting and 
overlapping. Since gender is understood and experienced through intersections with 
racialization, class, age, ability and sexuality, I believe that feminist intersectional 
analysis provides a necessary framework for unpacking and addressing my research 
questions.  
I. State Sovereignty 
 The concept of modern state sovereignty is particularly important to consider in 
relation to migration broadly, and forced voluntary return in particular. Different ideas of 
sovereignty offer understandings of political actors’ decisions and discourses, the ways 
these are interpreted and understood by the population, as well as their material 
manifestations. It is important to unpack and deconstruct Canadian sovereignty to 
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understand the processes of inclusion and exclusion, the ways these processes contribute 
to migrant criminalization and the impetuses behind forced voluntary return. Within this 
dissertation, I maintain that Canadian state sovereignty is a social construct, one which is 
continuously produced and reproduced through ongoing colonialism, elite negotiations 
and embodiments, and often-violent demands for conformity and/or exclusion. This 
construct is enacted by policy-makers, civil servants and gatekeepers, who have been 
allocated the authority to produce and uphold borders and boundaries (Moffette, 2014; 
Mountz, 2010; Spire, 2008). In the following pages, I deconstruct and critique 
sovereignty in order to challenge its fetishized legal and moral dominance in Canada and 
elsewhere.   
Sovereignty serves to justify hegemonic systems of bureaucratic governance, 
which are commonly understood as the best or only option, and are necessarily accepted 
by the majority of the population. According to McLennan, Held and Hall (1984), in 
modern democracies where the sovereign is constituted by the “will of the people”, the 
resulting government takes charge of the “machinery of the state” and thus becomes a 
power separate from “the people”.  In this type of system, the sovereign is located in the 
decisions and actions of a ruling government, legitimized through membership 
(citizenship) within a particular state and system (McLennan et al., 1984). Hall (1979) 
has also shown how the will of the people is carefully shaped through the construction of 
“common sense”.5 In projects undertaken in the UK, he outlines the specific actors 																																																								5 Hall draws on Gramsci’s concept of “common sense.” In another article, Hall explained the importance 
of this concept, stating that it enables an understanding of the ways “the practical consciousness of the 
masses of the people is actually formed. It is the already formed and “taken for granted” terrain, on which 
more coherent ideologies and philosophies must contend for mastery; the ground which new conceptions of 
the world must take into account, contest and transform, if they are to shape the conceptions of the world of 
the masses and in that way become historically effective” (Hall, 1986, p. 20). 
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involved in these processes and the techniques utilized, all within precise historical 
moments that demonstrate how certain political ideologies have gained currency. While 
his approach shifts back and forth between highlighting individuals’ influence and 
presenting state power as a monolith, he importantly deconstructs and critiques common 
sense, and thus the affiliated dominant power structures. 
Mountz (2010) undertakes a similar critique from a different angle as she focuses 
on Canadian civil servants rather than political elites, arguing that “‘the state’ does not 
exist outside the people who comprise it, their everyday work and embeddedness in 
social relations” (p. xxiv). The state, as well as its governance, are therefore embodied, 
beginning with bureaucracy and extending to the “architecture of everyday life” (p. xxxii). 
For Mountz, in order to understand the impacts of this construct, it is important to break 
down the power of the constituted state into its areas of impact and interaction, allowing 
for context-specific understandings of the way power operates on a daily basis. This 
focus on the individual civil servants and political actors who enact governance moves 
the loci from an imagined disembodied state to embodied individuals who have particular 
social locations and a multitude of lived interactions. Taking her argument a little further, 
this performative governance is therefore necessarily embedded in social power relations 
and thus gendered and racialized in specific ways, which when analyzed further offers 
insights into intersecting privileges and oppressions. It is also discretionary, as different 
actors may exert their power in different ways based on their own ideas and priorities.   
Spire (2008) provides an interesting intersection of the two aforementioned 
approaches in his analysis of the interactions and discretion that happen at immigration 
counters in France, as well as French consulates abroad. Focusing his attention on the 
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actions of bureaucrats who make the decisions, he shifts the gaze from law and policy to 
their practice and application. At the same time, he acknowledges the tone and directives 
that come from the politicians, and the way they become “common sense”, as the 
bureaucrats show “solidarity” with these messages (p. 42). For example, he points to the 
increased precariousness of migration through the careful development of strict 
immigration policies that preserve rights for migrants, while at the same time showing 
how the bureaucrats are positioned to make those rights inoperable. Spire elaborates the 
gendered and racialized hierarchies that exist within these spaces, the approaches 
advocated by the frontline workers, and the ways that these potentially impact the 
migrants seeking different immigration papers. Through this elaboration, he offers an 
important insight and analysis of one area of sovereign state control and how it is 
reproduced through embodied actions by bringing it down to the micro level in individual 
encounters at immigration windows. These encounters, and the ways they are described 
by the bureaucrats, are useful to unpack the ways macro level policies are experienced in 
micro level interactions.           
The aforementioned types of critical deconstruction of the sovereign state, 
dominant power relations, and boundary-making processes of inclusion and exclusion 
offer tools for challenging these very constructs. Without this deconstruction, the state is 
only understood as a natural container for the polity, the nation – or imagined community 
(Anderson, 1983), a process through which those accepted as members (i.e. permanent 
residents or citizens) find entitlements to certain rights and protections in return for their 
loyalty to the state (Bosniak, 2006; Gabriel & Macdonald, 2007). While experienced 
differently, this type of belonging, which has been described as a rigid identity (Truong, 
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2011), is necessarily linked to particular gendered understandings of citizenship, origin 
and racialization, and creates ideas of ‘home’ which are bounded within particular 
borders. Bosniak (2006) further explains that while the inside of an imagined ‘community’ 
is ideologically constructed as inclusive, its outer surface is understood as hard and 
exclusionary. The mechanisms that activate this hard boundary are required to separate 
the inclusive ‘Us’ from the different and threatening ‘Them’ (Lamont & Molnár, 2002).   
Within a post-colonial understanding, Ahmed (2000) refers to these ideas of a 
bounded home as a fetish, or in other words, a fictitious narrative that assumes “the 
possibility of a space that is pure” with fixed boundaries, situated in opposition to the 
‘away’, the ‘different’ (p. 88). The call to destabilize these links between nation, 
sameness, away and difference, and offer a critique of fixed origin as well as the idea of 
‘home’ as bounded within particular borders, has been well documented in the literature 
(Brah, 1996; Giles, 2008; Glick Schiller, 2010; McClintock, 1995; Sharma, 2006). These 
transnational approaches further articulate a critique of the propagated dichotomy of 
mobility and immobility (Grewal, 2005) and migrant and immigrant (Glick Schiller et al., 
1995), while opening conceptual avenues that may more accurately describe people’s 
lived experiences and ongoing efforts for self-determination, which often involve multi-
sited relationships and power relations on multiple scales (Ahmed, 2000; Glick Schiller, 
2010; Glick Schiller et al., 1995; Nolin, 2006).  
Securitization and Borders 
 In order to uphold the sovereign power of boundary-making in an increasingly 
globalized world, while at the same time continuing to propagate the idea of the generous 
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and humanitarian state, insecurity is highlighted and circulated by policy makers to 
encourage rigid bordering security measures (Ahmed, 2004; Macklin, 2002; Razack, 
1999). Some of these measures involve the solidification of national border spaces in 
different sites around the world, both as tangible physical structures, and as metaphors, 
arbitrary dividing lines to represent the materiality of power relations (Brah, 1996).  As 
Macklin (2002) explains, the broad purpose of border spaces is to demarcate territory in a 
permeable way, so as to selectively control who and what is able to get in or out. These 
demarcations become reified through the repeated common understanding of their 
existence and thus gain power through ‘common sense’ recognition (p. 384). 
Alternatively, while discussing the Mexican-U.S. border, Anzaldúa (1987) provides a 
vulnerably personal and heartfelt critique of these constructs, defining border spaces as a 
“dividing line, a narrow strip along a deep edge”, which acts decisively and violently to 
separate us from them (p. 25). She further challenges these demarcations by historicizing 
their creation in colonial violence, which imposed the arbitrary dividing lines. Anzaldúa 
importantly demonstrates the epistemic and material violence, pain and confusion these 
lines have caused.   
Mountz (2010), while discussing Canadian ports of entry, also challenges the 
reification of borders by explaining that borders are walls in the geographical imaginary, 
constructed barriers that make sense of political and social impositions. However, she 
goes on to argue that border spaces become imposed and embodied in dispersed and 
chaotic ways as they can be elongated or shortened as needed (p. xxix). She describes 
movable borders that can be drawn into state territory as needed to satisfy particular 
political projects. While Mountz describes imaginary walls, Brown (2010) points to 
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physical walls, critically expounding on the idea that these walls “project sovereign 
jurisdictional power and the containment of a secure nation” (p. 25). Brown’s multi-sited 
analysis of borders and border spaces involves the mental organization of space produced 
through boundaries; however, she adds that these boundaries have increasingly involved 
expensive and oppressive constructions, physical additions necessary to bring order to the 
chaotic border spaces that Mountz and Anzaldúa describe. Walls are thus propagated and 
built in different sites around the world to symbolically and materially organize power 
and space, and offer a remedy to the physical limitations of borders. However, as Brown 
argues, these constructs not only demarcate a dividing line, but also produce border 
spaces which become permanent zones of violent, unwinnable conflict and death.  
The protection required at the border spaces in the Global North thereafter takes 
the form of the chivalrous and paternalistic masculinized gatekeeper, the border officer 
who is charged with the moral responsibility to control the vulnerable (and feminized) 
border space and to protect the potentially victimized ‘nation’, which consists of both 
citizens and territory (Pratt & Thompson, 2008). Pratt and Thompson found that 
decisions made at border crossings took on ‘fatherly’ descriptions from guards 
themselves, who saw their role as chivalrous and protective as opposed to aggressive or 
dominating. The construction of this masculinized role requires ‘bad’ people and a 
feminized ‘damsel in distress’ nation in need of protection (Pratt & Thompson, 2008). As 
Walia (2013) further points out, in these spaces, migrants are necessarily cast as the ‘bad’ 
people, constructed as committing acts of “assault on the state” (p. 54). Hyndman and 
Giles (2017) add to this discussion, as they argue that these migrant threats are also coded 
as masculine with “questionable” motives and character (p.15). Within this paradigm, it 
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is precisely the constant proximity and unstoppability of migrants, as potentially 
dangerous masculinized strangers, that increase the demand for the fortified borders 
described above (Ahmed, 2004). 
 The border thus becomes a site of spectacle, where border officials command the 
power to publicly regulate and govern citizenship status and identity (Bosniak, 2006; De 
Genova, 2013; Luibhéid, 2002; Sharma, 2000, 2006; Villegas, 2015b). Yet, as Villegas 
(2015b) argues, there are also moments of resistance and migrant agency, when people 
use their knowledge and resources to subvert these spectacles and accomplish their goal 
of crossing. During these interactions, intersecting identities are read and interpreted by 
border officials in particular ways, and particular understandings of gender, racialization, 
class and ability are used as markers for inclusion and exclusion. Officials frequently rely 
on cultural stereotypes as these intersect with gender identity and sexuality in their 
assessments (Luibhéid, 2002; Pratt & Valverde, 2002). Focusing her analysis at 
American border sites, Luiheid (2002) argues that sexuality, and associated implied 
sexual acts, become points of exclusion as they intersect with gender, racialization, 
ethnicity and class. She centres her focus on women’s experiences of exclusion, “since 
women’s bodies historically serve as the iconic sites for sexual intervention by state and 
nation-making projects” (p. xi). In so doing, she highlights how certain women have 
historically been targeted for exclusion, including Chinese women who were suspected of 
being sex workers simply by virtue of race and gender stereotypes; Japanese ‘picture 
brides’ whose heteronormative sexuality and reproduction was still considered 
threatening and whose immigration was then limited in favour of European brides; 
lesbians, whose sexuality, if determined, could cause exclusion and deportation; and 
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refugee claimants, whose encounters with border officials often hinged on recounting 
experiences of sexual violence. These examples illustrate the ways gender is constituted 
through intersectional understandings that are regulated and fomented through 
performative acts at the border.     
De Genova (2002) argues that the performance of border enforcement is not 
solely relegated to demarcated border spaces; instead, this policing of bodies, movements 
and spaces takes place in multiple sites at varying moments (p. 438). Villegas (2015a) 
builds on this argument, highlighting how multiple borders shape migrants’ day-to-day 
lives (p. 251).  This disruption of rigid geo-political borders is widely noted, as border 
spaces are created abroad, as well as within boundaries, to exert power over citizens and 
non-citizens at differing moments and locations. States also increasingly enforce their 
borders beyond the confines of their physical boundary space, using a wide range of tools 
that impose stricter ‘front-end’ restrictions to limit people’s ability to reach the actual 
territory of the state in question. As Macklin (2013) points out, in the 1980s Canada led 
the development of deterritorialized bordering tactics and restrictions. A range of tactics 
continues to be employed by Canadian officials abroad to intercept and control particular 
migrants. This is done through visa requirements on foreign nationals from specifically 
determined countries, limiting the number of visas available, and establishing few 
regional offices in places, such as the Horn of Africa, able to process these visas or other 
applications, as well as strict screening by airline staff (with the carriers facing severe 
fines if they transport people without the right documentation) and liaison officers who 
enforce this screening (Hyndman & Giles, 2017; Macklin, 2013; Mountz, 2010; 
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Richmond, 2001). These strategies act to physically move Canadian borders to countries 
with high immigration flows so as to block access from a distance.  
Within national boundaries, the border may be felt in distinct ways by people 
located at different geographical sites, arguably shifting with them through the space. 
This bordering is experienced very differently based on people’s identities, experiences, 
immigration status and social locations. Through this shifting, the border reconstitutes 
itself around certain bodies marked as excluded, thus forcing some to experience the 
border in every aspect of their lives, including employment, education and access to 
certain services in particular (Bhuyan, 2012; Mountz, 2010; Sharma, 2006; Villegas, 
2015a; Wright, 2003). These moving, or symbolic borders necessarily become 
reproduced through varying forms of violence (Luibhéid, 2002).  
The aforementioned bordering processes work in some situations to create what 
Agier (2011) refers to as extraterritorial spaces or outplaces where ‘undesirables’ are 
managed (p. 5). These bordering spaces act to confine and control migrants to ensure they 
remain forcibly physically and ideologically distinct from the national population, not 
only marked as undesirable, but also undeserving of inclusion. These spaces “remove 
evidence of human displacement from view” and thus hide the problem through 
exclusion (Hyndman, 2000, p. 190). While Agier and Hyndman are primarily describing 
refugee camps in their analysis, similar arguments have been made about immigration 
detention centres, where unwanted migrants are forcibly hidden and kept distinct and 
distant from society, and where assistance simultaneously means control and power over 
life and movement (Agier, 2011; Khosravi, 2009). In her conceptualization of reception 
and detention centre spaces, Mountz (2010) describes these moving borders as long 
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tunnels, spaces at ports of entry and other sites, which are not considered state territory 
for the purposes of immigration control (p. xiv). These tunnels avail state authorities of 
constructed spaces where legal rights and state procedures are malleable, allowing for 
containment and control. Mountz refers to the arrival of migrant ships in British 
Columbia to ground her argument, as the migrants were moved across Canadian soil to 
inland detention centres without processing. Thus the border was stretched, or a ‘tunnel’ 
was created to allow border securitization to happen in a different location.  While 
developed in very different theoretical and material contexts, both Agier’s and Mountz’s 
conceptualizations of shifting borders help to disrupt ideas of borders that are legally, 
ideologically and materially static. Borders can be malleably moved into, or out of, the 
territory of a nation-state, to demarcate areas as not within the state for purposes of 
exclusion. 
From 2008 until 2015 there were a significant number of policy and procedural 
changes implemented by the former Harper government that have acted to reinforce 
Canadian borders along demarcated border spaces, as well as within Canadian territory 
and overseas. Examples include: the introduction in 2009 of visas for Czech and Mexican 
nationals, where none existed previously, to impede their entrance; immigration and 
refugee reform, including the creation of Designated Foreign Nationals as a category of 
migrants that faced mandatory containment through detention; and processes for 
increased speed and frequency of removals. While some of the Conservative 
government’s policies and practices are very slowly being overturned or modified by the 
current Liberal government, the impacts have been broad reaching and profoundly felt. 
These bordering tactics physically exclude migrants, either before they enter the territory, 
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or by containing them and removing them rapidly if their arrival cannot be prevented.  
Bordering policies and their impacts on FVR are explored in more detail in Chapters 3 
and 4.  
Borders Around Refugeeness 
 The bordering tactics described above have important material impacts on refugee 
claimants, as they become public targets for containment and exclusion. Refugee 
claimants self-select, choosing a state rather than being chosen through defined 
procedures (Macklin, 2002; Molnar Diop, 2014). This process requires people to travel to 
a given state and cross its border in order to claim refugee status and request protection, a 
request that must be met with access to particular rights and processes if the state is a 
signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees. If refugee claimants are then 
determined to be ‘genuinely’ persecuted, and thus ascribed with the refugee label, states 
that are signatories must protect them, limiting sovereignty in the decision over inclusion 
and exclusion.6 Therefore, most Global North states establish whatever boundaries 
possible to limit and manage the arrival of refugee claimants, and present a discursive 
and material preference for resettling refugees from other countries, thus reinstating their 
sovereign power to select (Mountz, 2010).  States in the Global South, who bear the 
major refugee protection responsibility, normally offer only prima facie refugee status, 
designating groups who are legitimately fleeing persecution, but only offering limited and 
																																																								6 The 1951 Geneva Convention, which has been ratified by 145 states, defines the term refugee as a person 
who:  
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, n.d.). 
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temporary rights (Hyndman & Giles, 2017, p. 1). As a result, violent control accompanies, 
and frequently dominates, protection (Agier, 2011), which thereafter has very little to do 
with ‘genuine’ fear (Showler, 2006). However, Agamben (1998) argues that if the 
spontaneous arrival of refugees represents a threat to the state, it is actually less of a 
physical threat than an epistemological one. In other words, by fleeing a state to establish 
themselves in another, refugees disrupt the ontologized continuity between the individual, 
their citizenship, their nativity and nationality, and the loyalty/membership they are 
supposed to project to all of these. They further challenge hegemonic assumptions of 
mandatory citizenship, as they may be stateless, having lost their original citizenship in 
transit and been delayed or prevented from gaining another for a multitude of reasons 
(Giles, 2008). Thus, their very need for reterritorialization challenges paradigms of 
national stability and permanence (Soguk, 1999).  
While the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Geneva Convention has not 
changed significantly, broadly accepted understandings of ‘refugeeness’ have changed 
quite substantially (Aberman, 2014; Bhabha, 2004; Judge, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2011). 
The end of the Cold War concretized this shift in the Western understandings, as 
refugeeness was relocated from political dissidents to helpless victims/’bogus’ refugees 
(Judge, 2010; Nolin, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 2011). While, during the Cold War, the asylum-
seeker had been defined as an empowered political actor, Yuval-Davis (2011) argues that 
there was a drastic shift post 9/11, when these same actors resisting their governments 
were reconstructed as “potential terrorists” (p. 37). Therefore, following these two 
historic events, refugeeness became dehistoricized, depoliticized and criminalized, as the 
construction of the appropriate victim of persecution shifted to certain bodies and the 
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corresponding narratives (Judge, 2010). As Adiche (2014) eloquently describes in her 
novel, Americanah: 
     The wind blowing [...] was odorous with fear of asylum seekers, infecting  
     everybody with the panic of impending doom, and so articles were written  
     and read, simply and stridently, as though the writers lived in a world in which  
     the present was unconnected to the past [...] It had to be comforting, this denial  
     of history (p. 320) 
As a result of these constructs, ‘genuine’ refugees are presented as speechless, 
invisible and passive victims, the opposite of the empowered democratic citizen (Nyers, 
2006). These characteristics are not only perceived, but also enforced, as refugees are 
frequently estranged from their own experiences and rendered voiceless (Agier, 2011; 
Hajdukowski-Ahmed, 2008; Soguk, 1999). As Nyers (2006) argues, they become trapped 
within a depoliticized humanitarian space, and silenced as ‘solutions’ to their problems 
are sought.  
These processes of reconstituting refugee subjectivity have necessarily become 
gendered, heterosexualized and racialized, narrowing the understandings of who could be 
included and how. As a result, women have often been perceived as more suitable victims, 
and thus more deserving of rescue and protection, so long as they could be positioned 
within specific tropes, becoming ‘victims’ of their cultures and erasing their agency and 
resistance (Musarrat Akram, 2000; Schrover, van der Leun, Lucassen, & Quispel, 2008). 
Through these constructs, the disempowered “third world supplicant”, who could be 
saved from her reality through refugee protection, has worked to reconstitute Western 
superiority (Razack, 1998). Moreover, this vulnerable femininity becomes inextricably 
tied to heteronormative motherhood, as refugees correspondingly become a hybridized 
figure of ‘women-and-children’ (Bhabha, 2004; Judge, 2010). Dominant ideas of 
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masculinity, therefore, no longer fit comfortably with global North state constructions of 
refugeeness, as trauma, helplessness and vulnerability are often concealed by men since 
they represents a challenge to their own socially-constructed gendered ideal (Judge, 
2010).      
Alternatively, those who are excluded from these rigid constructs, who may have 
similar reasons for their displacement, but do not fit precise and narrowly-interpreted 
definitions or expectations (Shevel, 2011), those Agier (2011) refers to as “remnants”, 
and Khosravi (2009) describes as “anti-citizens”, become ‘irregular migrants’ who are 
demonized and rejected as undeserving. The associated discourse vilifies them as dark, 
diseased and invisible (Agier, 2011), for whom exclusion is the only option. As one 
youth eloquently described in a reflection paper written for the Uprooted U program7 
developed for migrants barred from post-secondary education:  
     What are the criteria for being a refugee? Having your life threatened or being  
     kicked out of your own country isn’t enough? When instead of accepting you  
     because you are healthy and in good shape, you are accepted because you are  
     traumatized or live with disabilities. [...] Getting lost in the refugee process to  
     see yourself denied or rejected as if you are a soccer ball that they are passing  
     around (Regirousso, 2014).  
Recognizing the rigidity of refugee constructs also requires situating refugees 
among others who are displaced or find themselves without state protection or 
recognition. Yuval-Davis (2011) suggests “seeing voluntary and forced migration as two 
extremes of a very long continuum” (p. 37). Zetter (1991) importantly analyzes the 
processes for, as well as the benefits and risks of, assigning labels to refugees, arguing 																																																								7 Uprooted U was a post-secondary level education program run at the FCJ Refugee Centre for youth who 
could not access college or university because of their immigration status. Precarious status youth in 
Canada need to acquire study permits and pay international tuition fees to study at post-secondary 
institutions, barriers that are insurmountable for many.   
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that this is an inescapable part of public policy to be deconstructed. The labels, which 
provide some access to rights and resources for the relatively few who are recognized as 
Convention refugees, also limit inclusion and impose certain subjectivities on refugees, 
again silencing their agency, obscuring their experiences and thereby reconstituting their 
identities. Zetter (2007) returns to this topic, arguing that his previous analysis needs to 
be reviewed in light of the increased complexity of labeling within mixed migration 
flows. He states that across the Global North, fewer migrants are afforded labels such as 
“full refugee status”, thus putting those who are excluded at risk in multiple ways. Within 
this complexity, he advocates for replacing the refugee label with forced migrant to better 
reflect diverse root causes, and more accurately place the migration within wider 
transnational processes (p. 189). Betts (2010) takes up a similar argument, suggesting that 
forced migration is no longer monocausal, but instead a result of several environmental, 
political, and economic factors. He offers the term survival migration to describe the 
movement of people away from “an existential threat for which they have no domestic 
remedy” (p. 361); this threat to life is understood more broadly than the narrow 
conceptualization of persecution. Betts points to climate change and extreme poverty as 
reasons for the progression of survival migration. This broadened conceptualization could 
permit a new determination of who requires protection, countering the “ethical and legal 
arbitrariness” of the current system (p. 362). Betts argues that no new institutions would 
be required for this expansion, since existing ones would simply need to adapt. He further 
notes that this migration will occur regardless of the approach, thus his proposed 
framework could offer “guidance, predictability, and international reciprocity” (p. 378). 
While the particularities and suggested labels within these arguments differ, the important 
		 60	
commonality is the recognition of the diverse and ever-evolving reasons for displacement, 
calling for more inclusive and responsive institutional change.   
Warsan Shire (2015) offers an emotional representation and explanation of the 
different ways migrants may need to seek safety as a result of the narrowed refugee 
protection and closed borders in her poem Home. She describes the migrants’ situations 
clearly on the spectrum of forced migration, explaining that “you only leave home/ when 
home won’t let you stay/no one leaves home unless home chases you.” She goes on to 
describe the dangerous journeys many must take to reach states where they can seek 
safety, even though upon arrival they may be criminalized and marked as ‘bogus’ and 
undeserving: 
You have to understand  
that no one puts their children in a boat  
unless the water is safer than the land 
no one burns their palms  
under trains  
beneath carriages  
no one spends days and nights in the stomach of a truck  
feeding on newspaper unless the miles travelled 
mean something more than a journey. 
no one crawls under fences 
no one wants to be beaten 
pitied    
The means of travel described above are inherently linked to the criminalization 
of migrants within a paradigm that is built upon the idea that the ‘genuine’ refugees wait 
to be resettled. As Bhuyan and Smith-Carrier (2012) argue, the constructed connection 
between migrants and criminality is well documented. In fact, they outline how variations 
of the word criminal appear 73 times in Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act (IRPA), reinforcing the fact that migrants are arguably defined as “immoral subject”, 
		 61	
not to be trusted (Bhuyan & Smith-Carrier, 2012, p. 210). Crépeau, Nakache and Atak 
(2007) argue that these provisions in IRPA facilitate the criminalization of migrants in a 
way that the criminal code would not permit. Compared with provisions in the criminal 
code, IRPA “provides much broader powers to arrest and detain foreigners on security 
grounds” (Crépeau et al., 2007, p. 327). From 2008 to 2015 the Conservative Canadian 
government used these provisions a number of times to exclude migrants in different 
ways, which will be further outlined in Chapter 3.  
While the IRPA came into force post 9/11, thus expanding securitization priorities, 
Pratt and Valverde (2002) show how the conflation of migrant and criminal predates the 
paradigm shift. They show the development of these tactics as the criminal migrant was 
constructed by Canadian government officials in the 1990s transition period to 
increasingly govern immigration through criminalization. This criminalization was, and 
continues to be, racialized and has often relied on cultural stereotypes. Migrants were 
increasingly scrutinized under the guise of “danger to the public”, a shift increasingly 
implemented in immigration law from the mid-1990s (Pratt & Valverde, 2002, p. 144).  
McDonald (2009) extends this point further, highlighting and critiquing the fact that 
criminal checks are required by immigration officials for inclusion. She argues that 
accepting criminality as a legitimate reason to exclude obscures the systemic racism that 
is inherent in policing as well as the criminal justice system, which is well documented in 
Canada, as well as elsewhere. In an autobiographical portrayal of his own experience of 
criminalization, Regirousso (2016) describes the day he made a refugee claim at the 
Canadian border:  
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     The border was crowded with cars trying to get in or out, and everybody’s eyes  
     were on me with a disgusted look, as I was again.... nothing. One officer took off  
     my handcuffs, instructed me to sit at the back of the van, and handcuffed me again  
     to the metal behind the seat in front of me (p. 68).  
As such, the ‘deserving’ refugee becomes further dehistoricized and depoliticized, 
as varied experiences and interactions will automatically mark migrant bodies as 
‘undeserving’ and dangerous.  
II.  Migrant Illegalization 
“[He was a] stranger in a strange land whose only transgression was to exist in a place 
where his presence was illegal” (Hill, 2015, p. 1). 
 The increasingly mixed and complex reasons behind migration make strict 
dichotomies, politically-driven distinctions and associated labels more difficult to assign 
(Betts, 2010; Boehm, 2011; Zetter, 2007).  As a result of the increased criminalization of 
migration, many migrants in the Global North are ‘undeserving’ of the purported 
hospitable receptions, leaving them with few legal options or rights. These exclusions, 
while frequently resisted by migrants, advocates and certain gatekeepers in multiple ways, 
push some onto the spectrum of forced voluntary return. The following literature 
importantly offers analyses of both government and civilian soldier-enforced exclusion, 
as well as migrant agency in countering the exclusions, but overlooks some of the 
messiness involved in FVR. By offering one form of self-deportation, and maintaining 
further binary conceptualizations of return as either voluntary or forced, tensions felt in 
experiences of return are often missed. 
Several authors have argued that restrictive immigration bureaucracies that 
maintain obligatorily narrow definitions of “refugeeness”, and limit migrants’ options for 
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secure status in other immigration categories, increase migrant precarity and create the 
processes that produce precarious forms of status (Bhuyan, 2012; Goldring, Berinstein, & 
Bernhard, 2009; Goldring & Landolt, 2013a; Magalhaes, Carrasco, & Gastaldo, 2010; P. 
E. Villegas, 2014, 2015a).  Goldring and Landolt (2013a) define precarious status as “the 
situation of all nonpermanent residents, authorized and unauthorized” (p.1), and 
conceptualize it as “an assemblage constituted by practices, actors and institutions” (p. 
20). In this way they disrupt static ideas of immigration categories, recognizing that while 
temporary categories (arguably anything less than citizenship) may be rigid, they may 
also be transitory and/or fluid. Thus, precarious status may refer to temporary residents 
who are dependent on a person or institution for their status, sponsored spouses, refugee 
claimants and denied claimants, visa overstayers, and people without authorized status, 
with the recognition that people may also change categories at different times (Goldring 
et al., 2009). Yuval-Davis (2011) reinforces this understanding, arguing that these 
processes of belonging are always dynamic rather than fixed, they shift, expand and 
restrict, reflecting dominant power relations and ideologies. Thus, migrants frequently 
move between categories, including being without status, as categories are frequently ill-
defined to match people’s actual experiences (Goldring & Landolt, 2013b). Moreover, De 
Regt (2010) argues that divergent policies between states further create precarious 
situations where migration processes are not clear cut, making it increasingly difficult to 
define ‘legal’ migration in many circumstances. Thus, the precarious presence of 
migrants has been increasingly studied with the recognition that status categories and 
their associated inclusion/exclusion are purposefully constructed in particular ways that 
are frequently resisted, and should be further critiqued and challenged. 
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Others have focused more directly on those who are most precarious, migrants 
who are without any immigration status (non-status), and inherently susceptible to 
detention and deportation. As with the recognition of pathways to precarious legal status, 
authors have also documented the states’ role in re/producing the illegalization of 
racialized migrant bodies legally and socially (Bloch, Sigona, & Zetter, 2014; De Genova, 
2005; De Genova, 2002; Magalhaes et al., 2010; Menjívar & Kanstroom, 2014; Ngai, 
2004; Schrover et al., 2008; Willen, 2007). Villegas (2015a) defines this illegalization as 
“the process of marking certain bodies, their practices and presence as ‘illegal’” (p. 232).  
Critiquing the demarcation described, many scholars, as well as activists, have taken up 
the argument that a person in themselves cannot be illegal, and therefore bodies should 
not be criminalized for being within particular borders (Abji, 2013; Akers Chacón & 
Davis, 2006; Anderson, Sharma, & Wright, 2009; Lowry & Nyers, 2003; Nyers, 2010). 
Menjívar and Kanstroom (2014) develop that argument further, highlighting how 
‘illegality’ in this context risks becoming an existential condition, because, while there 
are remedies and penances for other crimes, this form of illegality has few possibilities 
for redemption. They contend that with extremely limited options available to regularize 
immigration status in the United States, exile through deportation becomes a potentially 
disproportionate punishment (p. 2).  
One of the ways migrants can overcome or leave this illegalization is by obtaining 
status documents, and Suarez-Navaz (2004) discusses the fetishization of papers that 
happens as a result. Through her study of migrants in Spain, she found that papers are 
given such a high value because they are seen as the only way migrants can acquire rights, 
protecting them from abuse, exploitation and forced displacement. As a result, “[p]apers 
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become an obsession” (p. 103) as they “embody multiple daily social relations embedded 
in an unequal distribution of power” (p. 111). Vasta (2011) shows how migrants unable 
to obtain papers through official channels may find ways of borrowing, renting or buying 
them, resisting state authority to both grant the documents and control their presence. The 
strategies she explored allowed migrants to maintain “a sense of autonomy and control in 
difficult conditions” (p. 200). Nonetheless, using official processes to obtain state-
sanctioned status documents is an inherently gendered experience, as options are 
frequently based on constructs and expectations related to migrants’ gender identity. As 
Shrover, et al. (2008) show, whether linked to labour market needs or tied to 
humanitarian acceptance of appropriate ‘victims’, the inclusion of migrants by state 
bureaucracies’ is necessarily gendered.    
De Genova (2002) further argues that migrant ‘illegality’ cannot be studied 
simply in terms of consequences, but rather must be historicized in order to denaturalize 
the legal/illegal binary. He goes on to explain how “illegality” is discursively and legally 
accomplished for the purposes of a specific form of inclusion, an enforced vulnerability, 
rather than direct exclusion. McDonald (2009) refers to this process as ‘apartheid’, 
through which migrants are not simply physically excluded, but rather included through 
their ‘illegality’ or ‘unlawfulness’. Ngai (2004) also contends that undocumented 
migrants are simultaneously included and excluded; they are incorporated into the labour 
force and become at once familiar and invisible, utilized for specific kinds of work. This 
point is highlighted in the fiction of Cristina Henriquez (2014), that describes and 
compares the experience of  migrant workers who have documentation with those who 
don’t. Midway throughout her novel, The Book of Unknown Americans, the workers on a 
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mushroom farm in the United States who have visas are fired and replaced with 
undocumented workers. When asked how employers would proceed and whether hiring 
workers without immigration documents exclusively would be possible, one character 
answered: “Probably. It saves them money that way” (p. 181). The exploitability of non-
status migrants, both economically and through substandard working conditions, make 
their presence valuable at the same time as it is criminalized. Magalhaes, Carrasco and 
Gastaldo (2010) argue that this is the sign of a deep disconnect between the demands of 
employers and the desire of the state for ‘skilled’ permanent residents. Thus, the 
‘desirable’ migrant is necessarily educated and highly skilled, while the ‘undesirable’, 
non-status migrant may or may not be skilled, but through their criminalization also 
becomes crucial to sustain the workforce.    
Discussions regarding migrant illegalization and undocumented residents have 
critiqued what has been called the citizenship – undocumented binary. For example, 
Willen (2007) reminds us that “legality and illegality are revealed as mutually 
constitutive and mutually defining” (p. 3). Sharma (2000) further argues that relying on 
citizenship-based arguments to make demands of the state “activates” the distinction with 
non-citizenship, where non-citizens are denied rights as a result of their position as the 
opposite of citizens; these types of demands made by citizens locate rights within the 
nation-state instead of linking them to a global conceptualization of rights and 
inequalities. Others have also taken up this issue to challenge systems that tie rights to 
nation-states. Though rights are currently assigned to particular immigration statuses and 
therefore not universal (Bloch et al., 2014; Goldring & Landolt, 2013a), many have 
advocated for the understanding of rights as deterritorialized, inherent to the person rather 
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than their ties to a particular state (Crépeau et al., 2007). Suarez-Navaz (2004) has 
highlighted migrants’ own struggles to maintain their identities as rights-holders; this is 
done both as a direct challenge to state-imposed exclusion, as well as a method of 
survival.   
Pathways to precarious status, and the effects of being without secure immigration 
status, are necessarily gendered, as well as racialized, classed and impacted by ability. 
Therefore, identity-based expectations have particular impacts on migrant bodies. 
Looking at gender disparities in Canada, Magalhaes, Carrasco and Gastaldo, (2010) argue 
that “[n]on-status women have been noted to be extremely vulnerable to poverty, 
unemployment, poor and unstable living conditions, danger, exploitation, abuse, and high 
risk or complications during pregnancy” (p. 147). The risk of gender-based violence for 
non-status women is also significant, while access to support and protection continues to 
be difficult to obtain. Building on that knowledge, Bhuyan et al. (2014) argue for a 
framework that posits precarious immigration status as a part of the spectrum of violence 
against women. In their report, Unprotected, Unrecognized: Canadian Immigration 
Policy and Violence Against Women, 2008-2013, Bhuyan et al. investigated the ways 
Canadian immigration policies contribute to women’s vulnerability to violence based on 
the many regressive immigration changes that were implemented during that time. Since 
migrants’ situations were made more precarious and access to support and services has 
often been reduced, women have faced increased risks of gender-based violence, and 
have often had few options for support. While the report offers a very nuanced 
understanding of the impacts of intersecting identities and sources of violence, there is 
also the continued recognition that women often face this increased vulnerability because 
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they frequently enter Canada dependent on a sponsor or employer who has some control 
over their immigration process (Bhuyan et al., 2014). De Regt (2010) highlights women’s 
agency in similar situations, noting that in particular circumstances women may chose to 
remain undocumented strategically as it may free them of specific risks of abuse, from a 
spouse or employer, on whom they would be dependent for their status. While such 
strategies present many other risks and concerns, they are indicative of the lack of viable 
alternatives women often face within the migration trajectories. As violence against 
women is inherently tied to broad patriarchal systems and various forms of oppression, it 
is important to recognize the role of precarious immigration status in perpetuating 
situations of violence and limiting women’s agency.   
Deportability 
It is precisely the potential temporariness inherent in precarious immigration 
status that reinforces migrants’ inclusionary exclusion, as they can be fully excluded from 
the society and the territory at any time.  De Genova (2002) defines deportability as “the 
possibility of deportation, the possibility of being removed from the space of the nation-
state” (p. 439), and argues that the power of deportability lies in the fact that some are 
deported while others are able to remain. He further contends that, it is deportability, and 
not actual deportation, which acts to produce ‘illegality’; some are deported so that the 
rest may precariously stay, commodified as exploitable and disposable workers. For those 
who remain, the border surrounds them, border spaces are moved to affect their day-to-
day interactions, rendering them deportable at any time. Therefore, deportability as well 
as deportation act as powerful technologies of exclusion, both within states and across 
their boundaries. Coutin (2015) further argues that these technologies of exclusion make 
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up the produced process of deportation, which begins with deportability and ends long 
after the actual removal with migrants’ experiences of reintegration. Therefore, she 
contends that deportation itself is much more than one discrete act involving a variety of 
actors and stakeholders.    
In her personal account of the impacts of deportability in Seeds of Hope, April 
May (2016) clearly shares the hyper vigilance and fear she experiences as a result of her 
precarity in Canada:   
Will the sight of a black SUV or a police cruiser ever not make my heart 
race a mile a minute, keeping my flight or fight instinct permanently on 
flight mode? Will I ever feel safe and secure again? Will I ever be able to 
walk out of my apartment without a complete surveillance of my 
surroundings? Will I ever be able to drop my hyper vigilance even within 
the confines of the four walls that I sink every measly paycheck into? Will 
I always be struggling? What about my girls? My beautiful brilliant loving 
girls. So full of potential, capable of such great things. Will they ever get 
the opportunity to follow their dreams? These are the thoughts that keep 
me company every day, thoughts that I constantly have to push back from 
my consciousness (May, 2016, p. 79). 
Revealing the long-term impacts of deportabilty, Ngai (2004) explains the ways it 
devalues any attempts at integration. The efforts people invest in building lives and 
integrating socially and economically are not only erased, but also rendered invisible 
through deportation (p. 2). P.E. Villegas (2014) reinforces these arguments as she 
analyzes the temporal orientation of precarious status migrants. She suggests that as a 
result of illegalization migrants have a complicated temporal orientation with an enforced 
orientation to the present, limiting their ability to plan for the future. This also affects 
experiences of reception and belonging. Willen (2007) similarly explains that 
illegalization structures “experiences of space, time, personhood, collectivity, and 
embodied subjectivity” (p. 2). Studying these effects on the long-term economic 
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outcomes of precarious status, Goldring and Landolt (2013a) found that the financial 
situations and job quality of migrants did not significantly improve, even after their status 
was regularized.  The ongoing disciplining by employers taking advantage of precarious 
status workers, as well as self-regulation by the workers themselves to avoid 
unemployment and mitigate deportability has long-term impacts. As a result, even when 
deportability is less of a constant threat, its impacts may be long felt, as is further 
described below. 
State and non-state actors endeavor to enact a variety of “common sense” 
responses to precarious status migrants in ways that reconstitute sovereign control. These 
responses, which include different practices of bordering and deportability, are 
encouraged by politicians, civil servants and individuals, who can all participate in their 
applications. Thus, in addition to governmental control, the “civilian soldier” (Orr, 2004) 
is given increasing amounts of power for targeted violence and social, economic and 
physical exclusion. Certain gatekeepers in particular become powerful civilian soldiers 
who can deny access to necessary services, without the legal obligation to do so. Park and 
Bhuyan (2012) demonstrate how this power floods over into social interactions with 
service providers who purport to offer help and support. These service providers 
participate in bordering by denying rights to migrants even when these rights are 
understood as universal.   
Self-Deportation 
In the United States, one way in which deportability has been concretized in 
discourse, and taken up within policy development and programming, is through the 
		 71	
concept of self-deportation.  This concept assumes an ‘attrition through enforcement’ 
strategy, which involves increased immigration enforcement and border controls at 
multiple levels, including federally as well as locally, and administered through 
immigration officials, police officers, school administrators, employers and landlords, all 
of whom are expected to check people’s documentation (Filindra, 2012).  These 
immigration controls necessarily rely on intersecting identity constructs for their 
implementation, as they assume a particular racialized, gendered and classed migrant 
body. The civilian soldiers engaged in these controlling tactics have few tools other than 
the above constructs that rely on racist, classist and heterosexist stereotypes. Particular 
migrant bodies in the U.S. today are thus always surrounded by border spaces as they 
bump up against border controls throughout their day-to-day interactions.  
Self-deportation has been conceptualized in the U.S. as an inexpensive and viable 
alternative to mass deportation, the threat of which makes continued residency 
unbearably risky for migrants facing capture, detention and deportation (Kobach, 2007). 
Migrants, particularly those without immigration status, are left to experience a decreased 
quality of life to the point that they would ‘voluntarily’ give up and go home (Fragoso, 
2013); by extension, others considering migration to the U.S. are expected to be deterred 
from coming in the first place. While this strategy has been promoted by different actors 
in varying ways, its utility has been significantly challenged. The premise that harsh 
punishments deter migrants from entering the country has been disputed by researchers 
and advocates alike (Mainwaring & Silverman, 2017; Menjívar & Kanstroom, 2014; 
Silverman, 2014). In fact, Rocha et al. (2014) argue that policies developed to heavy 
handedly discourage irregular migration have had the opposite effect of increasing the 
		 72	
number of undocumented residents, since migrants increase the amount of time they stay 
in the country, unwilling to repeat the difficult journey back and forth; and the longer 
they spend in the United States, the more likely they are to resettle permanently (p. 81). 
These same authors found that self-deportation policies also resulted in undocumented 
migrants staying longer than those who possessed some form of status. These findings are 
echoed by Banks (2012), who suggests that the unreceptive environment created by 
‘attrition through enforcement’ keeps migrants from trying to regularize their status, 
meaning they remain precarious for longer periods of time. Banks also argues that 
specific enforcement policies, which rely heavily on racial profiling, affect all migrants, 
regardless of immigration status. This racist othering affects perceptions of inclusion and 
belonging, and makes the value of citizenship seem less substantial, as even citizens 
could be subject to the enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, the policies are not only 
having the opposite of the desired effect for non-status populations, but are also 
negatively impacting the ‘desired/deserving’ migrant population.  
Filindra (2012) also challenges the usefulness of self-deportation policies in the 
U.S. from an economic perspective, arguing that the expected utility theory the policies 
are based on is inherently flawed. This theory, which assumes that ‘rational’ actors will 
‘opt’ to leave in such hostile environments, does not account for the multiple factors that 
push people to stay. Filindra points to economically-based studies that have shown that 
humans are less interested in maximizing profits than minimizing losses. Therefore, even 
if migrants cannot accumulate the amount of money they had hoped for, and may face 
significant risks, they are likely unwilling to accept the loss of investments they have 
made in property, businesses and children’s education. Filindra thus challenges 
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assumptions about migrants’ economic establishment, instead focusing on the ability to 
make meaningful financial investments in their communities and in their own futures. 
People who have established economic and social roots and become part of communities 
are frequently unwilling to ‘voluntarily’ leave.       
Fragoso (2013) offered a gendered assessment of American self-deportation 
policies that reveals that women are often disproportionately isolated as a result of fears 
of immigration enforcement. As vulnerable and unprotected workers, non-status women 
experience extremely high rates of sexual harassment and abuse in the workplace (p. 82). 
However, they are often too afraid to denounce such abuse for fear of losing their 
precarious employment or of being reported to immigration authorities. Thus, ‘attrition 
through enforcement’ has a sexualized gendered application that leaves women workers 
victimized, isolated and highly exploitable. Fragoso also found that non-status women 
were frequently overly dependent on male partners and family members for their limited 
economic and social inclusion. Precarious status women have thus been found to be more 
at risk of intimate partner and family violence, since their ability to seek help or support 
from community members, women’s groups, or shelters may increase their deportability 
if their immigration status is revealed. Therefore, both in the workplace and in the private 
sphere, as Bhuyan et al. (2014) demonstrate in the Canadian context, the state becomes 
directly and indirectly complicit in violence against women by passing and implementing 
‘attrition through enforcement’ policies that limit women’s ability to denounce the 
violence they face as well as restricting access to support services through status 
requirements.   
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Moreover, Fragoso also highlights the fact that hundreds of thousands of children 
are born in the U.S. every year to mothers who have no immigration status. These 
mothers often avoid accessing benefits and supports to which their children are entitled 
for fear of detection by immigration enforcement, which isolates them further. These 
mothers face an added layer of vulnerability with ‘attrition through enforcement’ since 
detention or deportation can result in the loss of custody of their children (Fragoso, 2013, 
p. 98). The state is thus complicit in the violent removal of U.S. citizen children from 
their families, many of whom had not instigated concerns about their parenting beyond 
holding precarious immigration status. Fragoso’s gendered analysis offers important 
insights into the ways self-deportation policies affect particular women, yet the implicit 
hetero-normativity and gender normativity inherent in his analysis potentially ignores 
precarious status women who do not fit within the social roles of partner/wife and mother.     
Taken together the three authors, Banks, Filindra and Fragoso offer lenses 
through which to conceive an intersectional analysis of self-deportation policies. While 
each author focuses on one aspect of migrants’ identities (i.e. gender, race, class), these 
identities are interconstituted, as racialization is necessarily gendered and classed, and 
vice versa. Therefore, it is not only important to understand how these identities are 
constructed as ‘other’, but to also recognize the differences in material impacts. The 
oppressions imposed on precarious status migrants as a result of ‘attrition through 
enforcement’ are felt differently based on these same intersecting identity constructs.    
Deportation 
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In order to maintain this constant threat of deportability, a number of ongoing 
deportations are necessary. As Khosravi (2009) argues, the spectacle of deportation 
removes the “bodily pollution of the anti-citizen” so that the health and wellbeing of the 
nation can be restored (p. 52). Deportation studies, while relatively new, explore 
securitization and enforcement regimes, as well as their procedures and impacts, focusing 
on policy, policing, detention, deportation and their effects in sending and receiving 
countries (Coutin, 2015). While the focus is frequently on the apparatuses and processes 
of deportation, migrant agency in these processes is noted by several authors outlined 
below; this is important in nuancing the involuntariness of forced return and 
understanding the complexities and divergences in migrants’ experiences. 
The transnational approach inherent in Deportation Studies allows for the 
inclusion of the many actors implicated in deportation. For instance, Coutin (2015) 
argues that this inclusion of diverse actors is important since deportation does not simply 
involve a relationship between state immigration officials and individual migrants. 
Instead, deportation is a process which affects communities, organizations, family 
members and activists in sending and receiving countries. She concludes that the 
deportation process is a violent form of exile, a forced migration that is inherently 
irrational since banishment through exile is considered unacceptable in other contexts. 
Coutin (2015) therefore contends, as other authors have, that exile through deportation is 
a disproportionate punishment that should not be normalized.  
Wheatly (2011) argues that forced return is still an understudied area of migration 
and that this gap in knowledge is important since we lack an understanding of the 
differential impacts on returnees’ social, political and economic reintegration as a result. 
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Hagan, Eschbach and Rodriguez (2008) also address the gap in research on forced return, 
undertaking a transnational approach to explore the familial, remittance and settlement 
disruptions caused by deportation of long-term residents, and how these disruptions affect 
future migration plans. These authors highlight the deportation process, analyzing 
immigration procedures that increase migrants’ deportability and deportation, while at the 
same time acknowledging agency in plans and actions that migrants develop to counter 
this process. Schuster and Majidi (2013) also highlight migrants’ agency and capacity for 
action despite the overpowering constraints imposed by state actions (p. 222). These 
authors look at the factors that make reintegration difficult in instances of forced return, 
including debts incurred, loss of opportunities, shame and the formation of transnational 
links. They found that migrants forcibly returned to their countries of origin would often 
migrate again in order to achieve their desired goals.  
While the power of border officials in the Global North is often highlighted 
through the deportation process, it is not monolithic, nor unchallenged. There are legal 
and capacity limitations to deportations, which restrict officials’ power. In Canada, 
officials also afford migrants some individual agency in the deportation process, as 
migrants are often given the responsibility of independently showing up at the airport for 
their removal. Therefore, in specific situations, migrants can choose not to present 
themselves, arguably increasing future deportability since officials will look for them, but 
also allowing the person to remain physically in the country. Moreover, for specific 
reasons, certain migrants become non-removable, either as the result of the 
implementation of the non-refoulment policy,8 or due to a lack of travel documents, or 																																																								8	Non-refoulement is defined in Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention: 
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the risk of statelessness that limits state officials’ exclusion options. In Canada, there is a 
list of countries that are deemed too dangerous to which to return migrants. Therefore, 
even though a person may not hold immigration status and is known to authorities, they 
cannot be deported (except for reasons of criminality). As Paoletti (2010) argues, the 
number of deportations may be low as compared to the number of removal orders issued. 
She suggests that this may represent a bond between the state and non-citizens, pointing 
to the potential for the development of other rights claims.    
Deportations are necessarily gendered and racialized, a process Golash-Boza and 
Hondagneu-Sotelo (2013) refer to in the United States as a gendered racial removal 
program. They argue that this physical exclusion has shifted from a focus on racialized 
women who were marked as moral and reproductive threats, to racialized men, as 
representations of men have shifted from labourers to violent criminals. They also point 
out that this shift from undesirable women to threatening men is connected to economic 
trends, as they link high unemployment with the increased deportation of men, while at 
the same time women’s employability (and potentially violent exploitability) has 
expanded. Others studying the issue in Europe have suggested that males are subject to 
removal in higher numbers than women due to public sympathy; officials may be less 
willing to use ejective force against women and children due to the negative perception of 
doing so due to the feminized construct of the ‘deserving victim’ (Khosravi, 2009; 
Schrover et al., 2008).  
																																																																																																																																																																					
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (UNHCR, 2007) 		
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Detention  
In order to ensure that migrants obey removal orders within a particular time 
frame, or to punish those who will not/cannot be removed, detention offers state officials 
the possibility of exclusionary spaces within their sovereign territory, which may push 
people to leave ‘voluntarily’. This constitutes a practice Crépeau, Nakache and Atak 
(2007) referred to as internment, which serves the dual purpose of punishing migrants, as 
well as perfomatively reaffirming state officials’ ability to control their territory and 
borders, thus purportedly protecting citizens. This  “detention–as-spectacle” is about 
sovereign enforcement, control and power rather than deterrence (Mainwaring & 
Silverman, 2017). Similarly, Khosravi (2009) compares immigration detention to a “pre-
modern prison”, where the purpose is not rehabilitation and reintegration, but rather 
punishment and removal. Adichie (2014) describes the experience of being detained in 
her novel Americanah, in which she describes: “[i]n detention, he felt raw, skinned, the 
outer layers of himself stripped off” (p. 347).  
In Canada, the Immigration Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) permits the arrest and 
(possibly indefinite) detention of non-citizens in three circumstances, when: 1) there is 
suspicion that a migrant will not appear for examination or removal; 2) the migrant poses 
a danger to the public; 3) identity cannot be established (Crépeau et al., 2007). 
Mainwaring and Silverman (2017) point to another reason detention is utilized, namely, 
deterrence of other migrants. However, they argue that there is no “credible proof” that 
detention practices deter future migrants, despite significant social, psychological and 
physical costs to those being detained. Instead the spectacle of detention may affect 
populations within the state, including citizens who may feel reassured, and migrants who 
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may experience increased fear about their own criminalization and proximity to 
deportability. Bosworth and Slade (2014) found that the men they interviewed in 
detention in the U.K. actively contested their criminalization, asserting an equivalent 
form of citizenship through community connections, “good families” and human rights. 
While women are also detained for immigration purposes, the number of men is often 
higher due to criminal constructs that rely on intersecting race and gender identities. 
Bosworth and Slade (2014) also found that in this context detention became gendered in 
particular ways, as many men performed hyper-masculinity to assert their identities and 
resist the power being imposed upon them. The authors gave examples of the ways the 
men spoke to both male and female guards to assert themselves, as well as persistent 
exercise to “perfect[...] a muscular, male physique” (p. 176).  The criminalization and 
deportability of migrants is an intersectional process, relying on particular identity 
constructs for exclusion and control.        
Migration continues to be a defining issue for many states, and thus, sovereignty 
is continuously reconstituted through the re/production of borders and control of space, 
time and bodies. Identities are frequently re/constituted through movement, and 
individuals are enlisted in this process through “common sense” (McLennan et al., 1984) 
understandings of inclusion and exclusion. Citizens engaged as civilian soldiers are 
expected to discipline the undesirable/undeserving migrant, while migrants themselves 
become exploitable, detainable and deportable. These inclusionary and exclusionary 
boundary-making processes necessarily involve constructed categorizations that 
legitimate and solidify these processes. Hierarchies are subsequently produced, within 
and across categories, defining who is welcome and who is constituted as a criminal 
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threat to the nation, as a remnant, anti-citizen who can be threatened, contained and 
disposed of.  
Voluntary Departure 
 At the other end of the voluntary/involuntary spectrum, migration scholars have 
also focused their attention on the voluntary return of economic migrants. This research 
has traditionally highlighted the experiences of migrant populations who hold particular 
immigration statuses and has systematized the analysis of their experiences of integration 
and return. Jean-Pierre Cassarino (2004) offers an overview of the ways voluntary return 
migration has been taken up in migration literature and correspondingly, how returnees 
have been depicted. He outlines several approaches that have predominated, including 
neo-classical economics and the new economics of labour migration approach, 
structuralism, transnationalism and cross-border social network theory.  
A neo-classical economics approach depicts migrants as individual rational 
economic actors who have made calculated decisions to migrate for income 
maximization. Their return is conversely understood as a failure insofar as they 
“miscalculated the costs of migration and [...] did not reap the benefits of higher earnings” 
(Cassarino, 2004, p. 255). The new economics of labour migration approach starts from a 
similar assumption, which identifies migrants as part of a household economic unit that 
seeks maximum communal rewards through strategic migration. However, this approach 
views return migration as the logical outcome of a successful strategy; therefore, 
migrants return when they have achieved their economic goals and projects. These 
approaches have overarchingly been gendered male, constructing workers as abled-
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bodied cis-gendered men and prioritizing men’s experiences, while ignoring women’s 
experiences. In these contexts, women are included only insofar as they are the 
dependents of men, as accompanying partners or the receivers of remittances. While 
attempts have been made to add women to this research and highlight their diverse 
experiences, such a dichotomous understanding of gender ignores intersecting identities 
and the necessary analysis of power relations (Donato, Gabaccia, Holdaway, Manalansan, 
& Pessar, 2006, p. 4). A structural approach focuses on macro level systems and power 
relations that instigate migration. This systemic approach addresses the social context of 
return, placing importance on the experiences of reintegration and involves a 
core/periphery understanding, in which migration is assumed to occur unidirectionally 
from the global South to the North, inherently undervaluing migrants’ return (Cassarino, 
2004). Transnationalism and social network theory open conceptual space for a more 
fluid understanding of migration, return, and the individual connections people make, 
maintain and build throughout. While these last two approaches have offered important 
entry points for an intersectional analysis, few migration researchers have pursued them 
in depth from that perspective.  
Cassarino (2004) built on these approaches, acknowledging their contributions 
and limitations, to develop a model that considers pre-return conditions, including status, 
motivations, and resource mobilization, to emphasize preparedness and willingness to 
return. His model argues that return cannot solely be viewed as voluntary, and that 
voluntary action can take different forms. Cassarino’s work is useful for this dissertation 
since he complicates both the conceptualization of voluntary and the associated 
motivations for return; however, his analysis remains limited in its conceptualization of 
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involuntary return and does not fully consider social location beyond immigration status. 
While many of the theories outlined by Cassarino have primarily been applied to so-
called economic migration, the relative arbitrariness of immigration categories means that 
people who fall within other categories may have had similar experiences. Exclusionary 
immigration policies have also obliged migrants to use particular pathways to increase 
their mobility, which may not correspond with the definitions and expectations of the 
aforementioned economic migration theories.9 
III.	Canadian	Boundary	Making	
Within the Canadian context, wherein my dissertation is situated, belonging has 
taken particular forms linked to ongoing histories of settler-colonialism and racist 
exclusion. As such, certain bodies are marked as worthy of inclusion, subjects who are 
understood through national stories of immigration and settlement. These same stories 
erase the bodies that do not contribute to building the dominant narrative, and exclude 
others from ever participating (Dua, 1999). As Walia (2013) explains, it is precisely 
settler-colonial logics that make immigration the issue that it is. Therefore, immigration 
policies become one instrument through which the reconstituting of colonial sovereignty 
is materialized and documented. Thus, those who cannot see themselves reflected in the 
nation-building stories cannot truly belong (Hall, 1999, p. 4). These narratives reinforce a 
capitalist “Canadianization” of the nation, demarcating particular boundaries of 
difference (Sharma, 2006), a process which normalizes a national “whiteness” and 
																																																								9 Voluntary return paradigms beyond those described in this section will be further analyzed in chapter 5 
through critiques of Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration programs implemented internationally as 
well as in Canada.  
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necessarily constructs bodies of colour as outsiders (Arat-Koc, 2005; Dua, 1999; Thobani, 
2007; Walia, 2010).  
At the core of these stories are nationalized ideas of discovery and European 
immigration, which have been concretized, as though society was absent before 
colonization, erasing what Amadahy and Lawrence (2009) refer to as the “largest 
holocaust that the world has ever known” (p. 106). These authors trace the history of 
Canada’s colonial policies: from the extermination of Indigenous peoples and terra 
nullius, to treaty-making between the colonial government and different Indigenous 
communities. They outline the subordination and dispossession inherent in colonial 
policies, and point out the ongoing control and fragmentation exerted on Indigenous 
people through the Indian Act, which enables Canada’s ongoing colonization of 
Indigenous populations with the continued assimilation, marginalization or silencing of 
groups and individuals. Genocidal acts have also included the reduction or elimination of 
populations through legally sanctioned psychological and epistemological violence, 
defining who can or cannot claim Indigenous identity, make treaty demands on the 
government and have access to land. These processes have been gendered and racialized 
based on imperial constructions, demanding that populations “‘perform’ indianness” 
(Lawrence, 2004) in order to be recognized.  
Canadian multiculturalism policy was developed in the early 1970s to affirm 
racial equality, while at the same time limit difference (Amadahy & Lawrence, 2009), 
and to build a “diverse” yet homogeneous nation which in turn would limit the 
conflicting demands of the actual heterogeneity (Bannerji, 2000, p. 8; Gunew, 1997, p. 
23). Within this context, Indigenous (as well as francophone) demands were reduced to 
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those of one interest group among many, muting their right to make claims on the 
government (Amadahy & Lawrence, 2009; Lawrence & Dua, 2005). As Bannerji (2000) 
argues, multicultural policies have thus obfuscated the relations of power located in the 
construction of difference; social relations have been glossed over to prioritize the 
concreteness of cultural identities. Within this construction, there are the “real” cultures, 
those that are dominant and fit within the Canadian project, while others are considered  
peripheral, and to be counted as just another among many, and thus not threatening the 
balance (Bannerji, 2000, p. 51). Therefore, as Fortier (2013) argues, critiquing and 
resisting a multicultural settler-colonial construct requires a challenge to the state’s 
governance broadly, and more specifically, to those in power who determine who can and 
cannot be included.  
Despite the critiques, the settler-colonial narratives and erasures continue to 
determine who may enter, reside, or be recognized as deserving of welcome within the 
Canadian state. Ongoing struggles for Indigenous self-determination demand that 
government officials recognize their treaty obligations, while other settler histories must 
also be acknowledged. The continued exclusion of histories of constructed, non-
conforming, non-citizens then becomes the prerogative of the legitimate use of power by 
the sovereign state (Benhabib, 2004; Bosniak, 2006; Macklin, 2002; Nyers, 2006), and as 
a result, the authorities within the state are able to continuously reconstitute the state 
itself in particular ways without the appearance of doing so (Goldring & Landolt, 2013a; 
Sharma, 2006; Soguk, 1999).  Control is performed through the bureaucratic procedures 
involved in the implementation of policies, attempting to bring order to the disorder of 
migration (Mountz, 2010).  This ordering depends heavily on identity, as identities 
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become solidified through privileging certain bodies, while stigmatizing and policing 
others, strategically producing hierarchal streams, which enable the bureaucratic 
differentiation between inclusion and exclusion (Agier, 2011; Luibhéid, 2002; Mountz, 
2010; Richmond, 2001; Vasta, 2011). While these categories are dependent on certain 
socially and self-defined identities, they also act to produce identities and 
compartmentalize people within them based on specific understandings of gender, race, 
class and ethnic position (Luibhéid, 2002). Value is then assigned to each category, based 
on economic and social needs, as well as xenophobic constructs and context-specific 
ideas of excluded identities. 
 While Canadian immigration policies are propagated as hospitable and 
humanitarian, and thus enable the immigration department to “promote the unique ideals 
all Canadians share” (IRCC, 2017), the immigration system, experienced through the 
actions of immigration officers, has consciously rejected and/or excluded migrants based 
on racialized, classed and gendered admission criteria. It is, according to Walia (2010), “a 
perfect system of social control, containment and expulsion” (p. 72), or as Bannerji 
(2000) describes, immigration policies become “a euphemistic expression for racist 
labour and citizenship policies” (p. 4). Until the early 1960s, Canada’s immigration 
policies and enacted procedures were explicitly racist and misogynistic (Arat-Koc, 1999; 
Richmond, 2001). Policies specifically targeted and excluded racialized migrants, 
including: Chinese migrants through a “head tax”; Japanese migrants through a 
“gentleman’s agreement” that relied on the Japanese government to limit emigration; and 
South Asian populations through a continuous journey provision that made it impossible 
to reach Canada ‘legally’. Early policies were also enacted to control women’s 
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movements and actions through the immigration “Women’s Division,” which was 
created by the Canadian government to ensure “care” for migrant women. Immigration 
officials monitored migrant women, imposing moralistic confines on their behavior and 
threatening them with deportation if they engaged in sexual relations outside of marriage. 
Taken together, these policies have effectively barred particular gendered and racialized 
bodies from Canada (Arat-Koc, 1999; Bhuyan & Smith-Carrier, 2012; Dua, 1999; 
Richmond, 2001; Wright, 2013; CCR, 2011). 
Wright (2013) elaborates on these exclusions to describe a “brutal deportation 
regime”, which in the early 1900s also targeted labour radicals, socialists, as well as the 
poor, the unemployed and the disabled whom the Canadian government did not want to 
financially support (p. 34). While the policy language may have changed, as Richmond 
(2001) argues, from macro-racist and overt to different levels of micro-racism, the 
exclusionary practices persisted. Micro-racism, as defined by Richmond, relies on 
cultural stereotypes and tropes that are currently more socially acceptable, such as the 
incompatibility of certain cultures and cultural practices with so-called Canadian values. 
Within this policy shift, the intersections of gender, racialization, class and ability still 
determine which migrants experience efficient and humanitarian immigration; thus, 
hierarchies are created that define rights to work, residence and citizenship (Hari, 2014). 
This is possible, as Das Gupta (1999) argues, because Canadian racism is subtle, 
systematic, even polite and democratic (p. 187). Therefore, the discriminatory exclusion 
inherent in these policies may even pass unnoticed.  
 As Razack (1998) points out, within this context, Canada is portrayed as an 
ordered state, where only ‘deserving’ bodies of colour are welcomed, those who can 
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project back the ‘civilized and generous nature’ of the nation. She further argues that to 
be effectively included as a ‘good/deserving’ immigrant, migrants must be individuals 
without history or accountability. Therefore, categories of deserving and undeserving 
migrants must be created to maintain this relationship, while at the same time excluding 
those who cannot conform to rules of white corporate tolerance, a trope that is not solely 
particular to the Canadian context, but well documented across borders and boundaries 
(Agier, 2011; Bhuyan & Smith-Carrier, 2012; Oliviero, 2013; Spire, 2008; Yuval-Davis, 
2011).  
Similar to Razack’s analysis, this type of inclusion is described by Ahmed (2000) 
as assimilating ‘acceptable’ ‘others’ in ways that forever cast them as the “stranger”. The 
figure of the stranger thus becomes a fetishized but familiar and recognizable figure, not 
unknown, but rather disembodied and marked as strange. Whether welcomed, celebrated 
or excluded, the figure of the stranger becomes reified, disavowing the processes that 
created it, thus erasing lived histories and genuine interactions. Ahmed challenges us to 
consider these processes, particularly where some bodies become “stranger than other 
others” (p. 6, italics in original) and necessarily dangerous and threatening in different 
ways. While these distinctions are frequently tied to the bodies of newcomers, Ahmed 
stretches her analysis much more broadly and further cautions against creating a new 
‘community of strangers’. She instead proposes an approach that deconstructs the social 
relations implicated in these processes through a series of encounters that reconnect 
people and experiences.   
Also focusing on the creation of the potentially dangerous ‘other’/stranger, 
Lakhani (2008) outlines how visible or enacted disruptions to the national narrative, and 
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obvious or deliberate trangressions of bodily norms, relocate even Canadian citizens to 
the stranger category. She makes this argument after analyzing media responses to a 
young girl’s expulsion from a soccer game for wearing a hijab. Orientalist perceptions of 
the hijab cast veiled women as ‘other’ and thus raise questions about citizenship and 
belonging. Therefore, the ongoing violence inherent in enforced assimilation demands 
that those identified as strangers aspire and conform to the hegemonic practices and 
values of ‘Canadianness’. They must demonstrate national loyalty through assimilation in 
order to justify inclusion in a so-called multicultural society, so as to subsequently be 
marked as an acceptable ‘other’ (Arat-Koc, 2005).  
These acts of boundary making have become particularly salient in the last few 
years in the case of citizenship requirements, as women have been denied the right to take 
the citizenship oath if they wear the niqab. Zunera Ishaq, having met all the requirements 
for Canadian citizenship, was stopped from accomplishing the final step, ostensibly 
because her mouth could not be seen saying the oath. Little acknowledgment was noted 
of the fact that she had lived in Canada for the required time, passed citizenship and 
language tests, and paid the required fees, fulfilling the set of guidelines necessary to 
achieve ‘Canadianness’. Instead she was marked as ‘other', an eternal stranger, and was 
told she would be continuously barred from inclusion unless she assimilated in the 
demanded way. As the former Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, 
Jason Kenney stated over twitter, “I believe people taking the public Oath of Citizenship 
should do so publicly, w/ [sic] their faces uncovered” (cited in Goodman, 2014), as 
though by covering her face, Ishaq was making a less public declaration than others. Her 
refusal to conform to the ‘Canadian values’ being imposed upon her became a 
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controversy that wound its way to the Supreme Court, as well as the 2015 national 
election.10 The niqab debate, while primarily focused on newcomer women, had the 
power to mark even Canadian-born women as outsiders, or strangers, somehow 
incompatible with the imagined community. Ishaq’s case was only one example of the 
Conservative Harper Government’s attempts to create ‘common sense’ categorizations 
for inclusion and exclusion through continuously antagonistic statements, carefully 
constructed and performed outrage, and policy solutions that increasingly marginalized 
migrants and limited their options.	
Security of the Canadian State 
 Within this current paradigm of national sovereignty, the relationship between the 
state, as a concept, and the populace, is produced and reproduced in different moments, 
with different approaches as to how this is accomplished. Citizens may identify with state 
sovereignty, compelled to enact bordering and securitizing practices, just as 
governmental discourse may identify the state as the vulnerable subject in need of 
protection (Brown, 2010; Butler, 2004; Hajdukowski-Ahmed, 2008). This relationship 
has been even more evident since September 11, 2001, since which time there has been a 
rearticulation of Canadian identity and a renewal of national exceptionalism, concurrent 
with a ‘re-civilization’ in the context of a ‘clash of civilizations’, making Canadians 
definitively Western (Arat-Koc, 2005). This post-9/11 reconstruction has occurred 
through the language of moral panic that has cultivated feelings that the average citizen is 
																																																								10 The Conservative Government continued to uphold the need for the ban throughout the election 
campaign, stoking gendered Islamophobic hostilities, while the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal 
ruled against the ban. The two main opposition parties, the NDP, and less publicly, the Liberals, took the 
opposing view to that of the Conservatives during the debates. 
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under siege (Davis, 2008, p. 19); and according to Thobani (2007), cast “whiteness [...] as 
vulnerable, endangered, innocent, and the subject of the irrational hatred of the non-
Western Other” (p. 170). As such, the ‘average’ white citizen, and even the certain non-
Muslim of colour, embodying particular forms of state sovereignty, must control and 
discipline the ‘other’, creating violent bordering spaces in multiple ways. Sharma (2006) 
refers to this as part of white nation building, where ‘others’ are made undesirable and the 
border is cast as “out of control” so that border security becomes national security.  
Drawing on affect theory, Ahmed (2004) theorizes that the circulation of 
emotions acts to concretize the exclusion of certain bodies through hate and fear. She 
elaborates on the distinct ways that hate operates to connect as well as divide. Hate 
functions in ways that constitute the subject and the nation, continuously binding the 
subject of inclusion with rights, and the nation with demarcated territory. While some are 
stuck together through hate, this union is only possible through hatred for the ‘other’, the 
outsider who is constituted as a threat to both nation and subject. This affective process 
gains legitimacy through the circulation of hate between figures and bodies, as constant 
circulation is necessary to increase affect and justify violence and exclusion (p. 123). 
Ahmed argues that hate cannot be contained in one figure, as it would lose its power, thus 
the constant movement and circulation of hate necessitates continuously producing 
‘others’ subjected to violent exclusion, both from the state and from the populace. 
Through this argument, Ahmed disembodies hate, conceptualizing it as moving between 
bodies and sticking to them in different ways. While this may obscure the roles of 
specific actors in the circulation of violent affect, it also allows for a different 
conceptualization of the way exclusion operates, and the way citizens are continuously 
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engaged in the othering of migrants and threatening ‘others’. This threat and response is 
further propagated through “calculated promotion of civilian insecurity and terror” (Orr, 
2004, p. 451) under which the Canadian populace is encouraged to participate in 
discussions of border security, the separation of the ‘good’ versus the ‘bad’ im/migrant, 
and the constructed association between the terrorist and the asylum seeker. As Orr 
argues, “National Security became National Fear”, and the penetrable border became a 
source of fear and anxiety for a great number of citizens. Those citizens who are brought 
on board through these discourses to enact state sovereignty through different acts of 
violent bordering become what Orr calls the ‘civilian soldiers’. While these ‘civilian 
soldiers’ are not equipped to address the perceived threat, they are encouraged by state 
actors to internalize the need for preparedness and possible violence, whatever form that 
may take (Orr, 2004, p. 454).  
However, the targets of violence from this hate-driven civilian soldiering are not 
always easily identifiable in practice. Maharaj (2010) creatively discusses this confusion 
in his novel through the narration of a young migrant who was trying to figure out his 
place in Canada. The boy in the novel is trying to understand his own precarious 
immigration status, as well as what that means in his relation to others:  
Refugees. I wondered how many people wandering around were refugees. 
Was there some way to detect them? Something in their clothes or 
gestures? What about the Ethiopian man sitting by himself? He was too 
well dressed and had an expensive briefcase besides. The woman from 
India with a dot on her forehead? She looked too fat and happy. The pink, 
stooped man wearing an old coat and hat? He might be too old.... Then 
another thought hit me. Was it possible that among this crowd there might 
be someone who could tell, and who might be gazing at me this very 
moment (p. 176). 
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This quote usefully illustrates the intersecting identity constructs that impact exclusionary 
processes and is a vivid depiction of how ill equipped ‘civilian soldiers’ may be. Tangible 
examples of these practices and the ways they were propelled by policy will be outlined 
in detail in Chapter three, which specifically outlines Canadian immigration policies 
implemented in the last eight years.     
Over the last decade countless policies have been designed, adopted and 
propagated by Canadian government actors who have utilized different techniques to 
engage the populace as ‘civilian soldiers’ responsible for the security of the nation. 
Border spaces move and shift to demarcate inclusion, exclusion and inclusive exclusion 
in varying ways, reconstituting sovereignty at the geopolitical level, as well as through 
bureaucratic processes and individual interactions. Where the bordering was not 
manipulated in these particular ways, distinctive constructions of the ‘other’ were utilized 
for further boundary formation. The ‘other’ was located in individuals as well as 
communities that were defined as outside the acceptable range of difference, and as such 
an identifiable stranger and a threat. 
Taken to its extreme, this exclusionary approach dictates that grave and 
unpreventable internal or external danger demands a state of exception (Nyers, 2006), 
where government authorities have the “legal power to suspend the validity of the law, 
legally plac[ing] himself [sic] outside the law” (Agamben, 1998, p. 15). As a result of this 
measure, “law and violence are indistinguishable” (Nyers, 2006, p. xi). In contrast to 
Agamben, who argues that the sovereign dictates when they can take this power, Arendt 
describes the process that “crystalized into totalitarianism” through increases in 
statelessness, rightlessness and violence (Owens, 2010, p. 143). Sovereign state officials 
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subsequently achieve legitimacy in reproducing the systems that necessitate their power 
by suspending juridical order in specific spaces through the disciplining and demonizing 
of the ‘other’, or the non-citizen, the identified but unstoppable source of insecurity 
(Macklin, 2002; Soguk, 1999). People are thus made into problems in order to make 
appropriate solutions (Sharma, 2006), and certain migrant bodies become the “vector of 
disease, agent of subversion, corruptor of moral order and debaser of national 
identity”(Macklin, 2002, p. 392; see also: Mountz & Hyndman, 2006; Agier, 2011), 
needing to be contained and controlled at all costs.  
Nyers (2006) argues that the refugee, in particular, becomes constituted through 
this violent exclusion as a result of the state of exception. Similarly, Mountz (2010) links 
the discursive construction of the ‘bogus refugee’ with the material impacts of the state of 
exception and the necessary relation to bare life (p. 121). The state of exception 
implicates what Agamben refers to as bare life, the body stripped of political and social 
rights through an inclusive exclusion, removed but captured; the person who can be killed, 
but never sacrificed (Agamben, 1998, p. 8,10). Butler (2004) follows a similar analytical 
path in her discussion of allocations of vulnerability, in which some are more acceptably 
subjected to violence than others. She raises questions regarding who can count as having 
a livable life, and extensionally, who can be mourned upon their death. Thus, the 
ungrievable death relates to the life that cannot be sacrificed. Agamben links the 
conceptualization of bare life to the lived experiences of refugees, excluded from political 
life and beyond protection or grievability. This has occurred in Canada in particular ways 
as a result of highly criticized governmental directives and procedures. For example, the 
possibility of indefinite detention in immigration holding centres and provincial prisons 
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has violently captured and excluded newcomers with little oversight or review. In fact, 
fifteen people died while in CBSA custody between 2000 and 2017, which has been 
hidden and shrouded in official rhetoric (Molnar & Silverman, 2017). The names of those 
who died, as well as the causes of their deaths, are often withheld for some time, with no 
accountability taken for the role the state may have played in the deaths. These 
disavowals mark the lives lost in detention as ungrievable.       
The imagined threat certain bodies pose to the state and populace is further 
amplified through the constructed association between the refugee and the terrorist, 
meaning terror is most likely to travel on the bodies of asylum seekers, as they become 
the site of insecurity and fear (Mountz & Hyndman, 2006). As Pratt and Valverde (2002) 
argue, there is a hybrid connection between the figure of the ‘bogus’ refugee and the 
‘foreign violent criminal’ that has been reinforced by successive governments in order to 
maintain concern over ‘excessive’ immigration.  While those marked as ‘terrorists’ may 
have some different characteristics from those who are deemed to be ‘bogus’ (including 
country of origin or religion), these distinctions are often fluid and are changeable when 
politically useful.  
Within the current anti-terror paradigm, the terrorist, whether male or female, is 
constructed as having been bred in abnormal family dynamics, which are opposed to the 
West’s heteronormative model (Puar, 2007; Razack, 2008). As a result of this “abnormal” 
upbringing, gender, racialization, religion and sexuality are inter-constituted: the male 
terrorist is gendered as overly violent, sexually perverse, religiously fanatical and 
excessively patriarchal; the female, is either masculinized or portrayed as passive, 
silenced, objectified and victimized. This gendered construction also involves the 
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narrative of women as victims of their communities, and in need of saving; a narrative 
which Razack (2008) identifies as a technology of the imperial project (p. 18). These 
constructions necessarily involve the body being read as improperly racialized through an 
“awkward blend of nationality, religion and ethnicity” (Pratt & Thompson, 2008, p. 630), 
outside the norms of politically constructed multiculturalism. Therefore, as a result of 
supposed inherent as well as socialized characteristics, national origins as well as life 
histories, people become marked as likely to be violent and commit terrorist acts and are 
condemned for what they might do (Razack, 2007). For people marked as terrorists, 
particularly Arab and Muslim men, “[t]hey face direct attacks and have their civil 
liberties under assault” (Razack, 2008, p. 47; see also: Arat-Koc, 2005, Jiwani, 2005).  
Macklin (2002) argues “[t]he effect is to alienate the subject from social citizenship even 
if legal citizenship is secured” (p. 389). Therefore, as outlined previously, full and active 
citizenship may be questioned and challenged regardless of status, as Canadian-born 
suspects are purposefully conflated with newly-arrived (im)migrants or refugees to 
emphasize their ‘otherness’ and incompatibility with ‘Canadian-ness’.  
Summary	
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature that most directly addresses and 
contextualizes my research questions. I drew on frameworks of transnationalism and 
intersectionality to explore power relations inherent in the connections between and the 
movement of bodies. Since gender constructs are necessarily interconstituted through 
understandings of racialization, class, age, ability and sexuality, an analysis that 
incorporates intersectionality is important. Theorizations of state sovereignty are linked 
in this chapter to research on the processes and pathways to precarity and illegalization, 
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in order to highlight the ways power is utilized and allocated to different actors to 
maintain common sense conceptualizations of inclusion and exclusion. The exclusion I 
have outlined is tied to the criminalization of migrants in many different and nuanced 
ways, and underpins forced voluntary return. Finally, the literature on Canada’s ongoing 
colonial project provides a historicized framework for national boundary making and the 
exclusion of particular gendered and racialized bodies. This literature provides a 
foundation for my exploration of the multilayered criminalization of migrants, an 
associated loss of hope and the influences of the latter on their return – a return located 
on the spectrum between voluntary and involuntary. The gaps in the literature reviewed 
largely maintain binary conceptualizations of return as either voluntary or forced, which, 
I argue misses the messiness inherent in particular experiences that are neither completely 
voluntary nor forced. The addition of FVR is developed in the following chapters to fill 
those gaps. 
  
		 97	
Chapter 3: Canadian Immigration Policy: Boxes and Boundaries, Spaces and 
Relationships 
     It’s just been sort of rapid-fire legislative amendments, and every  
morning from 2010 to 2015, it was sort of waking up to check  
my email and like, seeing, [...] what fresh hell is this?  
(Samantha, legal clinic lawyer)  
But now it is so clear with all the changes that are focusing,  
reducing the eligibility for this, reducing the time for that,  
reducing the age for this, reducing [...] So they want certain  
people in this country, period. You know what I mean?  
This is so clear now. (Chico, Settlement Worker) 
 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight specific policy and procedural changes from 2008 
to 2015 that: 1) perpetuated and expanded spaces of exclusion through the production of 
physical and ideological borders; 2) reinforced relationships that reproduced ‘othering’ 
and contributed to migrant illegalization. Both outcomes have been overtly gendered, as 
women have been targeted by specific policies and discourses in various ways; they have 
also had intersectional classist, racist and ageist impacts. Attention is given to the policies 
that had significant material impacts through literature, media and in the interviews 
conducted. This allows for an analysis of the ways borders and ‘others’ were 
reconstituted for political gain and the ways tactics were utilized to engage civilians, as 
well as bureaucrats, in bordering and ‘othering’ strategies. What is being highlighted is 
the multilayered criminalization of migrants and the bleakness and loss of hope 
experienced as a result, which buttresses the discussion of forced ‘voluntary’ return.   
Between 2008 and 2015 the Conservative Canadian government adopted a 
substantial number of immigration policies, which arguably overhauled nearly every 
aspect of the immigration infrastructure. The policies were coupled with an exclusionary 
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discourse fostered by Conservative politicians that painted migrants, particularly refugee 
claimants, as fraudulent cheaters trying to ‘steal’ access to services, supports and even 
permanent residence. This discourse circulated in the media, and among civil servants, to 
affirm the ‘common sense’ need for changes to the immigration system, as well as to 
reinforce the divisions between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ newcomers, the ‘desirable’ and 
the ‘undesirable’ migrants. The speed and impact of these changes left migrants, as well 
as frontline workers, endlessly adapting, struggling to stay on top of the new 
requirements and procedures while options were severely narrowed and doors closed.  
Rather than framing this chapter chronologically, I will examine the changes that 
occurred in Canadian immigration law and policy between 2008 and 2015 under two 
broad headings. Such a non-linear approach enables a deeper analysis of the specific 
ways that the Canadian state during this period substantively built and rebuilt 
exclusionary practices. Therefore, I first explore the bordering practices that were 
implemented through changing immigration policy and procedures. Justification for 
bordering relied on the discursive construction of the criminalized ‘bogus’ refugee, which 
is outlined in the first section. Subsequently, the bordering relied on the work of both 
border officials, as well as civilian soldiers located at the intersections between borders 
and ‘others’. The second part of this chapter addresses the exclusions that occurred 
through the refugee policy reform and the (re)production of the ‘other’. The reforms to 
refugee policy were far-reaching and had significant impacts on migrants and the 
refugee-serving community. Moreover, the ‘othering’ continued, and is further discussed, 
through changes to family class applications.     
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I. Excluding Migrants through Bordering Practices 
 Several of the changes to immigration policy and practice implemented by the 
Conservative government between 2008 and 2015 had a direct bordering impact, 
reinforcing exclusion in specific locations and spaces. These changes solidified the 
physical borders both at ports of entry and abroad, while at the same time perpetuating 
the psychological borders that surround bodies and communities, targeting migrants in 
multiple spaces. These borders have intersectional impacts, as they are experienced 
differently in individualized or collective ways and in reoccurring moments based on 
differing intersecting identity constructs.    
In 2009, as one of their first immigration policy amendments meant to intensify 
bordering, the Harper government introduced visa requirements for Mexican and Czech 
nationals, stating that the refugee system was overrun and overburdened with claimants 
from those countries. These visa requirements were proposed by then Minister of 
Immigration, Jason Kenney, who tied the need for the visas with a discourse of ‘bogus’ 
refugees, reinforcing borders at ports of entry as well as abroad. He framed ‘bogus’ 
refugees as dishonest queue jumpers who were trying to unfairly get ahead of other 
immigrants by claiming they were at risk of persecution: “It's an insult to the important 
concept of refugee protection to allow it to be systematically violated by people who are 
overwhelmingly economic immigrants” (Kenney, quoted in CBC News, 2009). Both visa 
impositions drew a significant amount of criticism internationally, as Mexico is an 
important trading partner and the Czech Republic is a member of the European Union for 
which no visas should be required. The visas effectively moved the Canadian border to 
Mexico and the Czech Republic by no longer allowing citizens of these countries to 
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board planes for Canada (or enter Canadian territory any other way) without first making 
themselves and their travel plans known to Canadian visa offices abroad and asking for 
permission or pre-clearance to enter. The Immigration Minister defended the measure, 
stating that the increasing number of refugee claimants from these countries was creating 
“significant delays and spiraling new costs”, as well as preventing people who “really” 
needed protection from being heard (Reuters, 2009). This policy served as a starting point 
in government officials’ continuous discussion of ‘bogus’ refugees, attempting to 
perpetuate a ‘common sense’ understanding of, and a border between, ‘genuine/deserving’ 
versus ‘bogus/threatening’ migrants. This was a tactic criticized as unfair and potentially 
illegal, as the Canadian Council for Refugees pointed out:  
     It is not appropriate for a Minister to comment on whether refugee claims  
     are founded or not. Such comments may constitute political interference in  
     the refugee determination process. Under Canadian law, the Immigration  
     and Refugee Board, a quasi-judicial tribunal, is responsible for determining  
     who is a refugee (CCR, 2009).  
Nonetheless, under the Conservative government, pronouncements regarding the 
validity of refugee claims from certain communities persisted. Government officials soon 
turned their attention to Hungarian nationals, as Roma claims from this country increased 
significantly after the lifting of visas for Hungarians in 2009. While a more in-depth 
analysis of the methods through which this community was ‘othered’ will be undertaken 
in part II of this chapter, unique bordering practices aimed at the Roma were put in place 
as a result. In 2013, the federal government undertook a campaign to develop 
psychological borders in Hungary without the legal reliance on visas or other interdiction 
measures. Six billboards were erected by the Canadian government in Miskolc, one of 
Hungary’s biggest cities and home to a large proportion of the Roma community; the 
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billboards read “Those people who make a claim without sound reasons will be processed 
faster and removed faster” (Keung, 2013b).  These criminalizing billboards warned Roma 
would-be refugee claimants against making false claims and threatened them with a 
speedy deportation.  
 
     (Keung, 2013b) 
This bordering strategy was complimented by internet tools, such as pop-up messages 
and web banners that would provide discouraging information to targeted users (Keung, 
2013b). The billboards and internet tools were strategically placed with the specific 
intention of deterring refugee claimants from accessing Canadian territory. It was 
therefore made clear that these claimants were not desired in Canada, as government 
officials created an imagined border where Canada has no actual bordering authority.   
Further building on the ‘bogus’ refugee propaganda, government officials 
implemented other bordering practices to keep out claimants. Subsequent attempts to 
reform the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), including Bill C-4 
(Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act), which 
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failed, and was followed by Bills C-11 (Balanced Refugee Reform Act) and C-31 
(Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act), all these Bills drew attention to the 
manner of arrival of refugee claimants, and by extension, their ability to transgress the 
Canadian border. Among numerous legislative and policy changes, there were increased 
efforts to intercept and/or criminally punish smuggling (seen as a direct infringement on 
border sovereignty), as well as reinforce the border by limiting other avenues of arrival, 
such as eliminating certain exemptions to the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA). 
This latter agreement between Canada and the U.S., implemented under the previous 
Liberal government, stipulated that refugee claimants must make their claim in whatever 
country they first arrive (primarily the U.S.), with the exception of people with family in 
Canada, unaccompanied minors and claimants from moratorium countries (countries to 
which Canada will not deport people). The implementation of this Conservative reform 
eliminated moratorium countries from the list of exceptions, further solidifying the 
impenetrable Canadian border. Moreover, for those who met the exceptions and were 
able to make their claim in Canada, the evolving legislation barred them from accessing 
the refugee appeal process should their claim be denied. This was a belated punishment 
for those who could not be legally stopped at their first port of entry. This particular 
policy has had significant gender impacts, as the United States and Canada did not handle 
gender-based violence claims in the same way; women who were returned to the U.S. to 
make their refugee claims would be at a significant disadvantage since the U.S. did not 
adopt robust gender guidelines for refugee determination (Arnett, 2005).   
 The reforms also increased funding for Canadian Border Services Agency 
(CBSA) activities and removals, using legal immigration enforcement to forcibly exclude 
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people and move them back across the border. Samantha, a community-based lawyer, felt 
this shift strongly in her work. As she explained, “The increased authority and funding to 
CBSA has really meant that there’s just such an enforcement orientation that I think the 
practice has totally changed.” Among the many areas of focus for enforcement, the 
changes eliminated automatic stays of removal for certain applications, including Judicial 
Reviews of refugee claim decisions. This change meant that claimants could become 
deportable as they waited for a decision on their own refugee claims, and as Atak, 
Hudson and Nakache (2018) show, CBSA actively worked to remove people while their 
Judicial Reviews were pending. This was the case with two of the migrants I interviewed, 
who elected not to apply for court-decided stays of removal and instead returned 
‘voluntarily’ to their countries of origin. These preemptive deportations had an important 
impact on claimants, as the Judicial Review was one mechanism utilized to determine if a 
claimant is genuinely at risk of persecution. Positive reviews were rendered even after 
claimants returned to persecution, as was the case with one participant.  
Increased funding for CBSA and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) 
enabled their officials to intervene more frequently in refugee hearings on their respective 
ministers’ behalf. The number of interventions therefore rose dramatically between 2012 
and 2015, from an average of 3% of all cases per year to 20% (Atak et al., 2018, p. 27). 
These interventions were made expressly to ensure the exclusion of people based on 
criminal convictions and security threats, maintaining the integrity of the program, and 
providing comprehensive information (IRCC, 2013). While these interventions were 
permitted before the reforms, the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration 
and Refugee Board (IRB) was mandated to notify the ministers if there were suspected 
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program integrity issues (IRB, 2016). These interventions were designed to challenge 
some aspect of refugee claimants’ accounts, again marking them as potentially ‘bogus’, 
and actively moving the border, through border officials, to the refugee hearing space 
itself, making it harder for claimants to be accepted and legally included in Canada. 
Moreover, refugee claims were further challenged through the increase in cessation 
applications brought against refugees. These applications challenged refugees’ credibility 
even after they were granted Convention status by monitoring their movements and by 
claiming that consulting one’s embassy or returning to their country of persecution for 
any reason indicated that refugees were not really in need of protection. As such, 
Convention refugee status could be removed and refugees forcibly moved back across the 
border.   
 The reforms implemented under Bill C-31 also gave the Minister of Public Safety 
the power to designate certain groups of newcomers as Designated Foreign Nationals 
(DFNs) or “irregular arrivals”, which meant that they had somehow breached protocols 
expected at the physical border and were therefore criminally punished through 
incarceration and the removal of rights. This power had no temporal or quantitative 
guidelines, meaning any group could be designated as DFN at any time (CARL, 2016). 
As Silverman (2014) explains, panic in the Canadian population was encouraged and 
mobilized in the media in 2009-2010 around the arrival of a small number of boats 
carrying asylum seekers on the British Columbian coast, which led to further discussions 
of border security and sovereign power, allowing for an expansion of powers for 
government officials. A DFN designation could simply be the result of the arrival of two 
or more people at once, which officials blamed for the slow verification of identity and 
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admissibility, or the mere suspicion of human smuggling, the latter which became 
defined quite broadly within Bill C-31 (Alboim & Cohl, 2012).  
The consequences of these suspected border infractions were severe and 
criminalizing, as DFN refugee claimants were again marked as ‘bogus’. The punishment 
for transgressing border regulations in these cases involved a one-year mandatory 
detention for those over the age of sixteen, with the minister retaining the right to decide 
if minors should be detained with their families or forcibly separated from their parents. 
There are few other instances where the mandatory incarceration of any population is 
tolerated in Canada, which is evidence of the criminal lens used against this migrant 
population. Further, DFNs would have no access to the Refugee Appeal Division, and 
faced a five-year ban on applications for permanent residence for those determined to be 
Convention refugees, or accepted under humanitarian grounds or family sponsorship. 
This bar meant that DFNs could not apply to bring their family to join them in Canada for 
five years, until they were allowed to apply for permanent residence (Alboim & Cohl, 
2012). The Canadian Council for Refugees raised particular concerns when this 
designation applied to women, particularly mothers who may have been forced to decide 
whether to keep their children incarcerated with them or relinquish them to a child 
welfare agency (CCR, 2013b). They also pointed out how delays in family reunification 
could detrimentally affect women and girls, as they often waited to be sponsored in 
precarious situations where they were vulnerable to gender-based and sexual violence 
(CCR, 2013b). While very few DFN designations were made, it is unclear whether this 
form of bordering actually has any impact on the deterrence of potential future refugee 
claimants.  
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 The imposition and solidification of physical as well as psychological borders 
which resulted from changes to IRPA were largely based on the criminalizing discourse 
aimed at refugee claimants. The ‘bogus’ refugee became a discursive tool to impede 
migrants from coming to Canada; establish the basis for challenging a large number of 
refugee claims; and exclude and confine migrants already on Canadian territory.  
Civilian Soldiers at the Intersections between Borders and ‘Others’ 
 While all border enforcement is jurisdictionally the responsibility of CBSA, the 
public was familiarized with reproducing bordering spaces through politicians’ 
statements and different media projects. Citizens thus become ‘civilian soldiers’, sharing 
the responsibility for strengthening borders and boundaries, and excluding the 
constructed threats. This exclusion required the construction of a common understanding 
of the ‘other’ as a misleading and threatening body which was gendered, racialized and 
impacted by religion, age, ability and class.          
The sharing of responsibility for border enforcement with the Canadians was 
visibly enacted during the 2015 election when debates over the niqab and citizenship 
permeated public discourse. Individuals and communities took it upon themselves to 
‘defend’ the nation through independent and collective acts of violence, both against 
veiled Muslim women and recognizable religious landmarks, marking certain bodies and 
communities as necessarily foreign and threatening, regardless of citizenship. This 
materialized at the election polls where, according to The Ottawa Sun, up to 9,000 people 
vowed to vote with their faces covered in different ways to “sarcastically” and violently 
show their concern over people being able to vote with their faces covered, particularly 
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niqab-wearing women (Cooley, 2015). While Elections Canada had provisions to allow 
face coverings, these voters demanded the exclusion of certain Canadians, defining them 
as fraudulent and violently mocking them, as well as calling on politicians to legislate 
their exclusion (Cooley, 2015). These ‘civilian soldiers’ constructed border spaces around 
certain communities, imposing exclusion without legal authority, while asking those who 
had the authority to do the same.   
This controversy was capitalized upon by the Conservative government before 
and during the election, as related measures were designed to target the ‘other’ and 
exclude particular communities. Just weeks before the election, two Conservative MPs, 
Chris Alexander and Kellie Leitch, announced the proposed creation of a “Barbaric 
Cultural Practices tip line”, an RCMP-run phone line where people could report 
suspected transgressions of Canadian norms and values to law enforcement. Kellie Leitch, 
one of the candidates making the announcement stated that “[t]he Conservative 
government is not afraid to defend Canadian values” (Powers, 2015), and encouraged the 
public to defend these values as well, however ill-defined they were. This reporting 
necessarily defined the non-observance of so-called Canadian ‘norms and values’ as 
criminal since reports were to be made directly to the RCMP.  
This tip line actually had its roots in an earlier amendment to IRPA, Bill S-7, the 
Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act which also made changes to the Civil 
Marriage Act and the Criminal Code, and was tabled on November 5, 2014, receiving 
Royal Assent several months later. The Bill primarily targeted forced and underage 
marriage, honour-based violence and polygamy, in order to address these forms of 
violence against women in Canada and abroad (Béchard, Elgersma, & Nicol, 2015). 
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However, as the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario (SALCO) pointed out in their joint 
statement against the Bill, the racist framework and wording of the amendments framed 
violence against women as a ‘cultural’ issue, prevalent in only marginalized and 
racialized communities (SALCO, 2014). As Mulinari (2007) explains, ‘bad patriarchies’ 
were cast as necessarily happening in “distant places and onto racialized bodies” (p. 169), 
disavowing violent patriarchy in the Global North. This ‘othering’ not only constructed 
racialized women as necessary victims of their inherently violent society and thereby 
criminalized racialized men, but it also invisibilized the global patriarchal power 
structures that make women susceptible to violence everywhere. The joint statement by 
SALCO clearly outlined that the ‘othering’ perpetuated by the Bill would have the 
opposite of the stated effect, leaving women more vulnerable to gender-based violence, 
with no recourse to protection if they did want to come forward. Moreover, the SALCO 
statement also highlighted the inconsistencies and redundancies from a legal perspective, 
as many of the supposed crimes targeted were already punishable under different legal 
mechanisms. The statement also argued that the focus on criminalization did little to 
support survivors of violence (as funding to actual support services had been increasingly 
cut), but instead acted as “a tool for the police to further profile and harass racialized 
communities” (p. 4). Nonetheless, with the announcement of the tip line, government 
officials continued on a racist trajectory, doing the opposite of what was being 
recommended by further marginalizing certain relationships and communities and by 
asking “civilian soldiers’ to get on board with increased profiling, surveillance, reporting 
and bordering.     
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These ‘civilian soldiers’ were also presented with projects undertaken by officials 
at the CBSA, which utilized sensationalist media techniques to enlist participation in 
border surveillance. Through an online “most wanted” list and a telephone tip line, 
citizens were encouraged to participate in border enforcement and the exclusion of the 
‘other’. The list offered pictures and identifying information of men who were subject to 
Canada-wide arrest warrants for various criminal-related immigration infractions. The 
web page boasted that as a result of the list, and people’s response to it, 68 individuals 
were located in Canada, 61 of whom were deported, and 18 were found abroad 
(Government of Canada, 2011). The people on the list were portrayed as threatening to 
Canadian society and Canadian families due to their supposed criminal past, as stated by 
then Public Safety Minister Steven Blaney, “These	people	represent	a	threat	to	society” 
(quoted in The Canadian Press, 2015). This surveillance mentality stretched into diverse 
communities, where many precarious status migrants feared civilian soldiers within their 
own communities. This fear was described in one interview in particular with a young 
undocumented couple who were choosing to self deport; as they explained:  
But [people in my ethnic community] talk, you know. She don’t have the  
papers, bla, bla, bla, it’s not good.... Yeah, sometimes you have scare  
because if you do like wrong things ... If you have a problem with the,  
with some people, they don’t just ... it’s, it’s not fair you know, it’s not  
like that, it’s your life (Katherine).  
To which her partner, Jonh, affirmed, “They say ah, I’m gonna call immigration for you 
to go home.” This couple described the borders being performed in their everyday 
interactions and relationships. They were most fearful of being ‘othered’, excluded and 
potentially reported to authorities by members of their own ethnic community.  
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Dispersed immigration enforcement tactics have also been promoted through a 
controversial television program titled Border Security, which documented, and allowed 
people to observe, CBSA activities at various points of entry in British Columbia, 
controlling border entries and disciplining certain bodies. The show, which began in 
September, 2012, was described on the broadcaster, National Geographic TV’s website 
as  
     a revealing look at life on the front lines of national security. [Where viewers can]  
     [f]ollow Canadian border services officers as they intercept suspicious characters  
     and contraband from around the world in an effort to keep us safe, and our health,  
     workforce, and ecosystem secure (“Border Security,” n.d.).  
This type of performance again marked border spaces as chaotic, potentially violent and 
dangerous spaces, requiring careful protection; it also identified certain strangers, putting 
Canadian viewers on alert. It continued to bring civilian soldiers on board with the details 
of protecting the vulnerable nation, and visually represented certain people crossing into 
the state as a potential threatening ‘other’. While the show drew criticism and even a 
formal privacy complaint, the Conservative government supported its importance 
financially (contributing $200,000 to the production costs) and verbally, stating that it not 
only informed viewers about CBSA’s work, but gave pride to CBSA employees and 
Canadians in general (Post Media News, 2014). This type of state supported spectacle 
acted to reify the threat and normalize Canadian policing that occurs in border spaces, 
with goals of marginalizing and excluding non-citizen bodies and encouraging civilian 
soldiering.       
However, as noted previously, citizenship was not necessarily a protection from 
bordering practices as evidenced from the erosions effected through further legislative 
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changes to citizenship in 2014, when the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act was 
passed.  This Act gave government officials new powers to revoke citizenship in certain 
contexts, and, while facilitating citizenship for some, made it more unattainable for others.  
The barriers to citizenship were implemented by increasing the necessary residency 
period from three out of four years to four out of six years, adding language requirements 
to applicants between the age of 14-65 where previously only those 18-55 had to satisfy 
language requirements, and significantly augmenting the financial requirements for 
others who aspired to citizenship. The result was an increase in class, gender, age and 
ability dimensions, and a limitation to access to rights and protections for many migrants. 
The changes caused tremendous anxiety for migrants applying for citizenship, as one 
frontline worker explained:  
     The citizenship is a big thing. We had kind of a rush here of people trying to get  
     citizenship before the law changed June 1st because before June 1st, if you were 55  
     or older you didn’t have to take the test, you didn’t have to prove your ability in  
     English.  Now if you’re between 14 and 64 you have to take the test. You have to  
     prove your ability in English (Deborah, settlement worker).  
Samantha, a clinic lawyer further clarified some of the problems with this provision in 
the cases she sees: 
     They want to apply for citizenship but they—you know, perhaps there’s illiteracy in  
     their own language, there’s, like, a high level of trauma. They’re not able to meet the  
     language requirements or the knowledge requirements, so they have to get all these  
     waivers, [...] there’s barriers all along the way. That path to citizenship has become  
     really hard. 
However, during the same interview Samantha explained the growing importance of 
citizenship applications for migrants:  
     I really have a very frequent sense that people don’t feel secure until they’ve got their  
     citizenship, which is why I think we’ve got into the business of citizenship  
     applications more and more, because it’s become so obvious how—as it became  
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     more difficult, it became obvious how very important it was for people, because to— 
     even permanent resident status feels awfully precarious for people at this point. 
Despite the feeling of permanence that citizenship might have provided, the new 
regulations enabled the government to revoke citizenship from certain dual nationals 
found guilty of terrorism. Revocation on criminal terrorist grounds created a new double 
punishment only applicable to citizens who held a second citizenship, placing the onus of 
terrorism on people who were not solely Canadian. While this new revocation power 
drew criticism and concern, becoming another relevant election issue, it was not the first-
time government ministers had tested their ability to change the guidelines and definition 
of Canadian citizenship, purportedly attempting to “protect the value of citizenship”. As I 
describe in the next section, Canadian Immigration Ministers Jason Kenney and Chris 
Alexander had previously circulated the concepts of ‘birth tourism’ and ‘anchor babies’, 
where a foreign national supposedly travels to Canada for the purpose of giving birth so 
that the child can later ‘anchor’ the family through sponsorship (Janus, 2014). As 
Minister Alexander’s spokesperson, Alexis Pavlich, explained, "Those who enter Canada 
fraudulently or illegally just to give birth here are taking advantage of Canada’s 
generosity" (Janus, 2014). These government officials suggested that they would attempt 
to limit citizenship to children born in Canada with at least one parent with permanent 
residence or citizenship. However, these changes were not ultimately pursued through 
policy or legislation.   
II. Refugee Policy Reform and the (Re)production of the ‘Other’ 
As the contestations against citizenship for certain Canadians circulated between 
2012 and 2014, one group that was targeted as supposed birth tourists was again the 
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discursively constructed ‘bogus’ refugee claimants. While their unborn children’s 
citizenship status was ultimately not used to punish their spontaneous arrival and 
purported fraudulent claim, it was another tool for ‘othering’ discourse, marking certain 
migrants as undesirable. As the ‘bogus’ refugee discourse continued to circulate and 
grow, the 2010 Balanced Refugee Reform Act, and the subsequent 2012 Protecting 
Canada’s Immigration System Act, were passed by the Conservative majority Parliament. 
These Acts drastically redesigned the refugee determination process in Canada and 
carved out distinctions and hierarchies among refugee claimants, which had significant 
implications. Refugee claimants were separated into two categories based on their 
country of origin, which impacted timelines for submitting claims, preparing for hearings 
and access to appeals, work permits and health coverage (Alboim & Cohl, 2012). 
Claimants from Designated Countries of Origin (DCOs), or so-called ‘safe countries’, 
were immediately ‘othered,’ as they became severely restricted in their claim process 
with only 30 days (if their claim was made at an immigration office in Canada) or 45 
days (if their claim was made at a port of entry) to prepare for their hearing, as opposed 
to the 60 days for regular claimants. These restrictions have had significantly detrimental 
impacts on DCO claimants, as described by Sathya, an independent immigration lawyer:  
     It’s so hard to get all the required documentation, to do psych assessments, to get  
     everything translated in a timely way. And so, I’ve seen—for me, as the person  
     doing the claim, it’s had a lot of adverse impacts in terms of having to get  
     documents into the Board late, and then having to argue about it and having  
     some real [...] horrible Board members who won’t accept it.  And so, it’s a  
     serious denial of procedural fairness. And I find that it really limits the ability  
     of my clients to make out their case. So that’s particularly for DCOs.”   
Countries were designated by the Minister starting in December, 2012, based on 
percentage of claims from a specific country that had been denied, abandoned or 
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withdrawn, or if the country had an independent judicial system, basic democratic rights 
and civil society organizations; all of which supposedly indicated that claims from these 
countries would not be credible (Molnar Diop, 2014). These designations were highly 
criticized, as it was argued that designations, if they are required, should be compiled by 
a panel of experts, rather than one minister who may be influenced by his own biases or 
political pressures (Alboim & Cohl, 2012). Macklin (2013) has argued that the 
designations were actually made primarily for economic reasons, as the government 
aimed to appease European anger over visa impositions and secure the Canada–EU 
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement. While this may have been the genuine 
motivation, the designations went a long way to ‘other’ certain claimants and mark them 
as ‘bogus’ refugees, undeserving of Canadian protection. In fact, the minister himself 
fueled those ideas, continuously referring to them as ‘queue jumpers’ and ‘bogus 
claimants’ (Alboim & Cohl, 2012).          
Moreover, as the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers argued, the shortened 
timelines for all refugee claimants created significant challenges for claimants and their 
counsel, as it was difficult to retain counsel within those deadlines, as well as seek 
psychological support, especially psychological assessments, and obtain corroborating 
evidence, including translations (CARL, 2016). For claimants submitting their 
applications at inland immigration offices, the timeframes still created challenges despite 
the lessened rigidity as compared to ports of entry claims. As Kate, a settlement worker, 
explained: 
     It takes a while to get Legal Aid to get a lawyer, to meet [...] to prepare your  
     [Basis of Claim form], to get all of your evidence together and translated.  
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     And you need to have all of that before you go and make your initial claim,  
     which takes quite a while to get together.   
Despite these delays in being able to request refugee protection, there were also 
provisions to discourage belated claims. Moreover, regardless of intent to claim, migrants 
could not access health care, social assistance or schooling for children until their 
applications were filed at immigration offices. This increased a gendered burden on 
certain migrants, for example, pregnant women who needed immediate and ongoing 
healthcare. The community doctor with whom I spoke reinforced this point, explaining 
that she had “seen at least three people now, who were pregnant and due soon, but they 
were still waiting for the eligibility appointment” (Dr. Agarwal). These women had 
postponed pre-natal care until right before their delivery dates, by which time they hoped 
to obtain health coverage (if, indeed they were eligible, which was not certain).  Dr. 
Agarwal went on to note the challenges of the shortened timelines from a medical 
perspective. She explained that 
     [The] turnaround time, which is now 30 to 60 days [to have] a hearing has  
     meant lots of unnecessary, I think, stress on the health care system and probably  
     [on] a lot of people, who are not getting the assessments that they need to assist in  
     their cases, like documenting that they are exhibiting signs of trauma which  
     you know, many people are (Dr. Agarwal). 
Without these assessments, the credibility of claimants’ experiences could be challenged, 
thus threatening their case for protection.       
The CCR (2013b) has further noted that the short timelines, in all their 
configurations, can cause particular challenges for women making claims involving 
gender-based violence, as well as for claimants seeking protection because of sexuality or 
gender identity. Migrants in these situations have to disclose stories that are often 
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stigmatizing and emotionally difficult to reveal, thus requiring higher levels of trust and 
safety. This was echoed by one of the front-line workers interviewed, as she pointed out:  
     If a woman comes and claims refugee, how you’re going to say in two months that  
     you have been raped, that you have been beat up? Like the case that we were seeing  
     now [....] she didn’t disclose [the violence], she disclosed it to us, but we have been     
     working with her for many days (Mariposa, settlement worker).  
Mariposa highlights the time it often takes for women (and men) to disclose gender-based  
 
violence. While lawyers have limited time to work with refugee claimants and prepare  
 
their case, settlement workers often have more time to build confidence and trust which  
 
can impact the potential for a positive decision at a refugee hearing.  
This overhaul of the refugee system was conducted against a backdrop which 
created a binary between ‘good refugees’ who languish in refugee camps waiting to be 
sponsored by the Canadian government and ‘bogus refugees’ who spontaneously and 
autonomously arrive in Canada seeking protection (Hyndman & Giles, 2011; Molnar 
Diop, 2014). This division is inherently understood in gendered ways, as Hyndman and 
Giles (2011) argue, since “those who stay still are viewed as genuine, immobile, 
depoliticized, feminized, while those on the move are potential liabilities at best, and 
security threats at worst” (p. 363). While this dichotomy is complex enough to be 
promoted as fulfilling Canada’s humanitarian obligations, it has had significant impacts 
on public discourse and the associated response to refugees. By sponsoring a limited 
amount of carefully selected refugees from refugee camps, the Canadian government 
propagated the idea that Canada “has one of the most generous per capita immigration 
and refugee resettlement programs in the world” (“Chris Alexander defends Canada’s 
response to refugee crisis,” 2015), while at the same time attempting to exclude refugee 
claimants. 
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The simultaneous addition of a Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) on December 15, 
2012 was welcomed by many, as refugee determination is necessarily a complex process, 
with a high risk of error (Aberman, 2014; CARL, 2016; Rousseau, Crépeau, Foxen, & 
Houle, 2002; Showler, 2006). However, with the implementation of the RAD, confusion 
over who had access, as well as the rigid timelines and procedures made the process 
relatively inaccessible and undermined its effectiveness (CARL, 2016). Originally, many 
claimants were denied access to the RAD, including those from DCOs, those who met the 
exemption from the STCA and Designated Foreign Nationals, as well as claimants whose 
claim was determined to have ‘No Credible Basis’ or be ‘Manifestly Unfounded’ at their 
refugee hearing. These exclusions were criminalizing punishments for border 
transgressions in the cases of STCA exemptions and DFNs, as well as for ‘fraudulently’ 
trying to gain refugee protection for DCO claimants and unfounded determinations. 
However, recent Federal Court findings determined that DCO claimants should gain 
access to the RAD.  
Additional amendments to IRPA under Bill C-31 barred refugee claimants from 
having access to Pre-Removal Risk Assessments (PRRAs) and Humanitarian and 
Compassionate Ground (H&C) applications for one year (for regular claimants) or thirty-
six months (for DCO claimants) after their claims were denied. The Minister of 
Immigration argued that this measure would “simplify the refugee system” by removing 
duplication and expediting removals of people who did not need Canadian protection or 
were not conforming to policy procedures (Openparliament, 2012). These bans have had 
significant outcomes, as they eliminated opportunities for people to have further risk or 
compelling humanitarian reasons considered before removal (CCR, 2013d). Identified 
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during interviews as inherently problematic, the changes altered the very nature of 
frontline work. Referring to the limits on the H&C, Asha, a community clinic lawyer, 
described the struggle she felt in trying to advise her clients, deciding whether the 
chances were better with a refugee claim or an H&C. She explains that before the ban she 
would advise female clients to 
     take a chance with the refugee stream and if it doesn’t work out we’ll make  
     an H&C claim, because [the client] has a 50/50 chance there as well, right?  
     So, for those cases [...] we have to now basically go back to the drawing  
     board and look at things a lot more closely and carefully. It was almost like  
     you were making a decision, but knowing that if you fail here, you don’t  
     know what will happen. 
This crucial dilemma was repeated in several interviews, as migrants may have had valid 
applications for both procedures, but strategically only one could be selected. The fact 
that H&C applications were determined by CIC officials through a completely paper-
based application, and refugee claims were determined at the Immigration and Refugee 
Board through an in-person hearing, meant that applicants had to consider very 
strategically which discretionarily-determined process they would undertake. The fear of 
having made the wrong choice was also discussed by Sathya, a private lawyer: 
     And so, it’s like waiting on tenterhooks, you know?  [...] I’ve really seen  
     that bar being very detrimental to a lot of people who made the decision to  
     make a claim but really could have won on an H&C also, but made the  
     decision because it seemed like the right choice and then were refused.    
Chico, a frontline worker further elaborated the difficulties inherent in having to make 
these choices, as the entirety of people’s experiences and situations cannot be taken into 
account.  
     So, this compartmentalization, you know – the silos – are very problematic,  
     [...] and that affects people. There is not a one-window service [...] when you  
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     can come and we try to fix or help you to fix whatever  
     (Chico, settlement worker).   
Obliging migrants to choose between the refugee and humanitarian processes had 
detrimental impacts, yet the discourse circulated continued to criminalize migrants into 
2015. Officials purported that the exclusion prevented ‘bogus’ claimants, people who 
would abuse the system, from being able to extend their stay or gain access to services 
and supports to which they should not be entitled. As I describe in detail in Chapter 4, 
this made many migrants’ very presence in specific spaces in Canada (e.g. in schools, 
hospitals and work places) increasingly precarious, along with their relationships and 
interactions with others (e.g. teachers, doctors and community members) in those spaces.   
The similar limitation placed on the PRRAs also had an important impact on 
migrants, as Sathya described, since she was faced with the probability that her clients 
could be removed before new risk factors could be assessed. She identified the PRRA bar 
as having a “hugely detrimental impact.” Country conditions that had changed since the 
person made their refugee claim, or new threats that had been made against the person in 
their country of origin, neither of which could be considered as a result of the changes to 
policy, increased the possibility of deportation to dangerous situations. While PRRAs 
have historically had a very low acceptance rate, it has been seen as an important tool 
nonetheless. As a frontline worker explained, its “[n]ot that PRRAs have huge acceptance 
rates. But [...] we’ve had a couple of families accepted on PRRAs. So that has been a big 
change” (Kate, settlement worker).  
The restricted access to the H&C and PRRA as a secondary option for refugee 
claimants who were not successful in their claim again indicated the government officials’ 
		 120	
distrust in these migrants. The applications were presented as unnecessary duplication, as 
policy makers espoused that one application (the refugee determination process) should 
be enough for each migrant; however frontline workers offered reasons for why multiple 
processes might be needed. The limitation imposed under Bill C-31 meant migrants were 
therefore denied alternative legal pathways to gain secure status in Canada.         
Unlike the refugee claimants spontaneously arriving in Canada, the refugees who 
waited ‘patiently’ in camps were highlighted by Conservative politicians as the ones truly 
in need of Canada’s protection. Yet even for these so-called ‘genuine refugees’, policies 
were not created to alleviate their suffering. In fact, Conservative quotas on government 
assisted refugees (GARs) were criticized for being too low, especially during the Syrian 
refugee crisis, when the Harper government first pledged to bring only 1,300 people to 
Canada (Levitz, 2016). Ceding to pressure, the government agreed to increase the number 
to 10,000, but declared that they would be prioritizing religious and ethnic minorities 
(Levitz, 2016). As most Syrian refugees were Muslim, this declaration effectively 
‘othered’ the majority of people needing protection who were supposedly ‘genuine’ 
refugees, in order to include only the Christian minority.  
Other refugees abroad were sponsored by groups who would take full financial 
responsibility for their resettlement. While this system was beneficial economically for 
the Canadian state’s humanitarian project, caps were placed on the number of 
applications that would be processed in some categories, and for some groups, 
sponsorship was limited to refugees recognized by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Alboim & Cohl, 2012). Moreover, the 2011 
elimination of the Source Country Class meant that people in need of protection who 
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were unable to leave their country of origin could no longer seek asylum in Canadian 
embassies, nor could they be sponsored by private groups (Alboim & Cohl, 2012). Thus, 
while government officials were pointing to some refugees as ‘genuine’, they were in fact 
making it harder for these same refugees to find protection in Canada. Refugee protection 
eventually became a defining election issue in 2015, as debates over how many refugees 
should be admitted gained increasing attention. While the Liberal Party made and upheld 
their ambitious campaign promise of bringing 25,000 Syrian refugees, they did so 
without extra financial support for the settlement sector that had been severely weakened 
over the previous ten years. Since 2016, it became clear that the impact of the many 
changes to IRPA, and the heavily felt restrictions on the settlement sector, would take a 
significant amount of time and political will to overcome.  
Another amendment made to deter and punish the arriving ‘bogus’ claimants was 
to the Interim Federal Health (IFH) Program. This program, first established in 1957, 
provided preventative health care and treatment to eligible migrants (Hari, 2014). The 
program recognized that those eligible may have experienced particular violence and 
persecution and would therefore be at higher risk of poor health; providing them with 
similar coverage to provincial programs was a first step to inclusion (Barnes, 2013). 
However, in 2012, the Conservative Canadian government eliminated this coverage for 
certain migrants, excluding them from the healthcare they needed. This exclusion 
designated certain migrants as less worthy of care, marked their lives as less valuable and 
their subsequent deaths as ungrievable.11 Those excluded were being punished for 
entering Canada of their own accord and seeking legal protection that was broadly 																																																								11 Judith Butler (2004) theorizes the ungrievable death in relation to certain bodies that are viewed as more 
acceptably subject to violence than others. See further discussion in Chapter 2.  
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deemed unjustifiable. Since these cuts to health care primarily affected DCO and refused 
refugee claimants, state officials were de facto designating them all as ‘bogus’ with one 
broad stroke, indicating that these migrants were undeserving of state services. As a 
community doctor shared, “there were a few patients that have asked me whether it was a 
problem that they were seeking health care and whether the government would know, and 
whether it would impact their claim” (Dr. Agarwal). These claimants feared negative 
repercussions from the government for trying to access the services they needed. 
Moreover, the confusion caused by these newly-created refugee categories and 
hierarchies made accessing health care more difficult for all migrants (Barnes, 2013; 
CCR, 2013a).  This same doctor reaffirmed this problem:  
     So, the IFH cuts—so the cuts happened in 2012.  A lot of confusion ensued.   
     There were clear delineations that if you came from one of 37 countries you  
     would have significantly less health coverage than you would have otherwise  
     had.  So, interestingly, what I saw more of was not people from those 37  
     countries, and more so people from other countries who thought they weren’t  
     covered anymore because there was a lot of other health clinics turning them  
     away and settlement workers telling them that they didn’t have health  
     coverage anymore, which is unfortunate” (Dr. Agarwal). 
While the province of Ontario, as well as several other provinces, eventually 
stepped in to fill the health care gap, this too was laden with confusion. As one settlement 
worker explained:  
     So, there is full coverage for refused claimants [...] in Ontario, but you  
     have to make sure your IFH certificate is—you know, is valid in order to  
     benefit from that top up from the province. So, I have had cases where  
     people haven’t realized that, especially people from DCO countries or  
     refused claimants think that ‘I don’t have any more IFH so I’m not going  
     to bother renewing the certificate for some basic, you know, public health  
     coverage that I don’t need.’ So, you realize [...] that they haven’t seen a doctor 
     in, you know, years” (Deborah). 
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A federal court decision reinstated IFH in July 2014, with the presiding judge, Justice 
McTavish, stating that the cuts constituted “cruel and unusual treatment” under the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She came to this conclusion because the government 
was specifically targeting refugee claimants with the “express purpose of inflicting 
predictable and preventable physical and psychological suffering on many of those 
seeking the protection of Canada” (CCR, 2014). The Conservative government pursued 
an appeal of this decision, which was ultimately dropped by the Liberals once they were 
elected. Thus, while the exclusion was ultimately reversed, the two years it was in place 
caused migrants significant concern and pain, with some ultimately being forced to leave 
as a result, as was the case with two of the participants with whom I spoke.   
 Clearly the significant 2012 changes to refugee policy went a long way to ‘other’ 
refugee claimants, obstructing their efforts to find protection within specific spaces and 
relationships. Refugee claimants were thus discursively branded as ‘bogus’ liars and 
cheaters, trying to gain access to rights and protections to which they should not be 
entitled. As a result of the many policy changes, migrants became increasingly precarious 
with fewer options to ensure their own safety and stability.     
Further ‘Othering’ Through Family Class 
Another area where significant changes were made to immigration policies and 
procedures under the Harper Government was within family class applications. Changes 
targeted both young and old, and had distinctly gendered, racialized and class-based 
implications.  
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Some of the first and most significant changes implemented were designed to 
fight ‘marriage fraud’, or ‘marriages of convenience’. These changes to spousal 
sponsorship processes ‘othered’ certain relationships, despite the fact that there was 
actually little data to substantiate the accusations of fraud (Alboim & Cohl, 2012). CIC 
outlined marriages of convenience/fraudulent marriage as 1) a couple who pretend to be 
in a genuine marriage in order to gain permanent residence for one spouse, with the other 
possibly obtaining material benefit; or 2) cases where the sponsor enters the relationship 
in good faith and is tricked or victimized by the person being sponsored. Both scenarios 
outlined were deemed to “weaken our immigration system and make the process more 
difficult for genuine immigrants” (IRCC, 2012). As the then Immigration Minister 
Kenney stated, “[t]he jig is up on marriage fraud”, explaining that there were numerous 
cases of fraudulent marriage, and that wide consultations with Canadians showed that this 
was an important issue (CIC, 2012b). Based on the premise that migrants were making 
their way to Canada and gaining legal status through fraudulent means, these policies 
again worked to divide the desirable from the undesirable, to establish a ‘common sense’ 
understanding of the problem, and to inform Canadians of the potential ongoing threat 
from the criminal ‘other’.  
A 2011 amendment to immigration policy stated that sponsored spouses, if 
divorced and remarried, could not sponsor a new spouse within five years of having been 
sponsored themselves. This amendment was designed to prevent a sponsored spouse from 
using the system to gain status and bring another partner; yet as Deepa Mattoo, an 
immigration lawyer at the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario, pointed out to the 
government’s Citizenship and Immigration Committee, it had important gendered 
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implications. She explained that the sponsoring spouses (usually male) who were abusive 
to their sponsored partner (usually female) had no limitation placed on them for future 
sponsorship applications (Openparliament, 2014). It is well documented that newcomer 
women are frequently vulnerable to and victims of abuse from their sponsor (Adamali, 
Kim, & Rupra, 2008; Bhuyan, 2012; CCR, 2013b), yet the changes to immigration policy 
did little to protect these women, instead it made them more vulnerable, as the accusation 
of marriage fraud had criminal punishments.  
In 2012, as a reaction to the marriage fraud discourse, the Conditional Permanent 
Residence (CPR) Status was implemented. This amendment imposed a precarious status 
on sponsored spouses who, as a result of this condition, would not actually receive 
permanent status for two years. The conditional status applied to sponsored spouses who 
had been in the conjugal relationship for less than two years and had no children with 
their partner at the time the immigration application was made. These spouses had to 
remain living in a conjugal relationship with their sponsor for a period of two years after 
the initial permanent residence (PR) was granted, otherwise the PR would be revoked and 
they could face deportation. After significant concern was raised by advocates and 
women’s groups, provisions were made within the policy for situations of abuse or 
neglect (CCR, 2015). This abuse would need to be proven to immigration officials for 
sponsored spouses to qualify for the exemption and in order to avoid being criminalized 
for having submitted a fraudulent application, which could lead to deportation. However, 
a 2015 assessment conducted by the CCR found that there was a significant lack of 
information about this issue among frontline service providers, which is especially 
notable since there is a strong need for an advocate in these cases, particularly when the 
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women do not speak English or have little knowledge of the exemptions (CCR, 2015). 
Moreover, the assessment found that CIC officials were also lacking information about 
the process and its exceptions. Organizations reported to the CCR that when they 
contacted the immigration call centre there was a lack of clarity and consistency, as 
officials had little information or gave inaccurate guidance, and they had little 
understanding or sensitivity to gender-based violence (CCR, 2015). Furthermore, proving 
abuse can be difficult and time-consuming, requiring a significant effort on the part of 
advocates and lawyers, as well as CIC officials who monitor and evaluate cases. Thus as 
the assessment explains, “[g]iven that there is no evidence that Conditional Permanent 
Residence is addressing a real problem, this is a shameful waste of resources” (CCR, 
2015, p. 3).  
This was a particularly gendered provision, as it has been widely acknowledged 
that sponsored women faced increased risks of violence. As one participant stated: “The 
women’s movement were against the Conditional Permanent Residence and that’s why 
they put the exception. Because if you remember, at the beginning there was no exception. 
But when the women’s movement jumped, they put in that exception” (Mariposa, 
settlement worker). While advocates may have recognized that women were increasingly 
at risk of violence, the policy acted to make migrant women more vulnerable. As a 
community clinic lawyer explained: “I definitely believe there is something going on that 
a lot more women are being investigated and a lot of women have to make an application 
for [an exemption to] conditional permanent residence” (Asha).  
On a personal level, as a frontline worker myself who assists with a number of 
immigration applications, the Conditional Permanent Resident Status exemption 
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applications are the ones that I find particularly unpleasant to make. In the majority of 
cases that I encountered, sponsored spouses (predominantly women) had left their 
partners after having suffered psychological and financial abuse. After moving to a 
shelter, or going to stay with a friend, the victim received a letter from Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada indicating that they were being investigated for failing to comply 
with the two-year requirement to live with their sponsor. The migrants whom I met who 
had their status threatened by immigration officials under the CPR had ample proof of the 
abuse they faced. As an advocate, I was left having to argue for an exemption based on 
differing forms of intimate partner violence and having to offer proof of that same 
violence, which is both time consuming and painful for all involved. This process both 
victimized and criminalized women. The existence of the CPR accused women in these 
relationships of being the victimizers with the power to take advantage of their sponsor, 
however they were frequently the ones who were vulnerable to abuse because of 
gendered power relations amplified by the control given to the sponsor as a result of 
Conditional Permanent Residence.  
Family class applicants were also targeted by Conservative policy makers due to 
expectations around age for both young and old. Amendments to immigration policy and 
procedures in 2011 and 2014 lowered the age of dependent children that could be 
sponsored by their parents from under 22 to under 19 years old, and suspended 
sponsorship applications for parents and grandparents. These amendments effectively 
linked bordering practices to age; older youth and seniors would face a rigid border that 
prevented them from joining their families.  
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In 2011, to diminish the backlog in sponsorship applications for parents and 
grandparents, government officials announced a moratorium on new applications, 
introducing instead a so-called super visa, which would allow visits for up to two years in 
length repeatedly for a period of ten years (Alboim & Cohl, 2012). However, there were 
important class and ability implications for these visas, as applicants would have to show 
private health care coverage to obtain the visa, which was frequently expensive, and as 
Alboim and Cohl (2012) argue this was the government’s way of excluding people 
deemed to be a potential drain on the health care and welfare systems (p. 29).  This 
program was also critiqued as having racialized implications, as these intersect with class 
and ability based on the assumption that sponsored parents will drain the welfare and 
health care systems. As Neborak (2013) explains, a 2012 Ontario Council of Agencies 
Serving Immigrants (OCASI) study found that there were more applications approved 
from the U.S. and Europe and substantially fewer approved from countries in Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East, where the majority of immigrants were actually coming from 
(p.11).  
Moreover, on August 1, 2014 the age of dependent children who could be 
included in their parents’ applications or sponsored by their parents was lowered from 
below twenty-two to below nineteen, with further exemptions removed for those in full-
time education. The CIC notice about the change stated that this amendment would bring 
immigration policy in line with the age of majority across the provinces, and that older 
youth could come as international students or as economic immigrants themselves 
(Canada Gazette, 2013).  The change had economic motivations, as was stated in the 
government-produced Canada Gazette (2013):  
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     Statistics demonstrate that older dependent children (those who arrive between  
     the ages of 19 and 21) have lower economic outcomes than those who arrive in  
     Canada at a younger age (between 15 and 18 years old). 
The CCR (2013c) provided numerous contestations to the above rationale, and pointed 
out that it would be especially detrimental to refugees and other migrants as they may 
have to wait many years to be settled in Canada, during which time their children may 
have become too old to sponsor. Several of the frontline workers I interviewed also 
indicated that this was a particularly detrimental change for their clients.  As Chico 
explained:  
     The changes in the age of dependents, this is cruel, though. You know what I  
     mean? And this is – we are going to reduce the intake by reducing the  
     eligibility criteria [...] [This] hit the person right in the middle and destroyed  
     families.  
This exclusion of migrants based on age had wide-reaching deleterious impacts as 
families learned that they would be kept apart permanently. It also constructed youth and 
the older adults as undesirable migrants that should be excluded. Overall, the changes to 
family class criteria created a migrant ‘other’ based on gender, racialization, age and 
financial expectations delineating who would be included as a desirable immigrant and 
who would be excluded, narrowing options for legal remedies.  
Summary 
This chapter has addressed immigration-related policies announced or 
implemented from 2008 to 2015 under the Conservative government that had significant 
impacts on those whom I interviewed within the context of forced voluntary return. As a 
result of these changes the pathways to precarious immigration status were augmented 
and the possibilities for gaining secure status eroded, leaving many migrants and frontline 
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workers with few legal options and many difficult choices. These policies and discourses 
led to a bordering and ‘othering’ of the people I interviewed, instigating a loss of hope for 
a future in Canada. The exclusions caused by the immigration policy changes were 
overtly gendered, as women were targeted in specific and varying ways; they were also 
classist, racist and ageist, as different policies limited inclusion. While the policy, 
procedural and discourse shifts alone can be tied to some of the forced voluntary return 
described by participants, they more broadly left excluded people with few possibilities 
of inclusion.  Such a bleak environment is significant to understanding the spectrum of 
voluntary to forced return.   
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Chapter 4: The Wide Reach of Migrant Criminalization and Loss of Hope 
This chapter draws on the experiences shared during interviews, in which frontline 
workers and migrants described the myriad relationships and spaces where people faced 
exclusion and felt criminalized, all of which were threaded through with gendered 
distinctions and inequities. These physical spaces, which included schools, work places, 
healthcare providers and immigration detention centres, necessarily overlapped with 
relationships experienced through positive and negative community ties, overarching 
distrust and subtle and overt racism. The criminalization experienced by migrants was 
described in a multitude of ways, from their experience of physical incarceration in jails 
and detention centres, and the use of handcuffs in both, to the marking of certain bodies 
as dishonest and suspect, leading to hypervigilance by state officials, migrants, and their 
advocates, and a ‘beg for mercy’ model of inclusion (which I define and discuss below).  
I draw on these examples to ground feelings of exclusion and surveillance in concrete 
lived experiences, which are linked to a loss of hope that for some, propelled them to a 
forced voluntary return.  
In this chapter, the ways exclusion is felt and experienced by migrants are 
outlined in two sections: I) Relationships and II) Spaces. These two sections are further 
divided based on the themes that emerged from the interviews through coding. Part I- 
Relationships, is separated into sections on Distrust, Racism and Community 
Connections, while Part II- Spaces, is divided into sections on School, Health Care 
Provision, Work Places and Shelter, and finally the Immigration Detention Centre.     
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I. Exclusionary Relationships 
Deep Distrust in Migrants in Toronto  
In the interviews I conducted, the overarching feelings of being mistrusted were 
described by migrants, and frontline workers also expressed concern about the level of 
mistrust by Canadians and Canada towards their clients. This distrust of migrants is 
woven into immigration processes and procedures by policy makers and bureaucrats, and 
as a result, migrants’ expressions of their experiences are frequently challenged, 
disbelieved and negated by officials who deny them inclusion in different ways (Bhuyan 
& Smith-Carrier, 2012; Crépeau et al., 2007; McDonald, 2009). Changes to the Canadian 
immigration system under the Conservative government increased avenues and resources 
for accusations of fraudulent behavior and misrepresentation, which encouraged state 
officials and civil servants to proceed from a standpoint of doubt and suspicion. As Chico, 
a frontline worker explained, “the whole effect is reducing the trust.” The discourse and 
social constructs that circulated as a result of this pervasive distrust leached beyond 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s purview, into the broader forms of bordering and 
criminalization within social services, work places and in the community which had 
strong impacts on migrants. As Sathya described: 
I think people are also very exhausted and can’t believe how much more cruel  
Canada is than it seems to be, because of how criminalized migrants really are...  
[I]f they had status, I think they could really enjoy this country. But [it is a]  
horrible place to be for precarious status [migrants] (Sathya, private lawyer).  
The frontline workers I spoke to described a systemic procedural distrust of their 
clients, which was caused by immigration officials accusing migrants of misrepresenting 
their experiences. The confrontational attitude of those officials compounded the distrust. 
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As Asha, a community-based lawyer, described, under the Harper administration there 
was a notable increase in misrepresentation investigations. These investigations directly 
accused migrants who had submitted immigration applications of misrepresenting 
themselves based upon some inconsistency, omission or error in their application. 
Misrepresentation allegations were often gendered in specific ways and frequently 
targeted migrants based on their social location, particularly as related to the parts of the 
world they came from, or their religious and cultural backgrounds. From a legal 
perspective, all three lawyers I interviewed discussed the increased workload that this 
lack of trust between government officials and migrants had created for them. Asha, who 
often found herself on the frontlines of fighting misrepresentation allegations because of 
the community she served, explained: 
     I do a lot of those misrepresentation investigations... So, there were a lot,  
     there were tons and tons of misrepresentation investigations which were  
     opened up against the clients. 
She went on to describe how this increased marginalization caused by the distrust of her 
clients further criminalized them, as they were continuously assumed to be attempting to 
defraud the system and therefore had to prove that they weren’t.    
     So, those cases became very hard to argue for because there were so many [...]  
     it was the culture which got created where everyone was being doubted... the  
     onus of proof, since it was falling upon clients to say that no, I didn’t do this,  
     and to create the evidence around that became really hard.... (Asha, community  
     clinic lawyer) 
The overemphasis on migrants’ untrustworthiness was linked to accusations of fraudulent 
behavior, and also drained the resources of legal advocates, since they had much more 
work to do to provide evidence of honest behavior. This diminishing capacity of legal 
services also had important implications for migrants who may not have been able to find 
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the help they needed to contest accusations, and thus may have had to face significant 
consequences, such as loss of immigration status, increased risk of detention and 
subsequent deportation.    
Samantha, another community lawyer, shared the impacts that she has seen with 
this increase in misrepresentation investigations: “I feel like it’s fostered a hypervigilance, 
sort of the sense that [...] you can’t plug all the holes [in people’s attempts to regularize 
their status], you know?” She described the impact that this has had on her practice, and 
the extra work entailed in continuously trying to prepare for any allegations of 
misrepresentation or dismissal of facts in her applications. Samantha shared that she now 
actively discloses any possible detail that could be used against her clients and collects as 
much evidence as possible, often preparing ahead for possible appeals and Judicial 
Reviews. She went on to explain that there is “a new level of hypervigilance” on the part 
of lawyers, frontline workers and migrants themselves, due to the increased level of 
doubt and investigations, but also because of the increased gravity of the consequences. 
Samantha named the consequence of this distrust and hypervigilance as a “begging for 
mercy model”, where, instead of humanitarian decision-making, immigration officials 
were asked to take pity on migrants for reasons carefully tied to good immigrant or 
deserving victim constructs. She explained that,  
     I feel like I reside in, like, the dark cauldron of humanitarian and  
     compassionate discretion, discretionary decision-making. Like, it’s just  
     begging for mercy all the time. Like, none of my clients fit into the rules,  
     right? So [...] you’re generally asking for some exception....  
     (Samantha, legal clinic lawyer) 
Another lawyer I interviewed, Sathya, also spoke of the idea of ‘begging for mercy’ and 
believing compassion is possible, but she located that hope in her clients rather than  
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herself. She explained:  
 
     [A] lot of people really think that even though there’s no [...] chance, that  
     maybe [the] immigration [official] has a heart. And so they really do have  
     that, like, hope that, you know, somebody will take compassion on them.   
     And I’m like, well, it’s not going to happen. 
Instead she described the violence inherent in this distrust and the ways that this is a 
direct affront on migrants’ dignity and wellbeing. In describing the reactions of her 
clients, she explained, 
     they’re treated automatically like they’re lying, like they’re criminals.   
     There’s no trust. Their words are misinterpreted and used against them in  
     almost every way.  And they feel that they’re in a Catch 22, because it  
     doesn’t really matter what they say, it’s going to be twisted to demonize.  
     And [by] that, I mean, they don’t use these words, but it’s pretty evident 
     that they feel like their dignity is on constant assault (Sathya, private lawyer). 
While this violent and criminalizing distrust was described as an overarching 
systemic attitude, it manifested differently based on migrants’ intersecting identities and 
the impact these have on the viewer. Interlocking constructs related to gender, 
racialization, class, ability, sexuality and age influenced procedural approaches. As one 
frontline worker, Mariposa, explained:  
     The woman has to prove everything. You need to prove that you were raped,  
     you need to prove that you were in domestic violence [...]. And then, talking  
     about gender, that’s very unbalanced, no? And it’s against, it really shows you  
     how this is, how the patriarchal system is getting more and more on top of  
     the women (Mariposa, settlement worker). 
The gendered expectations of an ‘appropriate’ victim are more frequently imposed on 
female migrants, as they have to prove they are worthy of that categorization in different 
ways. This perspective was shared by Asha, who emphasized the mistreatment of women, 
and that in her experience, 
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     ...there’s no compassion in [immigration officers’] voices, they were trained  
     to just be very, like, matter of fact and ask them questions, which was as if  
     they were being interrogated instead of being interviewed. So, so clients, and  
     especially women clients, I can tell you, [...], the amount of offensive 
     questions I’ve seen being asked of women clients is really, like, its harsh. 
Asha was clear that she was basing her answers on her own first-hand experience from 
her work with a particular community; therefore, it may not have represented the system 
at large. Yet she went on to speculate in 2015, that “I definitely believe there is 
something going on that a lot more women are being investigated.” The gendered 
criminalization of migrant women has been tied to changes to immigration policy and 
practice. As distrust and accusations of misrepresentation grew over the near decade of 
Conservative rule, women frequently became the targets, particularly racialized women.  
The Broad Reach of Overt and Subtle Racism  
As previously stated, the exclusion of migrants in different moments and spaces 
may take different forms based on social constructs related to intersecting identities.  In 
the interviews I conducted, exclusion was inherently racialized, taking different forms as 
race intersected with gender, class, age and ability. At multiple points, frontline workers 
described the racist distrust and marginalization that their clients faced at different times. 
Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, the frontline workers who first brought up the 
racism their clients faced were primarily racialized women themselves. These workers 
quickly identified racism in their clients’ experiences, often explaining that the clients 
themselves named the racism they faced. As Asha explained: 
     All the time, racism. But see the problem with that stuff is, it’s very subtle  
     most of the time, right? [...] but they all complain about the racism and the  
     xenophobia in a very subtle way (Asha, lawyer).  
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Mariposa, a settlement worker, echoed the experience of subtle racism, stating that 
“racism in Canada happens; the difference with Canada and the United States is that it is 
more subtle here.” Subtle racism in Canada relies on the normalization of whiteness, 
while concurrently the promotion of multiculturalism obfuscates systemic race, gender 
and class inequalities (Das Gupta, 1999). 
However, Sathya also described the more overt ways racism impacted her clients. 
She shared the ways her clients faced racism in the many different interactions they 
engage in during their settlement and integration efforts. She tied this racism to overt 
criminalization of migrants, as they were often deemed to be trying to gain access to 
things to which they were not entitled. She said that the racism her clients experienced 
was 
     really flat-out racism in the system and in, like, with service providers  
     where [the clients are] just treated like they don’t know anything or that  
     they’re cheaters, or that they can’t speak English or can’t understand, or  
     they’re stupid or unsophisticated because of different cultural practices,  
     because of different ways they dress, because of the colour of their skin  
     (Sathya, lawyer). 
This intersectional understanding of racist exclusion shows the many different ways 
migrants are made to feel ‘othered’ and marginalized. Asha went on to explain that these 
kinds of experiences led many of her clients to isolate themselves as a means of 
protection: 
     Another thing is, about the experience of racism, is that a lot of them try to  
     isolate themselves from the mainstream society anyways, right? ... That they  
     totally isolate themselves from the mainstream and they will basically, their  
     life will be really confined to one bus which goes from this one place where  
     they live to this one other place they reach and that’s it. They contain their  
     lives to very secluded and, which they also consider safe, safer zones,  
     (Asha, lawyer).  
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She went on to explain that she noticed this isolation tended to affect women more than 
men, as they may experience safety differently. Other workers also described the often-
gendered isolation enforced on their clients either through their own experiences of racist 
violence, or as a result of acts against others. Kate, while unable to name many 
experiences of racism (as opposed to other forms of discrimination), did share that some 
of her female Muslim clients were afraid to go out. She explained that  
     there’s a number of women in our community who didn’t necessarily have  
     experiences of discrimination, but after recent attacks on women in hijabs  
     in Montreal and Toronto, were afraid to go outside for a couple of weeks,  
     like, for fear of something. Although we never had a report that anything  
     did happen (Kate, settlement worker). 
As such, racist violence and exclusion does not necessarily have to be experienced by 
each person to know that it is a risk faced by those who are ‘othered’. This gendered 
isolation echoes the experience women described in their communities, as they withdrew 
from public spaces out of different, and yet interrelated, fears. This isolation then also 
impacts income and educational possibilities, as well as access to advocacy and support. 
It is therefore particularly important to include a gendered lens in considering the 
intersectional impacts of the criminalization of migration and the production of 
precarious status.     
 Other frontline workers described the racism faced by their clients, but clearly 
articulated that the clients themselves had not identified their experiences as racist. There 
were different explanations given for this, whether the racism was too subtle, or clients 
themselves were afraid to name it in front of white workers, not wanting to look 
ungrateful in their new society. Samantha shared her experiences, stating: 
		 139	
     I make submissions based on racial discrimination all the time, but I  
     find I’m the one putting them forward. I don’t know if my clients are  
     articulating that to me, to be honest. And that may be a barrier because  
     I’m, like, a white lady (Samantha, lawyer). 
Samantha’s recognition of the barrier that may exist in speaking about racism to the 
population identified as white Canadians is significant, as it points to the desire for 
inclusion by not threatening a particular power relationship. As the white worker, 
Samantha could not necessarily be seen as able to relate to racist oppression, therefore 
clients may not have wanted to address it directly. While on the other hand, Sathya, Asha 
and Mariposa could be identified as women of colour who may relate more to discussions 
of racist exclusion.  
Chico, a settlement worker, also shared the different forms of racist exclusion his 
clients faced, but explained that they were unable to identify it as such because they had 
internalized it too deeply. As he said: 
     I believe that many people don’t have that clear concept about discrimination,  
     racism, classism. You know what I mean? Some of them, they have been  
     living in that particular situation since they were born, so [it] is a given, you  
     know, the way then the system where they come from marginalizes them. 
The long-term, internalized racism Chico described may also keep people from naming 
or resisting it in different ways. While not all the migrants I interviewed identified racism 
as a significant factor in their experience in Canada, perhaps for some of the reasons 
identified by Samantha and Chico, others named it clearly. Suny and Maria, in particular, 
described the racist experiences they faced as some of the most impactful in their struggle 
with forced voluntary return.  As Suny shared, the oppression that she faced in Canada 
was continuously accented with racism: 
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Honestly, I feel being in Canada, a lot of people they, they judge you by your  
colour. Like even at the work that I have, they, I experience it… they expect  
that you know nothing so they don’t, they don’t um, show you [how to do]  
anything [new]. They expect you to be the one that’s ignorant and [that]… 
made me feel like, ... I would still be treated that way, in any job.  
For Suny, this ongoing anti-black racist discrimination (as it intersected with class, 
education and likely gender) became unbearable. She went on to explain that the 
exclusion she endured was quietly pushing her out:  
     It actually made me feel like I didn’t even want to stay here. [...] They  
     made me feel like it’s not even about your status, there’s so much more  
     to it that prevents me wanting to like Canada. 
In Suny’s statements, she importantly pointed out that she did not believe the ‘othering’ 
was related to her immigration status, as her co-workers were not aware of her particular 
situation. While a permanent status may have allowed her increased mobility in the job 
market to leave that particular situation, it would not have remedied the anti-black racist 
violence she encountered in different ways.  
 Maria described the racism she experienced in her many attempts to settle in 
Canada. She shared stories of racist encounters with other students in her English school, 
from the other moms at her job as a babysitter, and in her other attempts to “blend in.” 
She described the racism as fairly subtle, but undeniable as she explained that “I feel like 
some of them, … they tell you in a very explicit way that you belong there and they 
belong here.” She went on to say, “They don’t [...] tell you, ‘why are you here?’ But it’s 
just...” Maria explained that these experiences of exclusion were a factor in her 
“depression”. She shared that the people she had had interactions with made her feel like 
she would never be completely here in Canada as a result.  She described this as a high 
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price to pay for being in Canada, a price she felt she was still partially paying emotionally, 
despite gaining a more secure immigration status.   
Community in Toronto: Helpful or Hindrance  
In order to avoid racist ‘othering’ and exclusion, many precarious migrants turn to 
their community for support. While community was loosely defined, and seemed to mean 
different things in different interviews, participants often described some form of human 
connection, whether with service providers, citizens, other migrants or family members.  
My interview questions were framed in such a way that having a community was 
contrasted with isolation (ie. frontline workers were asked if their clients were isolated, 
and migrants were asked about their connections to others). The communities described 
offer support in many different ways, including psychosocial and financial, which may 
counteract the criminalization felt by migrants; however, these communities can also 
become a space where exclusion is reproduced. This tension was further described and 
challenged in my interviews with migrants, as they did not always see their communities 
as a welcoming place.  
For Suny, her community in Canada, which she described as connected to a 
Caribbean-dominant church, became a place fraught with discomfort and risk. As she 
explained:  
     Here, like, I’m not comfortable going to church, not even making someone  
     pray [for] my daughter, you know, pray for me. So, I’m not comfortable for  
     that. So, that’s why there’s a lot of stuff I know, like, I, before I do it I always  
     think, like, you know, is someone going to do me something?  
     (Suny, undocumented migrant). 
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 She went on to clarify that in her country, a small Caribbean island, she would have the 
opportunity to get to know people quite quickly, as the geographical community was 
quite small; in Toronto, since the city is so big, it takes much longer to know and trust 
people. She also pointed out that as a young mother with little familial or community 
support she could trust, she could not participate in many of the activities that her peers 
were taking part in, which left her relatively isolated.   
Katherine explained that while she had made friends in Canada, she felt that 
people from her ethnic community were not helpful to her. While her male partner, Jonh 
also felt uncertain about their ethnic community, he acknowledged that he had been able 
to make some friends and build more of a network than Katherine. The two of them 
offered a gendered analysis of their community connections, as he shared that he felt it 
was easier for men to bond since they could talk about sports (football) or cars and avoid 
discussing anything too risky, while women could be “a little bit mean.” Katherine added 
that the way she experienced women talking about other people’s immigration status 
made her even more nervous about interacting with them. They also agreed that Jonh had 
more friends because of his ongoing employment in construction, where he came into 
contact with other English-speaking people and had the chance to talk to them during 
breaks. Katherine’s limited employment in sectors such as cleaning, did not offer the 
opportunity to socialize with many co-workers and left her more isolated. For both 
Katherine and Suny, the circumstances produced by gendered expectations related to the 
formal and informal care work in which they engaged left them fairly isolated and unable 
to make the community connections they desired.  
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Most frontline workers, however, emphasized the importance of community 
connections and support for their clients. Several who I interviewed emphasized that 
connecting with community-based advocates, such as themselves was crucial to their 
migrant clients’ success in various ways. For example, some saw their role as advocates 
as critical for their clients to fight for their rights, as well as to access the services to 
which they were entitled. They also explained that they try to connect migrants with 
others in their community who could support and advocate for them. As one frontline 
worker, Kate, explained:  
     I think one of the things that we really try to do is connect people with  
     social support because we’ve seen that social capital, I guess you could,  
     say or as we call it, community, can make a huge difference in so many  
     things. 
 However, she also elaborated on the tensions found in community relations, and the 
diverse reactions migrants from different parts of the world may have to their 
‘community’:  
     Sometimes people are quite suspicious and not trusting of people within  
     their own community. So, I think it depends—like, there’s a big difference  
     say, with people from the Congo being very suspicious of people within  
     their own community than, like, Colombians, like, love other Colombians  
     and there’s great community. So, I think it depends on the nature of the  
     conflict that they’ve left and why people come to Canada as refugees  
     (Kate, settlement worker).  
Kate’s position as a service provider for refugees gave her a different perspective on the 
challenges of community than those expressed by Suny or Katherine. While Kate pointed 
to conflicts within communities based on histories of violence and division in the 
countries of origin, the other two women, both without immigration status, were more 
concerned with their community in Canada betraying them. Suny and Katherine did not 
indicate that they were worried about connecting with their community because of 
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conflicts that existed before they came to Canada, but instead it was their interactions 
with people in Canada that instigated their concerns. Their descriptions of the ways their 
lack of immigration status made them vulnerable underlined their fear of making too 
many community connections.  
The three lawyers I spoke to argued for the importance of connecting their clients 
with other community supports. They clearly described their own roles as limited, as their 
priority was to focus on the legal situation, and therefore they saw necessity in 
encouraging migrants to access other services and supports. As Asha explained, “I will 
actually refer them and I would want them to access other services because I can’t, I am 
not, like I can’t be everything for them, right?” Asha explained that she does not have the 
capacity to offer all that her clients need, including psychological support, settlement 
information and employment or financial knowledge, so she relies on community 
referrals for that. This explanation also points to the pragmatic nature of seeking services, 
as some migrants may only seek to access services, such as legal services, when they feel 
it is essential. A settlement worker I spoke to, Deborah, made a similar point by stating 
that 
     I see clients who have been here for a long time and all they’ve done is work.   
     They might have family here, like, you know, cousins, nieces, nephews, that  
     kind of thing, but they’re not necessarily connected to the community outside  
     of their family.  So, they work hard, they even pay taxes, but they’re not  
     connected to, you know, any community [resources].  They don’t participate  
     in anything outside of the family and work.  
This focus on employment is often both financially necessary and protective. While there 
may be little time for community involvement when engaged in low paid precarious 
employment, Deborah was also pointing to the fact that this provides certain migrants 
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with the perceived safety of not connecting with others who may threaten their precarious 
residence in Canada. Deborah went on to explain that many of her clients are also 
isolated because of the fear that their status will be discovered, so as she described, they 
are “basically hiding”.  
One frontline worker, Chico, also identified the risks in community and was clear 
about the reasons migrants may face challenges in their communities. He pointed out that  
     the problem is that we have to really discuss what support means. You  
     know, support is a precarious job? [...] You know, there is a concept of the  
     communities where, like, you have to pay the price to be here because that  
     happened to me. [...] Many people come here, and the abuser is the big brother.  
     You know, the big sister [actual family or contacts that have been in Canada  
     longer].  
He concluded that  
     in short term, there is support. It’s not the best support, but they can survive  
     with that support here in these communities. Survival is the best option, is  
     the only option, you know what I mean? (Chico, settlement worker) 
Therefore, while community is often extolled by many frontline workers for its 
virtue in providing advocates, as well different kinds of support, including financial, 
psychological and logistical, it also involves relationships where exclusion is reproduced 
for many migrants. The migrant participants in this dissertation were quite hesitant 
around their communities, or felt excluded from them for different reasons, most of 
which were related to their immigration status. By some understandings, communities 
can offer advocacy and support, but by others, they are filled with potential violence and 
risk to long-term residence in Canada. 
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II. Spaces of Exclusion 
School: Education Denied 
Interlinked with relationships, there are particular places where the exclusion of 
migrants impacted many areas of their daily life during the period 2008-2015. One 
location that was noted by participants as particularly marginalizing was in access to 
schooling. The controlled and limited access to educational spaces criminalizes both 
children and their parents when enrolment in public education is denied. As Mariposa, a 
settlement worker, pointed out:  
     When you are 8 years old, 10 years old, that’s where is your natural place to  
     be, in the school ... we keep talking about language and all this stuff, but I  
     believe the main barrier is the prejudism that is happening, and I believe  
     education is the clear example. 
Mariposa was describing her experience working with many families that struggled to  
register their children for school. She discussed the discrimination families with  
precarious immigration status face at school boards and at the schools themselves when 
first enrolling children.   
The participants in my study who I spoke to, who had experienced this exclusion 
first hand, described how they found it particularly upsetting. Katherine expressed the 
disappointment she felt since “here ...I can’t study, you know. So, for me it’s the most 
difficult thing, because I like studying.” Katherine went on to explain how she had tried 
to register for high school, despite completing some university before coming to Canada, 
but was told that she could not enroll because “the school say me I need have my parents 
here because I just, in the time, I just have 18 years old, so, and I need to have my parents 
here to have a job and bla, bla, bla, I don’t understand..... [sic].” In this instance, the strict 
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rules dictating that minors must have a legal guardian to register for school, combined 
with the language barriers, left Katherine feeling ‘othered’ and excluded without a 
completely clear sense of why. Since minors are frequently forced to migrate without a 
parent or legal guardian, the school board policy that demands a legal guardian for 
enrolment impacts many precarious status youth.   
Suny also faced insurmountable barriers in her efforts to access education in 
Canada. She explained that 
     when I first came up here I wanted to go to high school, I tried it, and actually  
     I called and they told me yes! um, they could take me, and when I went um,   
     I gave them my documents, I didn’t tell them my status. I don’t recall if they  
     asked my status. But I gave the, the documents and I told them that’s all I  
     have, and they told me what I needed and I just, I told them OK, but I never....  
     I knew by the time they told me that, that I probably wouldn’t be able to do  
     it, so I didn’t bother to go.  
Being unable to provide immigration documents due to her lack of permanent status, 
Suny decided not to fight her exclusion; she instead decided to withdraw her efforts. 
School, in this instance, was not deemed to be a right, but rather a space reserved for 
those who held particular documents that proved their presence was ‘welcome.’ However, 
Suny was determined to pursue her education in one way or another. She decided that 
since she could not attend high school, that she would try a private college. Yet that 
experience was no less marginalizing: 
      And after I tried the college, a private college. I actually paid and I was  
     willing to pay a monthly fee, and then um, I actually went to the, I went to  
     the orientation and then um... [...] I paid the admission and they, they  
     accepted my ID, the one that I had. And then I went to the orientation and  
     then when I, because it was a, caring, child-caring program, you needed to  
     do blood tests to make sure that you’re healthy and with it a [vulnerable person  
     police record check]. I was ok, when I heard about the blood test, I said ok,   
     I probably just have to pay extra to get it done. And then when I heard about  
     the police record I knew that I was unable to because of my [lack of] status. 
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Knowing that her very presence in Canada was criminalized because of her lack of 
immigration status, Suny could not interact with the police in any way. Once again, Suny 
had to withdraw from participating in civil society and once again she was reminded that 
she was not ‘desirable’ or worthy of inclusion.    
The one person I spoke to who had access to education due to her status as an 
international student, Esse, felt that she faced internal barriers within the academy which 
impacted her experience and ability to succeed. As she explained: “I think the 
international student has ESL and racialized,...it’s also the reason I am behind for 
finishing PhD, so I had a difficulty to find supervisor, especially for comps.” Esse shared 
that she had struggled to find support at different times throughout her degree and that 
she believed that assumptions were made about her and her ability to succeed 
academically. She explained that faculty and staff at the university insinuated that she did 
not belong. Esse tied the lack of support and the marginalization she felt at school to the 
oppression she faced as a non-Canadian racialized woman who did not speak English as a 
first language. Esse continued to pursue her academic goals despite the setbacks, and was 
ultimately able to finish her PhD, but her immigration status as a visa student became a 
factor in her inability to establish herself permanently. The student visa she was on 
expired before she could finish her dissertation, forcing her to make the decision to leave 
before she was ready to. Esse had applied for permanent residence twice, under two 
different streams, but she was unable to obtain it in time and was unwilling to overstay 
her visa.   
Health Care: Survival of the Fittest 
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Another area of concern for many of the participants in my study, both frontline 
workers and migrants themselves, was access to suitable health care for migrants. The 
lack of clarity over government cuts to health care access for certain refugees and other 
migrants led to widespread confusion and the denial of services, even to those migrants 
who had valid government-provided coverage (Barnes, 2013). As Kate, a settlement 
worker, explained, “[it] has been really, really difficult to know exactly who’s covered 
for what and when. And not even us, it’s hard for the [medical] service providers to stay 
on top of.” This confusion made it difficult for migrants to access medical services and 
support, and promoted abelist constructions of ‘desirable’ migrants as people who did not 
require medical care. Discourse was circulated by government officials stating that 
migrants were receiving “gold-plated health care”, which was better than the coverage 
that average Canadians were able to obtain (Wherry, 2012). In reality, refugee claimants, 
as well as some other migrants, received a document that allowed them to access the 
same provincial health services as Canadians, with the addition of some coverage for 
mental health services, vision tests and some prescription medication, similar to the 
coverage received by people on social assistance (Barnes, 2013; Hari, 2014).  
The drastic cuts to the Interim Federal Health (IFH) program in June 2012, which 
left certain migrants with access to only emergency public health services, caused 
migrants and service providers to be confused and defensive. The cuts were initially 
targeted at refugee claimants from Designated Countries of Origin (DCOs) and refused 
claimants. Yet, as Dr. Agarwal described, the impacts she experienced in her practice as a 
result of the changes saw many more migrants excluded:  
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     How many people have been told by their ill-informed, although not ill- 
     intentioned, social service workers or healthcare workers that they are not  
     covered, and therefore decided not to seek care? And then, what negative  
     outcomes have occurred? We don’t really know  
     (Dr. Agarwal, community doctor). 
As Dr. Agarwal points out, despite the targeted discourse that marginalized 
particular populations, many more refugee claimants felt the exclusionary impacts. The 
confusion over which migrants maintained access to healthcare and which did not meant 
that people might have avoided seeking treatment even when they were eligible for it. 
Therefore, the exclusion of ‘undesirable migrants’ does not only affect the targeted 
migrants, but also impacts others who, for other reasons, are categorized as ‘desirable’ 
refugees or migrants.  
Moreover, Dr. Agarwal highlighted the fear that these changes caused for 
migrants: “In terms of the IFH cuts, there were a few patients that have asked me whether 
it was a problem that they were seeking health care and whether the government would 
know, and whether it would impact their claim.” This fear demonstrates the ways 
discourse was understood and internalized by migrants to mean that if they sought 
services, they would be deemed ‘undesirable.’ This has important consequences not only 
on people’s physical health, but also on the community as a whole, as it worked to 
solidify a hierarchized construct of inclusion based on ability and needs. Even once the 
coverage was reinstated, healthcare providers continued to turn people away, as the 
administration involved in processing IFH patients had become arduous and the 
government was slow to reimburse clinics.  
Two of the migrants I spoke to tied their ‘voluntary return’ directly to the cut in 
health services they experienced. Kelly, who had a long-term chronic condition, had had 
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both positive and negative experiences with the health care system in Canada until her 
access was cut. She described advocates having to fight for her to get the medication that 
she needs, and people being rude in clinics and hospitals; but she also talked about kind 
and generous doctors. Kelly then explained that after her refugee claim was denied, while 
she was waiting for her appeal at the federal court to be decided, her health insurance was 
terminated. Around the same time, she learned that she required a new treatment that 
would not be covered. Kelly explained: “I wasn’t receiving any medication for the fungus 
and this was something that was indicated that was a big deal, a big problem. A serious 
problem. [...] And then that was the deciding factor to go.” Kelly felt the negative impacts 
of the health cuts firsthand and this marginalization impacted her presence and her 
wellbeing. It excluded her from healthcare-providing spaces and marked her as unworthy 
of life-saving services. 
Manuel also experienced the impacts of the cuts, as he also suffered from a 
persistent health condition. He explained that after his IFH expired and he was no longer 
able to renew it because of his status as a refused refugee claimant, he had to get medical 
exams done, but as he said: “I couldn’t pay for them, I couldn’t pay for them because 
they couldn’t charge them to the [IFH] document and I didn’t have any money either.” 
He went on to explain that because an Immigration and Refugee Board member had not 
believed his claim he was going to have to return to his country; however, he had 
obtained a legal stay of removal, which allowed him to remain until his Judicial Review 
was held and a determination was made on his case. Despite the stay, Manuel emphasized 
that he had to go. He said he had to leave because he 
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     can’t get medicine, which is very important for me. In that moment they  
     told me ‘you can stay’, but because I have no benefits, I can’t, because I  
     am on medicine for the rest of my life and I don’t have money to buy it. [...]  
     This is what I don’t have now here, and for that as well, I want to go  
     because I couldn’t be here.  
Even though he was still very afraid for his safety in returning to his country, and spent 
significant time explaining why, he still felt that he had to go back for the medicine. As a 
result of the health care cuts, migrants felt criminalized and stigmatized based on their 
physical ability and needs, and the associated exclusion led to a forced voluntary return 
for some.      
Economic Exclusion: Work Places and Shelter 
While for Manuel the biggest concern related to his limited finances was the 
inability to purchase the medication he needed, for others income issues came up in 
different ways. One area in particular that was raised in most of the interviews I 
conducted was migrants’ access to secure income and decent living conditions. Frontline 
workers and the migrants I interviewed suggested that there was a significant divide in 
people’s financial situations based on their immigration status. Refugee claimants tended 
to be on social assistance, which is called Ontario Works (OW) in Ontario, for some 
period of time12. Participants gave reasons for claimants’ reliance on OW, including the 
fact that they have to apply to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for a work permit 
which could take anywhere from five weeks to six months to be granted. The additional 
barriers to employment included limited English, lack of so-called ‘Canadian experience’ 
																																																								12	Ontario Works is a provincial social assistance program that provides a monthly allowance to eligible 
residents for rent and necessities. The amount is predetermined based on criteria including number or 
family member, health needs and pursuit of education.  
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and a Social Insurance Number starting with a 9, which marks them as temporarily in 
Canada (Landolt & Goldring, 2013).  
On the other hand, migrants without immigration status were almost always 
working, despite the lack of a work permit. Migrants in this situation do not have access 
to social assistance because of their lack of status and thus have to find jobs that pay 
under the table in order to survive. Yet, according to most of the participants, 
undocumented workers were frequently considered working poor.  
Migrants and frontline workers interviewed explained that OW was very hard to 
survive on, particularly when taking into account the cost of rent in Toronto, as well as 
the cost of living. As Mariposa pointed out, “They are in social assistance and working, 
because social assistance doesn’t help to survive anymore.” Social assistance in Toronto 
for a single person is currently $721 a month, and while funds are added for additional 
family members and certain extra expenses, the ability to live comfortably was 
challenged by many participants. Kelly pointed out that for her, the biggest difference she 
found living in Canada, as opposed to South America was the limited resources she had 
from OW. She explained: 
     That’s something that I’m not used to, the economic situation... I had a  
     sufficient amount of money to get anything I wanted [before]. I didn’t  
     want much, but I had that. Right now I only have Ontario Works. ... After  
     you spend the money on everything you need to spend it on, and then if  
     you want to get something else, first you have to look at the money and see 
     if it’s possible. 
In addition to the struggles inherent in surviving on such limited amounts of income, 
refugee claimants have been criminalized in different ways for being on social assistance. 
In Ontario Works offices, people are challenged by their caseworkers on their 
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deservingness to receive government support and their legitimacy as refugee claimants. 
This confrontational environment is nurtured by ongoing communication between CBSA 
and social assistance workers as Samantha, a community clinic lawyer, explained: 
     Since 2012, there’s been this, like, liaison person at every OW and ODSP  
     office that communicates to CBSA, or CBSA communicates to them about  
     anyone under a removal order, and [...] constantly having to prove that you’re  
     entitled to income. You know, if you have other stuff, appeals, applications  
     in process but you’re technically under a removal order but not removable, 
     so kind of having to fight that. 
Samantha was describing the increased surveillance she had observed in which social 
assistance workers were regularly communicating with the Canadian Border Services 
Agency to receive updates on their clients’ immigration processes. While having a 
refugee claim denied is not sufficient grounds to terminate OW, as people are eligible to 
receive financial support during appeals and continue to be eligible until their deportation 
date, this communication often caused migrants to be cut off prematurely. Therefore, the 
fighting that Samantha described to have clients’ OW reinstated was a drain on energy 
and resources, as social assistance workers became the civilian soldiers who bordered 
access to survival in many ways, monitoring and policing migrants’ livelihood as well as 
their movements.  
A clear distinction was made for migrants without any immigration status, as they 
were barred access to most services and supports. As a result, many of the people I 
interviewed emphasized how hard these migrants needed to work to earn enough money 
to meet their needs, highlighting the determination and creativity necessary for survival. 
A gender divide was identified by several frontline workers in this discussion, which 
highlighted women’s struggles in particular. Irene, a frontline worker in a community 
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centre, for example, highlighted women’s experiences among those of the non-status 
migrants she has supported:  
     It’s very rare that I find somebody who’s not working. Non-status, 95%  
     of them, women from ... Latin America, from all these communities:  
     Latin American, Caribbean, Portuguese, mainly, are employed in the  
     household, you know like, maintenance kind of, um, underground  
     employment.  
After describing that situation in detail she went on to describe undocumented men’s 
employment, primarily in the construction industry. Yet it is significant that her first 
association with non-status workers was about women.  Louisa, a community worker, 
also raised the issue of gender in her questioning of immigration officials’ handling of 
these cases from her experiences of supporting detained migrants. As she stated: 
     I always think, that’s the kind of person you would want to give status to  
     since they’ve been able to survive without healthcare and welfare for ten  
     years. That shows you are a survivor. Especially the women, the women  
     more so.  
Katherine and Jonh, the migrant couple mentioned earlier, also explained their 
experience working without status along gendered lines. Their descriptions of looking for 
work, the kind of work they obtained and the salaries they received were all influenced 
by socially-constructed gendered expectations and relations. Katherine had had a much 
more difficult time finding and keeping employment, while Jonh had work, but was 
underpaid relative to his co-workers. Jonh worked in construction, where he was given 
the opportunity to build skills, as he explained: “So here I learn, I do, like, digging, you 
know, of houses. You do, like, I do brick laying. Its heavy but it’s nice, I like, yeah.” 
However, he also pointed out that employers exploit the situation when they know that 
the workers have no immigration status: “He pay you 12 [dollars an hour], he pay you 12, 
but for the job you can receive like 16...” 
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Katherine, on the other hand, started out working for a relative who did not 
manage her business well and was unable to provide a salary. She then approached other 
businesses within her linguistic community, since she explained that she was not 
confident in English, but they would not hire her because of her status. But, she then 
changed her assessment during the interview, explaining that she felt her status had little 
to do with access to good jobs, rather nepotism allowed people to find work, but she did 
not know the right people:  
     That’s why I’m so frustrated, because, if you meet people, you, you, can be  
     illegal, but if you meet people, meet the [manager] of the coffee [shop], you  
     can work. Illegal or legal; but if you don’t meet anybody, you can’t work. 
Katherine then tried to find work cleaning, but found this to also be very precarious.   
Nonetheless, Katherine and Jonh described their economic situation as “okay”. They 
explained that they paid all their bills first, and if there was money left over, Jonh could 
buy cigarettes, because cigarettes were a “luxury.” Nonetheless, Jonh said that he was 
still able to smoke in Canada. Katherine never mentioned what her luxury is or whether 
she was able to spend money in that way.  
Within the interviews I conducted, many participants linked their economic 
situations to access to housing. Several participants raised access to housing as one of the 
most important barriers faced by migrants, with less emphasis on their immigration status. 
The cost of housing in Toronto is significantly prohibitive, which means that many 
migrants end up underhoused, homeless or living in substandard conditions (Kissoon, 
2013). Two participants discussed the overcrowding of apartments necessary for migrants 
to afford rent. Several frontline workers also discussed the discrimination their clients 
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faced due to class-based and racist discrimination within the competition for rental 
housing. As Mariposa pointed out:  
     But they, even they say that if you don’t have a status, its more challenging  
     to find a house, it’s like if you are in social assistance, its worse to find a  
     house. And I, it’s the same, it’s kind of class that divides. They don’t tell  
     you it’s classism, no? (Mariposa, settlement worker). 
When housing cannot be obtained, the shelter system is often relied on as a 
temporary solution. However, participants also discussed challenges in the shelters, as 
staff may not be sensitive to people’s particular situations, or the short timelines enforced 
for residence may be unworkable. As Asha, a community clinic lawyer, shared:  
     Women who are facing violence and who are, as I said, shelter hopping, they  
     have a huge trouble with the way shelters treat them [...] There are restrictions  
     in the time period, you can only be here 6 weeks and maybe we’ll give you a  
     grace of 2 more weeks, but then you have to get to a stage of second-stage  
     housing. They don’t qualify for welfare, so how do they get to that kind of stuff?  
This lack of access to supports that may help migrants, particularly women, move out of 
the shelter system is a significant barrier in many respects. Without making immigration 
applications, migrants cannot gain access to the supports, since social housing, childcare 
and other shelter-linked programs are tied to permanent residence. Therefore, shelter 
workers frequently encourage residents to make an immigration application as quickly as 
possible to gain access to the supports needed; but being in the shelter system also makes 
it more difficult to make certain applications (Bhuyan, 2013). Any immigration 
application linked to establishment in Canada or employment potential will be 
disadvantaged by residence in a shelter, therefore it is often not recommended to file 
these applications until secure housing is obtained, leaving migrants in a catch-22 
situation. So, in that sense, many migrants, especially women, end up homeless for 
significant periods of time.  
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Immigration Detention Centres – The Apex of Migrant Criminalization 
In many ways, the space of immigration detention is the most evident material 
manifestation of the criminalization of migrants. There are three Immigration Holding 
Centres run by the CBSA across Canada, one in Quebec, one in Ontario and one in 
British Colombia. Where there are no detention centres, migrants are held in provincial 
jails. Within the Toronto Immigration Holding Centre, located in the Rexdale district, 
people with precarious immigration status can be incarcerated in a five-wing detention 
centre where they have limited and controlled access to family, friends, or the services 
they may need. Immigration detention involves twenty-four-hour confinement with 
limited and controlled movement.  
. 
(Toronto Immigration Holding Centre) 
Most frontline workers agreed that the threat and intolerability of prolonged 
detention greatly influenced people’s ‘voluntary’ return. Even those who struggled to 
think of situations where people would self-deport recognized that clients in detention 
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were more likely than others to agree to leave. As Chico, a settlement worker, explained, 
being detained “destroys choices”; once someone is detained, their options decrease 
significantly. While I was not able to speak to anyone in the Immigration Holding Centre 
in Toronto, frontline workers were forthcoming with their experiences working with 
migrants who had been detained. Louisa, a frontline worker with significant experience 
working with people who had been detained, gave a few specific examples of the 
obstacles migrants find in detention with regards to meeting their needs. Specifically, she 
spoke of the inadequate health care provided and the hostility of the in-house doctor. 
Moreover, people’s movements are restricted, as they are told when to eat, sleep or go 
outside. Louisa described the security measures utilized to control movements within the 
detention centre: 
     Every single time they pass a guard they have to say their name and room  
     number. Some of the guards recognize them and remember. But they’re writing  
     [the names and numbers] down all the time. So, they know that they can’t move  
     without guards. So, when they go outside for recreation, when they come in,  
     now this is new because I haven’t seen this before. Now in the last few—I don’t  
     know how long, when they come in from outside, they line up, they go through  
     a security thing outside. And then they come in and hands against the wall, and  
     the guard with gloves pats them down. 
This control is not only used within the detention centre itself; additionally, when 
people are moved to and from the centre they are placed in handcuffs, emphasizing their 
criminality and ‘dangerousness.’  As Louisa explained: “When they’re arrested, they’re 
taken in handcuffs, and that’s very traumatic for people [.... and] anybody that’s moved 
outside, either to the doctor or the airport, are in handcuffs.”  
As Regirousso (2016) shared in his personal account of being detained: 
     I was then brought into a room with 4 men: 2 immigration officers and 2  
     security guys. ‘Face the wall, legs apart and hands on your head sir!’ What?  
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     But I did so quietly. ‘Hands behind your back sir!’ Clip...clip. My first time  
     ever wearing handcuffs (68).  
 Regirousso went on to describe the fear and trauma he felt being incarcerated in 
this way. He made the point of saying that this experience happened when he first 
reached the Canadian border at Niagara Falls and asked for refugee protection. Therefore, 
this overt criminalization was his “welcome to Canada.” 
The primary reasons given for detaining migrants are concerns over identity, or 
the unlikelihood of compliance with departure orders (i.e. if the person is considered a 
flight risk). Louisa explained that many of the migrants she had met in detention were 
arrested because they made the mistake of expressing to CBSA officials that they were 
afraid to go home. They were thereafter marked as a flight risk, meaning they were 
unlikely to show up for removal because of their fear. Therefore, their intense exclusion 
is directly tied to their immigration status as an ‘undesirable’ migrant who must be 
removed from the territory.  
The migrants held in the Immigration Holding Centre are those who are not 
considered high risk to society or high needs; they are migrants who have committed no 
crime other than being ‘undesirably’ present. Migrants who require additional attention 
for medical needs, mental health issues and/or criminality are relocated to provincial jails, 
where they are held with the non-migrant incarcerated population (Silverman, 2014). 
These prisons are often in remote locations, making access to loved ones and legal 
representation even more difficult. The practice of detaining migrants in prisons has been 
highly contested by activists, lawyers and migrants themselves, with people who have 
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been detained in these spaces engaging in numerous hunger strikes to protest their 
conditions and indefinite detention (CBC News, 2016).  
There are few applications that can be filed once a migrant has been detained, and 
those that are available often do not alleviate the situation immediately. Instead, people 
who are detained are generally being administratively prepared for removal. In this 
context migrants are held in detention centres until they agree to sign the removal order 
and other documents necessary for their deportation, including an agreement for CBSA to 
obtain a passport for them, which also informs their home country that they are returning; 
they are then usually transported directly from the detention centre to the airport. Sathya, 
a private lawyer who had defended many clients in detention, explained that in these 
situations migrants either stay incarcerated or they agree to leave. She expressed that 
“after a certain amount of time in jail, deportation looks pretty good.” She went on to 
point out:  
     When you’re in detention you have a CBSA [agent] who’s your removals  
     officer, right? And like, the things that I’ve heard removals officers say to my  
     clients are ...lies,... CBSA officers are frequently lying and manipulating the  
     emotions of people inside to facilitate deportation because that is, that is their  
     mandate and they have to fulfill it.  
However, she maintained that even in that context, the departure is still considered 
‘voluntary’ (as discussed further in Chapter 5) since procedurally migrants need to sign 
the departure forms and walk onto the plane themselves. Therefore, Sathya argues:   
     That is the purpose of detention, right?  It is to push people out.  It’s to put  
     them in such a desperate state.  That’s why they keep them in there as much as  
     they can, because they know that the longer they keep them in there, they’re  
     going to cooperate.  They’re going to comply.  And who can blame people?  
     So, yeah, detention absolutely would speed up that decision. 
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The loss of hope, desperation and despair Sathya described are important factors in 
forced voluntary return. With limited possibilities of release and the prospect of indefinite 
incarceration and corporeal control, migrants may be more likely to agree and comply 
with removal arrangements, marking the event as a voluntary one despite the landscape 
of involuntariness in the detention centre.  
The detention centre is a gendered space, as Louisa explained: there are three 
wings for men and only two for women, with one of the women’s wings holding families. 
Men are detained at higher rates than women, as the gendered constructs inherent in 
criminalization make them more suspect to authorities. Yet, the existence of a family 
wing also demonstrates that this criminalization has no age requirement. Kate, a frontline 
worker, showed her disgust at the imprisonment of a young child, “a ten-year-old kid 
who’s been there for nine months, who’s still in detention. Like, just crazy.”  Louisa also 
discussed her abhorrence of children in detention, stating that the number of children has 
decreased and that CBSA is trying to keep them out. She did raise one particularly 
egregious example, where “they did keep [the woman] and her son there. He was two and 
a half when [they were deported] and had never been outside the detention centre.”  
While Canadian children are not considered detainees, but rather ‘guests’ in the detention 
centre, and are therefore free to leave at any time, the incarceration of their mothers often 
means that they too experience the criminalization of detention. Therefore, from a 
gendered perspective, the over-criminalization of migrant women has far-reaching 
impacts beyond the women themselves.     
There are other ways that children experience exclusion as dependents of their 
parents. These experiences rob children of their agency, as their identities are externally 
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constructed through a number of processes, procedures and choices that occur without the 
children’s consent or even their knowledge in many cases. Asha described the significant 
impact this has had on her clients:  
     So usually when the minors come here, they do applications with their parents  
     right? It’s like a joint application....because when you do a humanitarian and  
     compassionate grounds application, ...you have just clumped it together as  
     one application, with the father say, for example, being the principle applicant,  
     they all get a refusal together. Same with the protected person status, if they  
     have made a claim in one family class, so everyone gets, everyone’s claim  
     gets rejected. And when that happens then they are either making a choice, like  
     the family’s making a choice to leave, they all go together. So, the minors are  
     not necessarily asked separately, ‘do you want to go?’ or not. And they don’t  
     usually have a choice in going…. these minors who have lived all their lives  
     here while these applications were in process are now facing violence there or  
     are facing, um, they are basically experiencing a reverse culture shock because  
     they don’t know their country anymore. 
With minors being included in their parents’ processes and experiences, including 
criminalization, the idea of forced voluntary return becomes increasingly complicated. 
Age is therefore an important construct that may impact the ‘voluntariness’ of return in 
different ways. The child may or may not be Canadian, or they may or may not prefer to 
remain in Canada without immigration status, yet that decision is largely made for them. 
When children are made to leave with their guardians, is their departure necessarily 
closer to the involuntary end of the spectrum? Some of the frontline workers I 
interviewed addressed children’s stated desires to stay or leave, and the emotional 
response that this can incite; yet the final decision predominantly rests with the 
parents/guardians. 
Asha went on to describe situations where she was able to help the children return 
after their involuntary departure. The minors that she has helped to return to Canada, who 
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identified as female, were eventually permitted to come back because they were at risk 
for their safety, while the males were given the right to return through citizenship.  
     I think it’s mostly younger women, mostly. And some of them are from  
     LGBTQ community and hence the threat is a lot more, to their lives. I have seen  
     cases of young boys also coming back…but whenever I have seen a young boy,…   
     they’re Canadian citizens. They get abandoned [by their fathers] along with their  
     mothers and, so when they grow up, they were born to a Canadian citizen so there  
     is a way to establish their citizenship, but mothers in most of these cases are not  
     Canadian citizens, so it’s, it’s easier to bring the children back, but not bring the  
     mothers necessarily. 
The gender dimensions of both these examples are particularly interesting. While 
drawn from a very small sample of anecdotal experience, these experiences mark girls as 
‘deserving victims’ in need of rescuing, and boys as rights holders. It also leaves the 
mothers behind, as they are neither rights holders nor the ‘right kind’ of victim.     
 Summary 
 The criminalization felt by migrants has taken many forms in different 
environments and spaces during the period 2008-15. Within the research for this 
dissertation, participants identified places and relationships that overlap to create the 
overarching, multilayered exclusion that migrants experience, which is overtly gendered, 
impacting women and men differently. Gender also intersected with other identity 
constructs within the experiences outlined, as migrants were either allocated certain rights, 
or excluded from them based on racialization, class, age and ability. Participant responses 
for this dissertation suggested that the two tiers where people felt most criminalized 
include: relationships (distrust, racism and community) and specific places (schools, 
healthcare provision, workplaces, housing/shelters and immigration detention centres). 
These multilayered exclusions made many migrants feel ‘othered’ and marginalized to 
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the point of losing hope for their future in Canada. This loss of hope is inherently tied to 
forced voluntary return, as the conditions inciting this return are induced when migrants 
are excluded.   
		 166	
Chapter 5 – Forced Voluntary Return: Nuancing the Tension Between Voluntary and 
Involuntary, Individual Agency and Loss of Hope  
 
Conceptualizations of voluntary return have frequently been positioned in direct 
opposition to deportation, or forced removal, which offers a narrow understanding of 
migrants’ motivations, agency and actions, as well as the processes involved. While some 
scholars have challenged the inherent limitations of a voluntary/involuntary dichotomy, it 
remains an under-studied area of migration. In this chapter, I explore these opposing 
concepts and propose that in/voluntary return can be better understood on a spectrum. 
Forced voluntary return is added to this spectrum to further nuance this tension and 
highlight people’s motivations for return. I draw on the interviews I conducted with 
migrants and frontline workers to ground these ideas within people’s lived experiences 
and will offer a gender lens to the analysis.  
This chapter focuses on the case study of the Canadian implementation of the 
Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) program, a pilot project 
implemented exclusively in the Toronto Region from June 29, 2012, until March 31, 
2015. This particular implementation of the AVRR is contextualized among the AVRR 
programs run internationally, and examined in terms of its perceived successes. I 
critically analyze the official evaluation produced by the Canadian Border Services 
Agency (CBSA) in 2014, near the end of the program, to contribute to unpacking a state-
driven perspective on voluntary return. Throughout this analysis, I not only draw out the 
forced ‘voluntariness’ of the program, but I also offer an intersectional approach to 
understanding its impacts. Frontline workers’ perspectives are incorporated into this 
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analysis to highlight the material impacts the program has had, as well as community 
reaction to it.  
 As a starting point, voluntary return is described by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as stemming from a “freely described” wish to 
return, based on “full knowledge of the facts” and occurring in “conditions of safety and 
dignity” (UNHCR, 1996). Therefore, individual agency to make an informed decision is 
prioritized, while at the same time, conditions in the country of return are considered 
crucial for a ‘voluntary return’ to occur appropriately. Conversely, Schuster and Majidi 
(2013) describe deportation, or non-voluntary return, as “the physical removal of 
someone against their will from the territory of one state to that of another” (p. 222). 
While these precisely developed and widely understood definitions offer points of 
reference at two ends of a the spectrum, there are many experiences of return that lie 
between the two. Within the Canadian context, where deportation is a significant 
impediment to the rights of migrants to make decisions freely, no one is physically forced 
onto a plane. Therefore, while all removals are considered voluntary, other tactics are 
used to push people to ‘agree’ to leave. These tactics, which include coercion, 
manipulation, threats and detention, are significant to the understanding of return on the 
spectrum between forced and voluntary. As Sathya, a private immigration lawyer, 
explained: 
     I mean big quotes around voluntary, right? Because, like, it’s all coerced  
     and it’s all forced. But there is no such thing as a ‘forced removal’, really,  
     because you have to sign for certain documents and you have to show up at  
     the airport, you have to get on the plane, you have to do all those things, you  
     know. 
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 This chapter first reviews self-deportation as one form of forced voluntary return. 
As an immigration enforcement strategy, self-deportation is tied to policies and practices 
that rely on ‘attrition through enforcement’, assuming migrants will choose to leave if 
their presence is challenged in multiple ways. The chapter then explores the loss of hope 
described by migrants and service providers as a result of the exclusionary and 
criminalizing environment in the Canadian context. Finally, the chapter investigates the 
Canadian implementation of the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration program.  
The analysis in this chapter highlights the ways different forms of forced voluntary return 
are nuanced processes, rather than specific moments or events.   
I. Self-Deportation as One Form of Forced Voluntary Return  
In this section, I focus on the power relations affecting migrants’ experiences of 
voluntary and forced return, which will nuance the spectrum between the two poles. This 
overview of self-deportation adds an important dimension to the voluntary/involuntary 
spectrum, as it includes both the coercion aspect of the ‘attrition through enforcement’ 
and the individual agency of opting to leave, which for some offered strength, while for 
others acknowledged an overarching loss of hope. While self-deportation has been 
specifically discussed as an immigration enforcement tactic in the United States through 
the increase of bordering, surveillance and fear, it applies to the Canadian context as well, 
as many of my interviewees related their own experiences to self-deportation. Self-
deportation relies on many of the exclusionary tactics and criminalizing experiences 
described in the previous chapters; therefore, this section also builds on primary data 
from my interviews to add a broader context to the impacts of that gendered exclusion. 
Since the same policies that have ‘othered’ migrants also contributed to the recruitment 
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of civilian soldiers, federal responsibilities have been downloaded to everyday 
gatekeepers who monitor and control access to services, spaces and relationships. These 
civilian soldiers are frequently encouraged to rely on tropes that are based on the 
racialized and gendered ‘other’ in order to enforce exclusion. For the migrants who leave 
as a result of this exclusion, the voluntariness of this departure is questionable.  
While the term self-deportation is linked to a particular context and specific 
exclusionary policies in the United States, other strategies are used in different settings to 
make remaining unbearable. For example, in the summer of 2013 in the United Kingdom, 
a campaign was undertaken to encourage precarious migrants to seek help in leaving 
‘voluntarily.’ This campaign involved posters and flyers strategically placed in migrant-
serving spaces and detention centres. More controversially, the campaign also used a 
truck with a large billboard on the back that advised non-status migrants to contact 
immigration officials or face arrest and detention.  
                 
                                 (Photograph: EP, Tavis, 2013) 
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The billboard offered a number to which migrants could send text messages in order to 
obtain information about ‘voluntary’ return. The truck drove around immigrant-populated 
neighbourhoods for one month, raising alarm and condemnation from groups, individuals 
and media outlets. The messages traveling on this truck ideologically moved the border to 
London neighbourhoods, making migrants into criminals who would be arrested, and 
reminding them of the violent deportability they endure. It also reminded residents of 
these neighbourhoods, who did have the right to stay, that their neighbours may not have 
the same right, thereby circulating the idea that precarious migrants should be encouraged 
to leave. In the end, the truck was deemed to be responsible for 11 ‘voluntary’ departures 
(Travis, 2013).           
The factors identified in this dissertation that push people to leave are often more 
subtle and disavowed than the previous example, with policy makers taking little 
responsibility for the hostility created. The Canadian approach described in the two 
previous chapters was more heavily based on the propagated distinction between the 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ migrant, yet the ability to distinguish between the two was 
largely blurred, leaving both ‘genuine’ and ‘bogus’ migrants feeling the impacts. The 
migrant couple I interviewed described the impacts of their ongoing deportability on their 
way of life; they shared how they limit their movements and interaction, and how they 
weigh their decisions carefully. At the same time, Jonh explained how they come to terms 
with the risk, 
     No, it’s like, we are careful. She is more careful…You want me to go, I go with  
     you to immigration. If immigration catch me in the street, or all these things,  
     I don’t be scared, because I [won’t live] scared, I live normal…I’m going to try  
     and I’m going to walk in the street normal.  
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Yet, his partner Katherine was less confident, as she explained: “I do the things too 
because I go with him, but in my thinking, it’s going to happen [getting caught]. But I go, 
but I think.”  The concern Katherine expressed was another indication of her isolation, as 
she may not have been willing to take risks without Jonh’s initiative. The exclusion and 
fear experienced as a result of this deportability, and the impact it has on day-to-day 
living complicates the binary between voluntary and involuntary return.  
When asked specifically about their return, and their understanding of self-
deportation, the migrants I spoke to highlighted the tensions inherent within the spectrum 
of forced voluntary departure. While some participants spoke of the fear they felt in their 
forced voluntary return, people also talked about their sadness and upheaval, while at the 
same time describing their excitement to see family, friends, familiar places and taste the 
food of their home countries again. The range of feelings and perspectives clearly showed 
that self-deportation meant different things to different people, as some described leaving 
before they lost status, as a kind of systemic ultimatum, while others talked about turning 
themselves in, or making their lack of status visible in different ways.   
     I would avoid to be deported right?... self-deportation, self-deportation, I think  
     so, because I don’t want to go back, but I have no choice,… so it’s kind of  
     self-deportation…I could stay, you know ‘illegally’, but I don’t, I know that  
     it will be so hard, right? To get job or you know, I also can’t get outside of  
     the country, so I don’t want to do that. For me the option is to go home.  
     (Esse, international student) 
Esse described criminalizing processes in many different ways in her discussion of forced 
voluntary return, through the loss of status, as she was afraid of the hardship involved in 
trying to find employment and having her mobility restrained. She went on to highlight 
the tensions between in/voluntary in her own plans to return: “It’s hoping to come back, 
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so try not to have a bad record or something, you know [...]?” Esse was clear that she was 
not willing to do anything in Canada that might hinder her future plans, so even though 
she had absolutely no desire to leave, she did so strategically to ensure that she would be 
able to return. Since her plans were to come back and apply for permanent residence, she 
did not want to jeopardize that application in any way, despite wanting to stay in Canada.  
Asha, a community-based lawyer, described similar scenarios, highlighting the 
agency she saw in some of her clients in light of their imminent departure:  
     Or they have, they have someone…everyone is here in their family and  
     they know that they will advocate for them to come back under some other  
     scheme. So it’s always those people who are ready to go…Or they are  
     getting deported to a third country and not getting deported to the country  
     where they have a lot of issues. 
In these situations, migrants are able to mitigate the involuntariness of deportation 
through the legal support and advocacy of others to address their own needs and desires. 
While systemic barriers were still clearly pushing them out, the idea of circular or 
secondary migration allowed migrants to use their agency in departure plans.  
Kelly, a refused refugee claimant, also spoke of secondary migration, doing 
whatever she could to make arrangements to move on after she had left Canada. While 
she felt that she could not stay in Canada any longer, she was not prepared to remain in 
her country of origin. For Kelly, the desire for secondary migration was clear: “I want to 
see if I can get my [European] citizenship. If not, then I don’t know. Perhaps living in 
another country in South America and if I do, I won’t need anything.” She had made a 
refugee claim in Canada, which had been denied, yet in the interview, she spoke of the 
fear that she still felt to return. Kelly was pushed to leave Canada, despite being eligible 
to stay because she had a Judicial Review of her refugee claim pending. Her immediate 
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need for medical attention for an ongoing health condition outweighed her fear of leaving 
at that point, as was explained in the previous chapter. Manuel, who was also a refused 
refugee claimant, was in a very similar position, as health concerns paired with the lack 
of access to health care also forced him to leave despite a pending Judicial Review of his 
refugee claim. He felt that his only option was to go back to Central America and live in 
hiding because it was the only way he could guarantee consistent access to health care for 
a chronic condition. Interestingly, I learned several months later that even though the 
Judicial Review was approved in Manuel’s case, giving him the opportunity to return to 
Canada to have his refugee claim reconsidered, he chose to remain in his country. His 
movements and actions were limited in his country of origin, since he still feared for his 
safety, and he was dependent on other people for his day-to-day needs, but nonetheless he 
chose to remain in that environment rather than return to Canada.   
II.  Loss of Hope 
While there were strategic reasons shared for forced voluntary return, for many it 
was also the result of an overpowering loss of hope. Maria, a migrant from Latin America, 
spoke directly to the feeling of exclusion she experienced in Canada in different ways, 
and the many times it made her lose hope. She shared the challenges she faced in Canada, 
including a lack of employment, poverty and discrimination. Her interactions with law 
enforcement and immigration officials had left her feeling isolated and criminalized, 
despite having been the victim of a serious crime. As a result, she described different 
moments of “waiting to be deported.” Despite these experiences, Maria also explained 
the difficulties she saw in going back because of the expectations of others. She discussed 
the judgmental disappointment others would express to her, since, as the first female in 
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her family to have migrated, she believed she would be letting family and friends down 
because she had not met certain expectations. She also felt that they would judge her for 
not having earned enough money, or having collected enough material goods. She 
described the hardship she would face in finding employment and establishing herself in 
her country of origin. The tension between the imagined hardship of going back and the 
lived hardship of staying, led her to describe the idea of self-deportation as a way “to stay 
safe and to feel safe.” Maria explained that for her, keeping the idea that she could reject 
a life in Canada in her mind gave her the strength to keep going.     
Suny, a young migrant from the Caribbean, described departure in similar terms 
but with differing consequences. To her, self-deportation was also tied to intense 
frustration and concerns over mental health, but did not give her strength. Instead, it 
signified an ending: 
     I feel like self-deportation is almost like suicide…It’s not going to, they’re  
     just doing it because they’ve had enough. So, I feel like it’s like suicidal, like  
     you’re just ending all your dreams, all your hopes, like suicide. In suicide you’re  
     just taking yourself, taking your life. Self-deportation, I feel like you’re just  
     ending everything you had hoped for, like for no reasons. Maybe, yeah, you  
     had enough, but maybe, yeah. I just feel like it’s similar to it, because either you  
     lose your mind or you go back home and start all over, or you could stay here  
     and you’d go crazy.  
The tension that she describes between losing your dreams and ‘losing your mind’ speaks 
powerfully to the impact of life with precarious immigration status and the hardships with 
which it is associated. For Suny, the need to make the difficulty and pain end coincided 
with an extremely difficult life choice, one where the person would let go of dearly held 
ideas about a future, abandoning all those hopes and dreams. The comparison to suicide 
is both painful and enlightening. April May made a very similar point in her 2016 piece 
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Bittersweet, when she explained her reasons for staying in Canada with precarious 
immigration status, despite the enormous hardships. She clearly expressed the fact that 
she was not a refugee and did not face persecution, but for her, returning meant giving up 
the hope around which she had built her life in Canada: 
     The moment you get on a plane to your native soil that hope, that dream,  
     that life is lost forever. And while it’s true that you may be able to pull  
     yourself together enough to survive back home, something will be  
     permanently broken, that sense of failure will haunt you and overshadow  
     what you managed to create. 
For her, this was an unacceptable sacrifice, and so she stayed and struggled in Canada 
despite the strain. For others, the pain, frustration or fear became too much, and the only 
remedy was to leave. This defeated position was also described by frontline workers 
when reflecting on some of their clients. As Mariposa, a settlement worker, explained: 
     I saw it [for the first time] last year, clients that [...] are coming to say, ‘you  
     know what, I’m leaving’.... And they feel defeated by Canada, by the system.  
     That was the first time that I was seeing that, it was not happening before.  
Mariposa was linking the exacerbation her clients felt to the immigration landscape that 
increasingly excluded them. The continual hardships and losses, as described by Maria 
and Suny, cause migrants to feel like they are being worn down to the point when they 
cannot take it any more. Self-deportation can be a moment of agency in those situations, 
whether it feels “safe” or “suicidal.” Mariposa went on to describe the conversations she 
has with her clients when they come to tell her they are leaving: “It’s just, ‘I need to go.’ 
And you try to convince them not to do it, good luck. [...] sometimes they come just to 
reaffirm or to get information, but the decision already is done.” 
Interestingly, several frontline workers saw the connection between mental health 
and forced voluntary return as something they needed to remedy. From this perspective, 
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people would not actually want to leave, but rather were going through a difficult time for 
differing reasons. As Asha, a community-based lawyer, explained, “You’ll get them 
counseling because they’re under so much mental health stress that they start saying, ‘I 
want to go’.” Asha struggled to find the few examples she could think of where people 
actually wanted to leave, because from her perspective “you are able to talk them through 
most of the time.” While this approach removes agency from migrants by possibly 
negating their desire to leave, it also reinforces the idea of a forced ‘voluntariness’ where 
migrants would not leave voluntarily as long as they could gain access to the services and 
supports they need.   
By extension, many of the discussions with participants focused on voluntary 
departure as a reaction to not being able to endure the current situation anymore. 
Frontline workers talked about their clients being “exhausted”, “frustrated”, “fed up”, 
“disappointed” or experiencing “despair” and “hopelessness.” Mariposa described the 
reoccurring disappointment of refused applications as “diminishing” her clients. The 
extended time in immigration limbo, whether it be as a result of multiple rejected 
applications, or the delays of a single application, leaves people with a diminished sense 
of hope for their future. For migrants waiting to regularize their status, either because of 
excessively slow processes, or because of limitations placed within the systems which 
contribute to precarious status and illegalization, the feeling of lost time and stagnation 
can become intolerable. As Suny shared: 
     Sometimes I feel like I’m just wasting time. Yeah, I honestly feel like,  
     sometimes I would probably, I would say it, like, maybe God should just  
     take me out of here. And I, like, I’m not afraid to be out of here. Like, I’m  
     only scared of doing the decisions and it’s, you know, it ends up being a 
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     life decision, like, it could have been better. But if it was to happen by  
     chance or by fate, I would just let it be. 
Suny struggled with the idea of initiating a forced voluntary return for some time. She 
shared with me the ways the frustration over wasted time and opportunities pushed her to 
try something, anything, to change her situation. At that point, she explained that she 
would leave it up to God to determine what should happen to her, too afraid to make a 
decision with such a life-changing impact, but at the same time, being too frustrated to do 
nothing. Instead of leaving, Suny finally decided to make an immigration application that 
was considered quite risky, as she had reached the point where something needed to be 
done. Ultimately, she was successful in that application and gained permanent status in 
Canada.  
Chico, a settlement worker, made a similar point when he talked about his clients 
who make applications out of desperation in order to gain inclusion in different ways. As 
he explained: 
     People come here and say: I need a work permit, so I’m going to make a  
     refugee application...This is not the reason why you’re going to make – I  
     know that you need a work permit application…but don’t do it because [of]  
     that, no? Oh, I need to apply for social assistance, you know, because I 
     don’t have a way to survive in this. But if you make a refugee application,  
     for how long will be the social assistance? Three or four months? 
He went on to state that he understands the thought processes through which these  
decisions happen, and even if they eventually lead to a departure order, they are not 
always the wrong choice: 
     You know, they haven’t breathed – you know, they haven’t really relaxed.  
     They didn’t have any chance to do anything in the society. They have been  
     marginalized, totally ignored, even denied, you know, by the society. So,  
     some of them, they just want to say ‘give me at least three months of peace’,  
     you know what I mean? 
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This overarchingly described defeat, which took different forms, with varying 
impacts, was also frequently linked to the separation from family. The interviews suggest 
that the prospect or reality of long-term separation from family is one of the deciding 
factors for migrants’ forced voluntary return. The separation could be caused by long 
immigration processes, including refugee family reunification, sponsorship applications 
and appeals, or simply from the lack of mobility that comes with having precarious 
immigration status. These lengthy and delayed separations have been tied to both the 
criminalization that migrants feel and the systemic racism they encounter.   
Mariposa pointed to the racism inherent in the immigration system when it came 
to family reunification for migrants from Africa. She explained that migrants from Africa 
are the ones most commonly asked for DNA tests to prove familial connections. There is 
deep-rooted racism and distrust in this practice, as the underlying assumption is that 
African people lie about who their family members are. She further explained the racism 
in these processes, sharing that “they have [six] offices in the whole continent to process 
the continent, and [it] is the biggest continent in the world.” This limited number of 
offices necessarily leads to delayed applications and many lost years before migrants can 
see their family members (CCR, 2017). This point was reinforced by Samantha, a 
community-based lawyer, who explained the impact this delayed processing on the 
African continent has on her clients: 
     [R]efugees who then have to wait seven years for their babies to join them here...  
     Just needlessly keeps [my clients] there, like, in this long-term limbo that  
     has totally negative health effects. 
Kate, a settlement worker, also emphasized the impact of family separation, as she shared  
a couple of cases where that became the deciding factor for people. She explained that 
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     you wait a year for your refugee hearing and then six months for your decision.  
     And then…years until your wife and three kids come here. And a lot of people’s  
     family members are in situations of profound insecurity.  
Kate went on to describe cases where the knowledge of long-term familial separation was 
enough to push people to return to the country they had come from. She explained that in 
some of these circumstances the decisions were taken so quickly that people did not even 
inform her that they were leaving; they simply left a note or some message to tell her they 
had gone.  
 Katherine and Jonh also linked their return with their need to be reunited with 
family. This desire was tied to a health issue that they did not want recorded, but was also 
a reflection of their inability to find the support and services they needed in Canada. 
When Katherine and Jonh, who held no legal immigration status, realized that they would 
not be able to collect the money needed to buy their plane tickets home, they decided to 
turn themselves in to CBSA to be deported. They explained that while they were working 
their money was used up every month for rent and bills, and they could not bear to wait 
until they could collect the money little by little. Their need to leave as quickly as 
possible pushed them to risk detention and other forms of immigration enforcement. I 
asked them if they were afraid of what would happen when they turned themselves in, 
and their answers again took a gendered perspective: 
     I’m not nervous for me, I’m not nervous, I’m just nervous for her. For me,  
     I’m good, they can do whatever they want, cause, but she’s a..... (Jonh) 
     I’m not afraid, he afraid for me, but I’m not. (Katherine) 
Jonh’s fear for Katherine’s safety and wellbeing, but not his own, speaks to gendered 
constructs around physical and emotional strength, as well as the ability to express and 
perform fear and distress in specific ways. Jonh was afraid that the experience would be 
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too unpleasant for Katherine, and that she would be physically or mentally affected by it, 
while he projected his own strength in being able to handle difficult situations. He went 
on to explain that he did not need to be afraid because 
     if we respond honestly and correctly [to] everything the person ask, is ok…  
     They persons [CBSA officials], not monsters, the people act like they monsters. 
     They persons like you, they go coffee, McDonald’s... 
Jonh’s understanding of the power relations inherent in his self-deportation speaks to 
different conceptualizations of state authorities, either as frightening and violent state-
sanctioned enforcers, or as ordinary individuals who hold a particular authority. While 
these understandings contribute to migrants’ considerations of self-deportation in 
different ways, differing identities intersect with the fear, coercion and marginalization 
experienced to push certain people to leave ‘voluntarily.’ While these experiences offer a 
limited snapshot of people’s push-and-pull factors for forced voluntary return, they also 
capture the messiness underlining individual realities. While some people described 
agency in their decisions, by ensuring they would eventually be able to return, choosing 
secondary migration or prioritizing familial reunification, others presented defeat and 
broken dreams. It is questionable if any would have left if they could have accessed the 
services and supports that they felt they needed. This lack of access is deeply tied to the 
false dichotomy between the ‘deserving’ and ‘bogus’ refugees and migrants. It is also a 
form of marginalization that is inherently gendered, further impacted by intersections 
with racialization, class, age and ability.     
III.  Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration 
 This section explores another approach undertaken by state officials in different 
geographical locations in order to highlight the tensions inherent in forced voluntary 
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return. Focusing on Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programs, I 
unpack the ways ‘undesirable’ migrants are still ‘othered’ and targeted for exclusion, 
despite tactics that are arguably gentler than ‘attrition through enforcement’.  
AVRR programs have been developed internationally since the 1970s and have 
generally targeted refugee claimants, refused claimants and non-status migrants, but they 
have gained increased popularity over the last decade (Morris & Salomons, 2013). 
Governments have invested notable funds to encourage migrants to leave this way, 
instead of having to rely on detention and deportation, or ‘attrition through enforcement’.  
AVRR programs offer incentives of money, services and/or information in the country of 
return to encourage migrants to participate. Should participants agree to leave 
‘voluntarily’ within a predetermined timeline, they would receive the various forms of 
reintegration support for limited periods. These incentives are largely administered by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), which works with state officials to 
implement their desired version of this program. The IOM understands AVRR programs 
as “part of a comprehensive approach to migration management, which includes timely 
asylum adjudication, effective removals of irregular migrants, regular migration options 
and accurate public information on those options” (IOM, 2011, p. 1). The AVRR 
programs are further seen as beneficial for all involved because: 1) state officials are able 
to rely on alternatives to deportation that are considered more politically acceptable; 2) 
migrants are able to leave with dignity and receive support upon return; 3) the burden is 
lessened on the receiving state through the supports offered to migrants (IOM, 2011). 
This benefit was echoed by one of the service providers I spoke to:  
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     There is…this concept of leaving with dignity. You know, that a person  
     makes the decision to leave, well the system is forcing them to leave, but  
     they can provide dignity in the way then they go out, you know?  
     (Chico, settlement worker)  
While Chico importantly highlighted the opportunity to encourage migrants to leave 
without the necessary violence of deportations, he also showed his ambivalence about the 
program, questioning its very voluntariness as he notes that the system is still forcing 
people out. Such critiques of the voluntariness of these programs have been widely 
expressed in the literature as well (Andrijasevic & Walters, 2010; Ashutosh & Mountz, 
2011; Blitz, Sales, & Marzano, 2005; Webber, 2011). Therefore, while AVRR programs 
may offer a more palatable removal, they are not genuinely offering a choice, since the 
migrants targeted often have no procedural way to remain in the country. 
 The AVRR programs have taken different forms in various countries in the 
Global North, reflecting particular priorities and targeting specific groups. Frances 
Webber (2011) has highlighted different European incarnations of the program since the 
1970s, including programs in Germany, France, the Netherlands and Spain, but she 
focuses much of her discussion on various UK schemes. The UK schemes had different 
target populations, prioritizing: refugee claimants and denied claimants, ‘illegal’ entrants 
and overstayers, non-European Economic Area families with at least one child, and 
foreign national prisoners. While some of these UK schemes offered financial support or 
subsidized reintegration assistance in the country of return, others only assisted with the 
logistics of departure. Moreover, most programs involved restrictions on returning to the 
UK, and since migrants were not offered assurances of security in the country of return, 
refugee applicants were further made to sign a declaration stating that the IOM would not 
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be liable for injury or death upon return (p. 100). Webber openly challenges the 
voluntariness of all of these schemes and states that  
     [R]epatriation cannot be termed ‘voluntary’ where the alternative is utter  
     destitution… or years in detention. Nor can it be ‘voluntary’ where the  
     prospect of obtaining recognition as a refugee has become remote because  
     the system for the determination of asylum claims and appeals is deliberately    
     underfunded (p.104).     
Blitz, Sales and Marzano (2005) reach similar conclusions in their study of the Afghan 
community’s views of the same programs in the UK. They importantly add that the 
negative public and media perception of precarious migrants were factors that influenced 
the voluntariness of these programs. The public ‘othering’ and exclusion of migrants 
thereby dovetailed the AVRR program with ‘attrition through enforcement’, further 
pushing this voluntary departure to the forced end of the spectrum. Blitz, Sales and 
Marzano (2005) ultimately ascertain that within hostile environments, where return 
policies were becoming more aggressive, the choice of ‘voluntary’ departure as a genuine 
alternative to deportation holds little value.  
 Maria Pablón Lopez and Roxana A. Davis (2011) examine a different voluntary 
return program run in Spain during the last recession. This program targeted unemployed 
‘legal’ foreign residents who had accrued certain unemployment benefits. Upon departure, 
these migrants would receive their employment benefits, transportation would be paid, 
and they would receive small amounts of money for additional expenses; they were then 
obliged to remain abroad for at least three years. While this program was arguably more 
voluntary than others, there were many concerns expressed: 1) migrant rights groups 
objected because they feared the program placed blame for the recession on migrants; 2) 
governments in return countries feared the impact of large scale returns for their own 
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economies; 3) migrants themselves rejected it because: they had not worked enough to 
gain benefits; they did not want to give up their residence; their situation was still better 
in Spain since they had access to social services; they feared humiliation or had 
integrated too extensively; and/or they believed the government wanted to get rid of them. 
As a result, while notable numbers of migrants registered for the program, Pablón Lopez 
and Davis claim that many migrants’ rights groups in Spanish society still considered it to 
be a failure.  
AVRR in Toronto 
 In this final section of the chapter, I outline and investigate Canada’s 
implementation of an Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) program. 
While short-lived from June 29, 2012, until March 31, 2015, this program became an 
important part of border enforcement over an almost three-year period, as it supported 
CBSA’s efforts to return migrants quickly and efficiently. The tensions inherent in this 
forced voluntary return initiative are worth briefly outlining: 1) only refused refugee 
claimants were eligible for the program, meaning migrants who were already marked as 
unwelcome and likely to be deported; 2) migrants could receive more money or support 
services if they agreed to leave earlier in their appeals process; 3) while deportation 
orders were often inevitable for the migrants eligible for the program, these migrants 
were also determined by CBSA to be low-risk deportees. Within this low-risk 
arrangement, migrants agree to collaborate with CBSA throughout the deportation 
process and to present themselves to the airport for departure, which also means they 
have the power to choose to not show up. While the impacts of this choice should not be 
underestimated, since overstaying a deportation order comes with significant sacrifice 
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and risk, it is still an option that provides migrants with some agency. With these tensions 
noted, I analyze the program from the government perspective through the CBSA’s 2014 
Evaluation Report, which was a result of qualitative and quantitative research conducted 
between October 2013 and March 2014 by the CBSA’s Program Evaluation Division. 
The report is further contrasted with CIC’s operational manual, as well as community 
perceptions based on the interviews I conducted to offer an intersectional understanding 
of its impacts.       
The short-lived Toronto-based AVRR pilot program ran from June 29, 2012, until 
March 31, 2015, with an allocated budget of $ 31.9 million (Government of Canada, 
2015). Its implementation was part of the Conservative government’s refugee policy 
reform, which was supposed to streamline the refugee determination processes. The strict 
and condensed timelines imposed through the legislation would then be followed by 
incentives to encourage refused claimants to leave as quickly as possible, thereby 
maintaining a speedy process from beginning to end. The priorities for the pilot program, 
as outlined by the CBSA, were to remove failed refugees quickly and cost effectively in 
order to allocate more resources to the complicated removal of high-risk deportees 
(migrants with criminality considerations, or those considered a flight risk) (Government 
of Canada, 2015). For CBSA, the ‘voluntariness’ of the program was an attempt to ease 
removal, as ideally participants were expected to give up appeal rights and cooperate with 
CBSA in preparing for departure, including obtaining travel documents and other 
necessary documentation within set timeframes (CIC, 2012a). CBSA partnered with the 
IOM in the implementation of the project, as the border enforcement officials would 
identify and screen potential participants for the program and then refer them to the IOM, 
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which would then assist with return arrangements and the allocation of reintegration 
supports, saving CBSA time and effort. The IOM was to remain independent of CBSA to 
ensure the voluntary participation of migrants in the program (CIC, 2012a).   
 
(Greater Toronto Enforcement Centre - CBSA operations centre in Toronto) 
Two significant community outreach events were held jointly by the CBSA and 
IOM to first inform the community (NGOs, legal representatives, the airline industry and 
foreign missions) of the pilot program before it started, then to offer an update a few 
months in (IOM interview, 2016). The IOM then pursued one-on-one consultations with 
these groups to seek input on the outreach strategy during which they were advised to 
utilize local and community newspapers, radio and informal networks in the languages 
spoken by migrant populations (IOM interview, 2016). It is unclear from the information 
provided by the IOM representative which languages in particular were targeted. While 
the IOM representative to whom I spoke explained that the community response was 
largely positive, this did not necessarily translate into referrals for the program, as many 
		 187	
of the frontline workers I interviewed expressed concerns over its voluntariness. As one 
participant noted: 
     I didn’t find it very beneficial to most of my clients, so I didn’t encourage the  
     program, to be honest. If people asked me about it, I gave them the facts, but I  
     didn’t go out of my way to tell them I think ‘this is the best for you’, because  
     sometimes it wasn’t the best for them. Because if you look and examine the  
     program, it wasn’t the best program for certain people at risk at home.  
     Especially those failed refugee claimants who had their refugee claims  
     rejected, but that doesn’t mean they weren’t at risk still (Irene, settlement worker). 
 Outreach did lead certain migrants to seek information about the program even 
when they were not eligible for it, though no statistics were kept for this population (IOM 
interview, 2016). These may be migrants who were also scheduled for removal and were 
seeking out other options, as well as migrants who mistakenly thought they were eligible 
since there were several reasons even refugee claimants would be ineligible, including 
criminal history or ongoing court obligations (Government of Canada, 2015). The 
outreach also led to a notable population who were eligible and who presented 
themselves independently to CBSA as walk-ins to participate in the pilot program 
without the expected referrals. Up to twenty percent of the participants referred to the 
IOM were walk-ins (IOM interview, 2016), which was a population that CBSA had not 
planned for in their design, and “consequently procedures were developed and 
implemented later” (Government of Canada, 2015).   
  The Canadian government’s priority was to “facilitate the timely removal” of 
refused refugees, and a voluntary program was seen as an efficient way to achieve this 
goal (Government of Canada, 2015), thus blurring the in/voluntary distinction. The IOM 
representative explained that the organization’s constitution prohibits the involvement in 
forced returns, and thus that the program was framed as completely voluntary. 
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‘Voluntariness’ was outlined through the information that was provided to migrants, 
including the ability to choose to participate, to travel on commercial flights without 
escorts (like any other traveler), and the option to withdraw at any time (IOM interview, 
2016). These provisions added costs from the CBSA end, as the anonymity ensured 
through ‘voluntary’ departure meant Canadian officials could not hold airlines financially 
liable for the migrant’s original irregular arrival. Normally, if airlines do not verify 
travelers’ authorization to enter Canada effectively, they become financially responsible 
for the migrants’ departure flights. The evaluation report states that nearly 51% of the 
return tickets CBSA purchased for AVRR participants involved airline liability cases, 
meaning the airlines could have been financially responsible for the return, but instead 
CBSA accrued the extra costs (Government of Canada, 2015).  
While the measures outlined to ensure ‘voluntariness’ can increase the likelihood 
of leaving with dignity, as previously highlighted by Chico, it is not necessarily 
understood as a voluntary departure by migrants themselves. As one participant explained, 
referring to one of her clients:        
     But we did find in their case that CBSA was quite accommodating, in that their  
     deportation date was supposed to be, like, a week before Christmas. So, we  
     managed to negotiate that these kids could finish out school before Christmas  
     and have Christmas together and New Years together and then they deported  
     them on, like, January 3rd or something…we took them to hockey games and  
     the aquarium and the CN Tower and kind of made their last month of—be  
     tourist around Toronto before you have to leave. Yeah, but in the end, the  
     actual financial support of AVRR was really very low.... She was being  
     deported, that’s how she completely saw it, yeah. Yeah, it was—for the kids 
     it was okay. Like, CBSA was fairly good. But for the mother it was, like, an  
     awful experience (Kate, settlement worker). 
 Gender is an overlooked category of analysis in the CBSA’s evaluation of the 
AVRR. The refugee experience is a gendered one, since patriarchal power relations 
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impact the motivations and methods of forced migration for migrants. Moreover, the 
refugee determination process itself becomes a site where gendered explanations of 
persecution and fear are expected by decision makers (Aberman, 2014; LaViolette, 2007; 
Murdocca & Razack, 2008; Murray, 2013; Rehaag, 2008). These processes favour 
different migrants at different moments based on current constructions of victimhood and 
the corresponding expected identities. Racialization, class, ability, sexuality, education 
and religion intersect with gender through these processes to produce particular tropes 
and stereotypes of dangerous societies from which refugees need protection, or 
alternatively, of threatening migrants who must be excluded (Murdocca & Razack, 2008; 
Razack, 2008). Consequently, the refusal of refugee claims is also gendered, as claimants 
who cannot perform gender identities in ways that are deemed appropriate are frequently 
denied access to protection (Aberman, 2014; LaViolette, 2009; Murray, 2013; Rehaag, 
2008). The subsequent removal process, and access to the AVRR, are therefore impacted 
by these same patriarchal power relations, with the violence potentially faced upon return 
to the home country also shaped by identity constructs and social relations.  
While the IOM shared that the gendered division of program participants was 
nearly equally split between female and male (50.7% to 49.3), there was no breakdown 
available within family units (969) or among the significant number of children who were 
included with their parents, as 31.4 percent of participants were under the age of 18 years 
old (IOM interview, 2016).  The breakdown becomes particularly important since the 
selection of reintegration services was highly dependent on whether the participants were 
part of a family unit or individuals. Families with children primarily chose housing and 
schooling for children as their desired services in the country of return, while single 
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participants chose training for themselves and small business setups (IOM interview). If 
women in these instances were primarily responsible for childcare, as is often the 
situation, their opportunities to seek their own development were significantly reduced. It 
cannot be assumed that family units necessarily refer to nuclear families; therefore, 
disaggregated data and a more detailed analysis would be required to truly understand the 
gendered impacts of this program.  
 2015-2016 data prepared by CBSA for a community consultation organized by 
the African Canadian Legal Clinic in 2016 showed that twice as many men as women 
were deported that year. While the same data are not available for the years the AVRR 
was operating (2012-2015), anecdotal knowledge from participants affirmed that this 
gender ratio is usually the case. While the totality of deportations per year included a 
large number of people who were not eligible for the AVRR program, the 
disproportionate representation of women participating the AVRR program (50.7%) is 
noteworthy; men were deported at higher numbers overall (i.e. as part of the AVRR 
departures, as well as other deportations), but women made up just over half the 
participants in the AVRR, which could be indicative of their greater desire for this 
program.  
This gendered outcome may be linkable to the feminization of poverty, since 
women may have been more in need of the economic supports offered. As was described 
in the previous chapter, the criminalization of precarious status migrants leaves women 
often more economically insecure and isolated. Therefore, they may be more likely to 
agree to programs that assist with economic and social integration in their country of 
return. Conversely, precarious status men, while frequently exploited for their cheap 
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labour, may have more options in Canada or abroad without necessarily needing to rely 
on the AVRR incentives. More research is needed in this area within the Canadian 
context as well as internationally.        
 Class and race also intersect in the AVRR participation, though no reports were 
officially made in these areas. It is noteworthy that four of the top five countries of return 
through the AVRR program were in Eastern Europe (Hungary, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
and Slovak Republic), with Hungarians making up the highest proportion of participants 
by far, at 48% (Government of Canada, 2015). Prior to, and throughout the refugee policy 
reform, members of the Conservative government had generated targeted discourse 
denigrating the refugee experiences in Eastern Europe, particularly for those from the 
Roma community. Roma claimants from different countries, particularly Hungary, were 
constructed as ‘bogus’ claimants, migrating to Canada to unjustly benefit from our 
‘generous’ social services. This ‘othering’ both negatively classed and racialized 
migrants from these countries as they were portrayed as poor economic migrants, who 
were also cheaters and liars. Roma claimants were part of an already racialized and 
marginalized community targeted for violence in the countries from which they arrived, 
but whose community had been relatively unknown in Canada. However, the discourse 
that circled around the community and their ‘bogus’ refugee claims, obliged them to face 
exclusion and bordering within Canadian society and institutions. CBSA officials’ 
declarations about the Roma community’s economic motivations for migration were 
explicitly highlighted in their AVRR evaluation report, which states that “[t]he top five 
destination countries for pilot program participants reported a lower gross domestic 
product in 2008 and growth has remained low since then” (Government of Canada, 2015). 
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This focus further ignores the noted violent persecution that Roma communities face in 
these countries, instead shifting the gaze to the economic and employment downturn.         
Class was a factor to further consider within the population that participated in the 
pilot program. In the first year of the AVRR program, CBSA was targeting migrants who 
had made their refugee claim prior to the 2012 refugee reform but received a decision 
after. According to the evaluation report, the removal of this population through the 
AVRR was faster and more efficient than for refused claimants who made their claim 
after the reform (Government of Canada, 2015). Pre-reform claimants were not given 
access to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) and lost access to the Pre-Removal Risk 
assessment (PRRA), meaning their only option to appeal was through a Judicial Review 
at the federal court, which required a lawyer and a stay of removal (both of which have 
significant cost considerations). This lack of affordable options may have made pre-
reform claimants more likely to accept the AVRR.  
Moreover, as previously stated, refused claimants from Designated Countries of 
Origin (DCOs) were the primary participants after the DCO list was imposed, and they 
left faster and more efficiently than non-DCOs (Government of Canada, 2015). It is 
worth noting that like refugee claimants who had arrived before the 2012 reforms, DCO 
claimants were also denied access to the RAD, meaning that their only recourse for 
appeal was through a Judicial Review. The added expenses, in addition to the twelve to 
thirty-six-month ban on eligibility for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA), may 
have made the AVRR a more strategic option. Participants were also offered more 
financial support the fewer appeals they made, which made these two groups likely to 
receive the maximum amount. Financial and in-kind support would be reduced for an 
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appeal at the RAD, further reduced for a Judicial Review and even further reduced for a 
PRRA application. These reductions were critiqued by the community, as one participant 
explained to me: “I never referred anybody to avail themselves of [the AVRR] because it 
just seemed so repugnant to sell your appeal rights, you know, for some piddling in kind” 
(Samantha, immigration lawyer). European nationals were also excluded from in-kind 
support, which meant that they were offered varying amounts of money directly for their 
departure.  
It is nonetheless surprising to me that the pre-reform and Designated Country of 
Origin refugee claimants in particular would be the most willing and efficient participants 
in the AVRR. Pre-reform refugee claimants would have spent significant time in Canada, 
potentially making community connections and establishing themselves; and DCO 
claimants may face significant violence upon return. However, the choice to participate in 
the AVRR may also be the result of the ongoing criminalization of refugee claimants by 
the Conservative government, as claimants who were present during the passage of the 
refugee reform would have witnessed the criminalizing and ‘othering’ discourse, as 
would DCO claimants who were directly targeted. The real and perceived exclusion of 
migrants, and the material impacts associated, are among the dominant motivations 
behind forced voluntary return, and therefore, may impact the participation in the AVRR 
pilot program. 
This intersection of exclusion and voluntariness was also located in the 
interactions between CBSA and AVRR participants. As an immigration lawyer explained 
to me:  
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     I was dealing with a client recently who was, who signed it with them, so   
     they give them this form where you sign it, that [you’re] taking this option,   
     and then [the client] was calling me and struggling with me, how can he regularize  
     his status. And I’m like “but you already signed it with them, why did you sign   
     it?” Because when you’re in that meeting in that room, you feel like you don’t 
     have many options right? And rather than taking the form with him and being  
     like, ‘ok fine I’ll come back’, he actually signed it there and then and now he 
     was struggling with what can he do about it (Asha, community-based lawyer). 
The intimidation inherent in the encounter Asha described further challenges the 
voluntariness of the program. The option to participate in the AVRR was presented when 
migrants attended their first appointment with CBSA, a meeting that was laced with 
stress and intimidation. Having attended such appointments myself (as a frontline 
worker), I have witnessed the power imbalance, as CBSA officials ask pointed and 
accusatory questions from behind a glass window in a small room. The principal purpose 
for those appointments was to prepare people for removal. When offered the option of the 
AVRR, people were likely aware that the alternative to that meeting was regular removal. 
Therefore, agreeing to participate at that moment did not meet the UNHCR’s definitions 
of voluntary return. The evaluation report, in fact, highlighted that the costs of the 
program were increased because the CBSA had not anticipated that people would 
withdraw from the program, despite that being part of the ‘voluntariness.’ As the report 
stated, “almost a third (1,384 or 29.4%) of those screened as eligible and interested would 
not leave under the pilot program” (Government of Canada, 2015). Moreover, “[s]ome 
potential participants [...] did not enroll in the pilot program after the CBSA had referred 
them to the IOM while others [...] withdrew after enrolling” (Government of Canada, 
2015). The initial meeting described above offers one window onto reasons migrants may 
withdraw from a ‘voluntary’ program after agreeing to participate.      
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 CBSA also determined that the program offered sustainable and desirable return 
for participants based on the small number who afterwards attempted to return to Canada. 
The evaluation report stated that only three participants tried to return to Canada 
(Government of Canada, 2015). Therefore, without any other evaluation mechanism or 
measure, the CBSA’s Program Evaluation Division deemed the program successful, and 
that participants had effectively reintegrated in their country of origin, so long as the 
participants did not try to return to Canada. However, this does not factor in the many 
reasons migrants may not try to return, including strict visa requirements, lack of funds or 
the assumption that their entry would be rejected, nor does it consider whether migrants 
moved again to other third countries. The only apparent concern for CBSA appears to be 
keeping the migrants who participated in the AVRR out of Canada. Therefore, the 
imposition of a deportation order challenged the entire premise of ‘voluntariness’, as did 
the ongoing criminalization and exclusion of refugee claimants.  
Summary 
 This chapter explored the spectrum between voluntary and involuntary return in 
theory and practice, highlighting both migrants’ agency and the myriad of ways that 
discourse, policies, state officials and civilian soldiers work to exclude migrants socially, 
economically and physically. By nuancing the spectrum, and adding forced voluntary 
return, the tensions become clearer. Migrants’ experiences of return along this spectrum 
are importantly impacted by gender, as it intersects with other identity constructs. 
Socially-constructed expectations regarding gender, racialization and class, and the ways 
these are expected to interlock, therefore have material implications. Migrants face social, 
economic and legal exclusion based on varying aspects of their identities and are 
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encouraged to leave in gendered, racialized and classed ways. By exploring self-
deportation policies, including the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration program, 
through an intersectional lens, the subtleties of forced voluntary return have been 
highlighted in order to clarify deportation as a process rather than a particular event. 
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Chapter Six - Conclusion 
 My dissertation research was undertaken to learn from the lived experiences of 
migrants and frontline service providers within the migrant-serving sector in order to 
better understand forced voluntary return in Canada. With little literature available on 
this specific topic, I undertook the research without clear ideas of what I might find. I 
began to answer the research questions in this dissertation in chapter 1, by providing an 
overview of the methodological frameworks and individual methods I used, as well as my 
social location. I approached the research from an epistemological perspective of 
Feminist Standpoint theory and drew on Intersectionality, particularly McCall’s (2005) 
conceptualization of the intercategorical complexity approach to ground my analysis. In 
chapter 2, I provided a literature review with the breadth and depth of literature on state 
sovereignty and migrant illegalization to highlight the research that exists on migrant 
precarity and how that applies to the Canadian context. I also indicated some of the gaps 
in the literature which have presented voluntary and involuntary return as distinct binary 
experiences. Then in Chapter 3, I drew on participant responses, policy documents and 
government statements to outline some of the changes to Canadian immigration and 
refugee policy from 2008-2015, offering an overview of the shift in atmosphere that 
increased migrant exclusion. This led, in Chapter 4, to the analysis of multilayered 
criminalization, exclusion and loss of hope experienced by migrants. Finally, in Chapter 
5, I explored participants’ conceptualizations of forced voluntary return. I also offered an 
analysis of the now-terminated Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) 
program, a pilot project implemented in the Toronto Region, as it related to FVR.  All of 
the aforementioned allowed me to address my research questions: 1) What factors push 
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migrants to make decisions on the spectrum of forced voluntary return? 2) How does 
gender, as it intersects with other identities and social relations, influence migrants’ 
experiences of forced voluntary return?  3) What does the addition of forced voluntary 
return, a non-binary concept, offer to current research on voluntary and involuntary 
migration? 
 Regarding my first question, this dissertation research drew on a necessarily small 
sample of participants who experienced FVR, and who all indicated that for them FVR 
was closely tied to feelings of being criminalized and excluded, and to an overwhelming 
loss of hope for their future in Canada. The exclusion expressed by participants was 
manifested in the ways migrants experienced relationships and spaces in which they lived 
their lives in Toronto, which allowed me to address my second research question. The 
relationships were often different based on intersecting identities and had clear gendered 
and racialized impacts. Migrant participants identified interactions within their 
communities, including a controlled access to services, which resulted in experiences of 
feeling distrusted as migrants and racialized persons. The exclusionary spaces identified 
included schools, healthcare and workplaces, housing/shelters, as well as immigrant 
detention centres. Limited and unsafe access to the above places had important impacts 
on migrants based on their gender, class, race, age and ability, which came together in 
ways that pushed some to leave. My findings suggested that the environment created 
through these exclusions is built on patriarchal, racist and ableist power relations. Both 
migrant and service provider participants indicated that migrants vulnerable to these 
oppressive power relations would be less likely to lose hope and leave if they could 
access the various forms of support they needed. A loss of hope was therefore related to 
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the perceived impossibility of a meaningful future in Canada, characterized by increased 
inclusion, decreased experiences of criminalization, a possibility for family reunification 
and the elimination of time spent incarcerated in immigration detention. Participants 
identified loss of hope as one of the primary factors that pushed them to leave 
‘voluntarily’, so as to relieve the pain associated with staying.       
 My dissertation research also offered an analysis of the limited Assisted 
Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) program piloted in the GTA by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) in collaboration with the Canadian 
Boarder Services Agency (CBSA). This program offered an interesting case study, as the 
contradiction between voluntary and involuntary return is clear in the way the program 
targeted migrants. While selected migrants could voluntarily participate in the program, 
these same migrants were already subject to removal orders and would be expected to 
leave Canada regardless.  
The third question concerning the addition of forced voluntary return to current 
research on voluntary and involuntary migration became increasingly relevant throughout 
my research. While the questions of factors that pushed migrants to make decisions on 
the spectrum of forced voluntary return were likely to be context specific, the addition of 
FVR to the study of migration offered the possibility of conceiving of a spectrum 
between voluntary and involuntary departure that may reflect people’s lived experiences, 
including from gendered perspectives. The consideration of this spectrum of return 
challenged the binary that has been dominant in current research since there are many 
reasons for return that are not fully voluntary or involuntary. This spectrum also added to 
discussions of border enforcement, securitization and state sovereignty as migrants are 
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discursively and materially targeted in various ways that urge them to leave. While the 
focus on migrant agency in research, as well as in the migrant-serving sector in Toronto, 
has largely emphasized the strategies migrants use to remain as safe in this city as they 
can, this focus may overlook the experiences of migrants that leave for various reasons.  
Toronto also offered a philosophically interesting backdrop for this research 
because of a motion that was passed by City Council in March of 2013 that declared 
Toronto to be a ‘sanctuary city’, the first of its kind in Canada.13 As a result, an estimated 
200,000 non-status residents (Keung, 2013a) should have access to municipal services 
such as libraries, recreation, shelters and subsidized childcare regardless of their 
immigration status. While this motion was an important victory, its implementation has 
been uneven, and at best can only cover a limited range of services (Hudson et al., 2017). 
While I initially believed the policy might contribute to feelings of inclusion and mitigate 
migrants’ experiences of criminalization and loss of hope, nearly all participants (both 
migrants and frontline workers) disagreed.   
Building on the Literature 
 In order to explore and answer my research questions, I drew on two key 
theoretical frameworks, feminist transnationalism and intersectionality throughout my 
research and analysis. These frameworks were best suited for this work because they 
offered theoretical groundings to understand the structural and societal relations that 
intersect to produce power relations and oppressions on multiple scales, from the macro 																																																								13	Several other cities have also declared themselves Sanctuary Cities, including: Hamilton (Ontario), 
London (Ontario) and Montreal (Quebec); Vancouver (British Columbia) has adopted an access without 
fear policy; Calgary (Alberta), Ottawa (Ontario), Regina (Saskatchewan), Saskatoon (Saskatchewan), and 
Winnipeg (Manitoba) are considering passing similar declarations. 
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(international) to the micro (individual), which therefore allows for a richer 
understanding of state sovereignty and bordering policies and practices. Feminist 
transnationalism demanded an understanding and deconstruction of global power 
(Ahmed, 2000; Glick Schiller, 2010; Grewal, 2005; Mohanty, 1988), which also provided 
theoretical validity to challenge the reified constructions of the nation-state and its 
borders, and understandings of mobility and immobility, that involve multi-sited 
relationships and power relations (Ahmed, 2000; Glick Schiller, 2010; Glick Schiller et 
al., 1995; Nolin, 2006). I used intersectionality in conjunction with transnationalism to 
conceptualize the ways inequalities, discrimination and oppressions intersect and overlap 
systemically and at the individual level. This approach provided tools to problematize the 
dichotomization, division and compartmentalization of identities, instead understanding 
these social constructs as relational and interconnected. In accounting for dominant 
societal power relations, these frameworks allowed me to investigate the ways 
exclusionary policies and discourses pushed migrants onto the spectrum of forced 
voluntary return, and the ways in which intersecting identities and social relations 
impacted these experiences.   
 A review of the pertinent literature on state sovereignty, securitization, borders, 
migrant illegalization, detention, deportation and voluntary departure provided a 
grounding for my research within the theoretical and empirical work of scholars both 
internationally and within the Canadian context. Starting with state sovereignty, I drew 
on literature that elaborated the ways the state and its mechanisms were re/produced and 
enacted by government actors, as well as official and unofficial gatekeepers (McLennan 
et al., 1984; Mountz, 2010; Orr, 2004; Spire, 2008). Boundaries and borders were thus 
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ontologized to enable strategic inclusion and violent exclusion (Anzaldúa, 1987; Bosniak, 
2006; Brown, 2010; Macklin, 2002; Mountz, 2010). This literature provided an important 
foundation for understanding the climate in which the Canadian Conservative 
government of 2008-2015 created a discourse and policies that contributed to migrant 
exclusion and forced voluntary return. The literature on migrant illegalization built on the 
concept of manufactured exclusions that resulted in enforced vulnerabilities, both through 
exploitative inclusionary exclusion and the full exclusion of deportation (De Genova, 
2002; Goldring & Landolt, 2011, 2013a; Magalhaes et al., 2010; Ngai, 2004; Villegas, 
2015a), all of which had gendered implications (Bhuyan et al., 2014; De Regt, 2010; 
Magalhaes et al., 2010). This literature helped to contextualize the ‘hardships’ faced by 
precarious status migrants and some of the factors that amplified exclusion and 
criminalization, which may have contributed to the forced voluntary return spectrum 
explored in this dissertation. The literature on deportation and voluntary return, situated 
at the two ends of the spectrum of forced voluntary return, complicated these end-points 
as not only events, but also as evolving processes (Cassarino, 2004; Coutin, 2015). 
Finally, the literature was related to the Canadian settler-colonial context to better 
contextualized the site of research for this dissertation. Drawing on these bodies of 
literature, and offering feminist analyses through the theoretical frameworks chosen 
enabled me to conceptualize Forced Voluntary Return in nuanced ways that may further 
contribute to discussions within the fields of critical border studies and deportation 
studies.  
Limitations 
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This dissertation research had some limitations, as identified in the chapter on 
research methods (chapter 1). My sample size of migrants who engaged in forced 
voluntary return was relatively small and tied to a particular organization. The specific 
reasons for this, as outlined in chapter 1, included the difficulty in reaching this 
population, their vulnerability, and the limited amount of time they may have had to talk 
about their experience before engaging in FVR. Additionally, frontline workers who I 
interviewed were purposefully selected to deepen and extend my knowledge of the issues 
related to forced voluntary return. Speaking to service providers, including lawyers, 
settlement workers and a doctor, from across Toronto with different clients from various 
countries of origin, socio-economic status and immigration status provided a breadth of 
knowledge about their experiences assisting migrants, as well as about the migrants 
themselves. While service providers brought their personal perspectives about migrants’ 
experiences, they were also able to reflect more broadly on multiple cases in addition to 
individual experiences. Their diverse experiences and perspectives enriched my 
knowledge of forced voluntary return.  
Implications for Future Research 
   Limited research investigates migrant return from a perspective that complicates 
the in/voluntary binary to include experiences on the spectrum between the two. 
Comparative experiences to that of Toronto in other geographical and social contexts, as 
well as from the perspectives of migrants located in different phases of migration may 
offer a deeper understanding of motivating factors for forced voluntary return. Moreover, 
this dissertation explored gendered experiences primarily within female/male binaries 
with no nuance for the experiences of migrants who identify their gender differently. 
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Further research could focus on the FVR experiences of trans and gender non-binary 
migrants.  
 Finally, while this research offered an analysis of the ways migrants in Toronto 
experienced criminalizing exclusion and loss of hope under a near-decade of 
Conservative rule in Canada, these experiences may vary under different governmental 
regimes. Increasing an understanding about how different political landscapes, policy 
directives and civilian soldier engagements may impact forced voluntary return can add 
to understandings of the return spectrum and draw out commonalities to better understand 
and support the experience. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Guide for Migrants 
Interview Questions: 
Researcher: Tanya Aberman 
Participants: Uprooted Torontonians with various forms of precarious immigration status 
(or no status), who have decided to ‘self-deport’ or remain in Canada. 
Note: Some changes and addition to these proposed questions will occur during and 
between the interviews. 
Demographic Questions 
-     Gender 
- Age 
- Country of origin 
- Race/Ethnicity/Cultural background 
- Education 
- Employment/income 
- Number of people in the household 
 
1. Questions about the experiences before migration 
1. Can you tell me about your life before you came to Canada? 
2. Did you have a job? If so what kind of job? If not, how did you support yourself? 
3. Did you go to school? 
4. Can you tell me about your family? 
5. Can you tell me about your community? 
6. Where were you living? What were the living conditions like? 
 
2. Questions about the experiences of migration 
1. When did you decide to come to Canada? Can you tell me about that decision? 
2. How did you come to Canada? 
3. Who did you come with (relatives/broker)? 
4. How long did it take you to migrate? 
5. How did you feel about coming to Canada? 
6. Can you describe your arrival in Canada? 
7. Can you tell me about your experiences with Canada Border Services Agency 
officials when you arrived? Was it difficult for you to enter? In what ways? 
8. How do you feel about CBSA? 
9. Did you make any immigration applications when you first arrived? 
10. Have you made any applications since? Which ones? When? Did you have help?  
11. Why did you make those applications? Can you tell me about your experiences 
making these applications? 
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12. Did anyone help you to make them? 
13. Where they accepted? 
14. Do you intend to make more applications in the future? If so, which ones and why? 
 
3. Questions about experiences in Canada 
1. Can you tell me about your experience living in Canada? 
2. How has your lifestyle changed since you arrived in Canada? What have been the 
biggest changes? 
3. How long have you lived in Canada? 
4. Have you made many friends? Where have you made friends primarily? Do you have 
family here? Do you feel supported? 
5. Are you working? If so, what kind of work? If not, by what means are you supporting 
yourself? 
6. How do you feel about your employment situation in Canada? 
7. Do you feel hopeful for your future in Canada? Why/Why not? 
8. Can you tell me about any groups or organizations you may have become involved 
with in Canada? What has your involvement consisted of? Do you enjoy it? 
9. Have you ever needed to see a doctor in Canada? Can you tell me about that/those 
experience(s)? 
10. Can you tell me abut any experiences you have had with the school system in Canada 
for high school/university? 
11. Can you tell me about how you feel about the idea of going home? 
12. Has Immigration Canada ever asked you to leave? If they did, would you? Why/Why 
not? 
13. Have you been offered the Assisted Voluntary Return and Resettlement Program? If 
so, can you tell me about that experience? Did you accept it? 
14. Are you aware that Toronto is a sanctuary city? How did you become aware? 
15. What does that mean to you?  
16. Have you been able to access city services? 
17. Does it make a difference for you? Does it affect your decision? 
 
Planning to return: 
Why are you planning to return? (health, school, job, family...) 
What would you be going back to? 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide for Service Providers 
Interview Questions: 
Researcher: Tanya Aberman 
Participants: Settlement Workers who work with Uprooted Torontonians with various 
forms of precarious immigration status (or no status), who have decided to ‘self-deport’ 
or remain in Canada. 
Note: Some changes and addition to these proposed questions will occur during and 
between the interviews. 
 
Demographic Questions 
-     Organization 
1. How long have you been working in the immigration sector? 
2. How long have you been working in this particular organization? 
 
Questions about community served 
3. What community would you say that you primarily serves? 
4. Is there a catchment area formally or informally? If so can you tell me about it? 
(size, diversity, socio-economic status) 
5. Have your clients generally been in Canada for some time or are they primarily 
new to the country? 
6. Can you tell me about the immigration applications that they primarily make? 
Which do you spend the most time working on?  
7. Can you tell me abut your experiences working on these applications? 
8. Do you have a sense of the rates of acceptance? 
9. Can you tell me about how your clients chose to make their applications?  
10. Do people make applications that have little chance of being accepted? 
11. Are your clients generally employed? In school? On social assistance? 
12. Do your clients generally access other organizations for services? If so which 
ones?  
13. Do your clients generally have community support or are they generally fairly 
isolated? 
 
Questions about Immigration Policies 
14. Considering all the changes in the last few years, have you found it challenging to 
keep up? 
15. Can you tell me about how the immigration changes have affected your work? 
16. Can you tell me about how the changes have affected your clients? 
17. Which changes would you say have had the most impact, why? How? 
18. Have you noticed a difference because of the changes to health coverage for 
refugees?  
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19. The shortened refugee process?  
20. Bans on H&C?  
21. Bans on PRRA?  
22. What have clients expressed to be their main obstacles and frustrations? 
23. Have you worked with clients in detention? 
24. Does their experience of the process seem very different? Are their many more 
challenges? 
25. Have clients said that being in detention affects their choices with regards to 
immigration processes? 
 
Questions about other obstacles 
26. Can you tell me about other barriers affecting your clients? Can you elaborate? 
27. Have your clients talked to you about facing discrimination or racism? 
28. What overall view of Canada have they expressed to you?   
29. Have you heard of the concept of self-deportation? 
30. Have you had clients come to you to talk or ask about going home? 
31. About how many? 
32. Did they say why they wanted to go home? Can you tell me about it? 
33. What emotions/influences speed up or slowdown that decision? 
34. How do their emotions/outlook change once they make that decision? What 
impact does it have? 
35. Have you noticed an increase or decrease in terms of the number of people 
wanting to go home? 
36. Are you familiar with the AVRR? 
37. What was your experience with the AVRR? 
38.  Did you have many clients who used the AVRR? How many would you say? 
39. Did clients initially ask you about the AVRR or were they informed by CBSA? 
40. Did the clients benefit from the program? 
41. Are you familiar with Toronto’s Sanctuary City Policy? 
42. How do you feel about the policy? 
43. How does the policy impact your clients? Have you seen any impacts? 
44.  Would you say that your clients are generally hopeful for their future in Canada? 
Why/why not?                                                                                                                                                                              
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Appendix C: Informed Consent Form 
Informed Consent Form 
Study name: Self-Deportation in a Sanctuary City: Experiences of Precarious Status 
in Toronto:  
Researcher: Tanya Aberman (Doctoral Candidate, Graduate Program in Gender, 
Feminist and Women’s Studies, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada)   
Purpose of the research: to investigate the ways 'self-deportation" is encouraged in 
current Canadian immigration policies and the intersectional impacts this has had on 
uprooted people. 
What you will be asked to do in the research: is to share your experiences and 
interactions 1) with the Canadian immigration system and the Assisted Voluntary Return 
and Reintegration Program (if applicable) and 2) your reasons behind staying in Canada 
or leaving. The interview that I will be conducting with you will be of approximately one 
hour (or a maximum of two hours). 
Risks and discomforts: Some of the topics we discuss may be difficult or upsetting. You 
may pause or stop the conversation at any time, or choose not to discuss certain things at 
any time in the interview. I have knowledge of and can provide suggestions of various 
support services that are available in the area or region where you are located if you feel 
they would be beneficial. 
Benefits of the research and benefits to you: Your answers will enable you to share 
your valuable thoughts and ideas about the current Canadian Immigration system and its 
impacts on people’s lives. It will increase knowledge about why people stay or leave, and 
be used to recommend changes to immigration policies. The results of this study will be 
shared with the aspiration that it could be useful for information/advocacy by settlement 
agencies and uprooted people. 
Voluntary participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and 
you may choose to stop participating at any time. Your decision not to be interviewed 
will not influence the relationship you may have with the researcher or study staff or the 
nature of your relationship with York University either now, or in the future. 
Withdrawal from the study: You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any 
reason, if you so decide. Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer 
particular questions, will not affect your relationship with the researcher, York University, 
or any other group associated with this project. In the event you withdraw from the study, 
all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed wherever possible.  
Confidentiality: The interview will be recorded to ensure that your words are 
remembered accurately. The recording will be done on a password-protected device and 
kept in strict confidence. All recordings and transcriptions will be securely stored, using 
encryption software, on my password-protected computer until the completion of my 
dissertation oral defense (August 2016).  After my degree is completed, data will be 
permanently removed from my computer and archived in an external hard drive that will 
		 230	
be kept under lock and key in a filing cabinet in my home office for a period of three 
years. Only a made up name for each participant will appear in the final transcripts of the 
interviews; your real name will not be identified in any written account of the 
research. While aspects of the interview data will be included in the dissertation and may 
be published, your identity will always be kept in confidence and will not be shared 
with anyone. Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law. 
 
Questions about the research? This research has been reviewed and approved by the 
Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University’s Ethics Review Board and 
conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics guidelines. If you 
have any questions about this process, or about your rights as a participant in the study, 
please feel free to contact the Office of Research Ethics. 
 
I,      , consent to participate in “Self-Deportation in a 
Sanctuary City: ” conducted by Tanya Aberman. I have understood the nature of this 
project and wish to participate.  
 
Signature  ____________________   Date     
Participant  
 
Signature ________________    Date     
Principal Investigator 
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Obtaining Informed Consent through Oral Consent 
 
 Due to the precarious immigration status of many of the participants involved in 
my research, written consent may not be possible. Uprooted people may not be willing to 
identify themselves in writing, since their presence in Canada may not be legally 
recognized or may be precarious. In order to ensure increased anonymity and 
accommodate participation for people in these precarious situations, oral consent will be 
requested. The same consent form will be shared with these participants, which can be 
read orally or by the participant, and each will be asked to consent verbally before the 
interview begins. As a result, no written record of the participant’s identity will be 
created.  
 
 
 
 
 
 	
 
 
